Publications

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International nuclear safeguards are technical measures implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify the correctness and completeness of declarations made by States about their nuclear activities. The systems used to verify such activities include electronic and digital hardware and software components capable of data collection, processing, analysis, storage and transmission. Despite increasing efforts to protect digital systems against unauthorized access or attack through cybersecurity measures, these systems are not immune to cyber exploitation that could compromise their integrity or reliability. Previous versions of these systems did not include capabilities that exist today, such as BluetoothTM and GPS. The inclusion of these new capabilities, as well as new data processing and storage mechanisms, adds new attack vectors and opportunities for adversaries to exploit the devices that did not previously exist. As mentioned in the above referenced Cybersecurity for Safeguards study, cyber-domain vulnerabilities present risks to the equipment used to perform the international nuclear safeguards mission. The IAEA has produced guidance on the protection of nuclear facilities and their computer systems against cyber threats, but these documents do not specifically address the risks to safeguards or safeguards equipment. In response, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Safeguards/Safeguards Technology Development (NA-241) sponsored Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia, SNL) and the Idaho National Laboratory (Idaho, INL) to conduct a one-year study to evaluate cyber related vulnerabilities in safeguards equipment and develop recommendations for the mitigation of any identified risks.

The burnup of an HEU fueled dynamically operated research reactor, the Oak Ridge Research Reactor, was experimentally reconstructed using two different analytic methodologies and a suite of signature isotopes to evaluate techniques for estimating burnup for research reactor fuel. The methods studied include using individual signature isotopes and the complete mass spectrometry spectrum to recover the sample’s burnup. The individual, or sets of, isotopes include ¹⁴⁸Nd, ¹³⁷Cs+¹³⁷Ba, ¹³⁹La, and ¹⁴⁵Nd+¹⁴⁶Nd. The storage documentation from the analyzed fuel material provided two different measures of burnup: burnup percentage and the total power generated from the assembly in MWd. When normalized to conventional units, these two references differed by 7.8% (395.42GWd/MTHM and 426.27GWd/MTHM) in the resulting burnup for the spent fuel element used in the benchmark. Among all methods being evaluated, the results were within 11.3% of either reference burnup. The results were mixed in closeness to both reference burnups; however, consistent results were achieved from all three experimental samples.

Detecting the presence of radioactive sources, preventing the illicit use of radiological materials, supporting arms control treaties, responding to accidental radiation releases, and disposing of radioactive sources safely and securely are common concerns in the Middle East. The Radiation Measurements Cross Calibration (RMCC) project aims to improve radiation measurement capabilities across the region and establish common standards. The RMCC project has been an ongoing initiative for the last twelve years. Its goal is to build core competencies in radioanalysis in the Middle East by facilitating the exchange of expertise and fostering dialogue to improve methods and strengthen a growing network. This year the Middle East Scientific Institute for Security (MESIS) in Amman, Jordan assumed leadership of the RMCC.

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The fidelity of the forward model within a spent fuel forensic analysis system was improved by using two unique methodologies. The first consisted of developing a system to create accurate one-group neutron cross-section libraries for any user specified reactor system. In such, a detailed model is developed using the depletion code MONTEBURNS. During MONTEBURNS execution, cross-section libraries are generated at every user specified burnup step in time. These libraries could be developed for many reactor systems, then housed in a database and used for analyzing unknown fuel samples. The forensic analysis system for spent fuel resulted in higher accuracy at predicting the initial uranium isotopic compositions and burnup from spent fuel samples. Using this method, the error in results was reduced from the order of 1-6% down to less than 1% when recovering a fuel sample's burnup and initial uranium isotopic composition. The second method consisted of implementing 2D/3D reactor depletion codes as the forward model within the system's framework. This method would allow the usage of potentially recoverable geometric information from an unknown sample. No predetermined cross-section library is required for the system using this method, therefore potentially reducing model error associated with the neutron flux spectrum. The accuracy of the recovered initial uranium isotopic compositions and burnup from spent fuel samples was also improved using this method, even more so than the first. For MTR reactors, the error using this method was significantly reduced and was driven to below 0.5%. However, additional research may be required to determine the ideal fission yield and recoverable energy per fission for cases where significant amounts of 239 PU are bred and burned throughout the life of the fuel.

An improved system was developed to recover the initial parameters and operating conditions from spent nuclear fuel. This work is an expansion of a previous proof-of-concept system developed by the author. The improved system increases the fidelity of the forward model within the spent fuel forensic inverse analysis using two unique methodologies. The first improvement consists of developing a system to accurately create one-group neutron crosssection libraries for any user-specified reactor system. As such, a detailed model using the depletion code MONTEBURNS is developed. During MONTEBURNS execution, cross-section libraries are generated at every user specified burnup step in time. These libraries could be developed for many reactor systems, then housed in a database and used for analyzing spent fuel.

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As global nuclear energy expands, assuring peaceful uses of nuclear technology becomes increasingly important. In addition to complying with international nuclear safeguards, a responsible nuclear energy program promotes a corresponding safeguards culture. Establishment of transparent peaceful uses of nuclear technologies starts with cooperative international engagements and safeguards systems. Developing states investing in nuclear energy must assure the international community of their longterm commitment to safeguards, safety, and security (3S) of nuclear materials and technologies. Cultivating a safeguards culture starts in the initial phases of infrastructure planning and must be integrated into the process of developing a responsible nuclear energy program. Sandia National Laboratories supports the implementation of safeguards culture through a variety of activities, including infrastructure development.

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