Publications

Results 1–25 of 49
Skip to search filters

Data-driven agent-based modeling, with application to rooftop solar adoption

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Zhang, Haifeng; Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy V.; Letchford, Joshua L.; Lakkaraju, Kiran L.

Agent-based modeling is commonly used for studying complex system properties emergent from interactions among many agents. We present a novel data-driven agent-based modeling framework applied to forecasting individual and aggregate residential rooftop solar adoption in San Diego county. Our first step is to learn a model of individual agent behavior from combined data of individual adoption characteristics and property assessment. We then construct an agent-based simulation with the learned model embedded in artificial agents, and proceed to validate it using a holdout sequence of collective adoption decisions. We demonstrate that the resulting agent-based model successfully forecasts solar adoption trends and provides a meaningful quantification of uncertainty about its predictions. We utilize our model to optimize two classes of policies aimed at spurring solar adoption: one that subsidizes the cost of adoption, and another that gives away free systems to low-income house-holds. We find that the optimal policies derived for the latter class are significantly more efficacious, whereas the policies similar to the current California Solar Initiative incentive scheme appear to have a limited impact on overall adoption trends.

More Details
TYPE Conference Poster YEAR 2015
ScopusOSTIDOI

Optimal interdiction of attack plans

12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013

Letchford, Joshua; Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy V.

We present a Stackelberg game model of security in which the defender chooses a mitigation strategy that interdicts potential attack actions, and the attacker responds by computing an optimal attack plan that circumvents the deployed mitigations. First, we offer a general formulation for deterministic plan interdiction as a mixed-integer program, and use constraint generation to compute optimal solutions, leveraging state-of-the-art partial satisfaction planning techniques. We also present a greedy heuristic for this problem, and compare its performance with the optimal MILP-based approach. We then extend our framework to incorporate uncertainty about attacker's capabilities, costs, goals, and action execution uncertainty, and show that these extensions retain the basic structure of the deterministic plan interdiction problem. Introduction of more general models of planning uncertainty require us to model the attacker's problem as a general MDP, and demonstrate that the MDP interdiction problem can still be solved using the basic constraint generation framework. Copyright © 2013, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.

More Details
TYPE Conference YEAR 2013
ScopusOSTI

Security games with surveillance cost and optimal timing of attack execution

12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013

An, Bo; Brown, Matthew; Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy V.; Tambe, Milind

Stackelberg games have been used in several deployed applications to allocate limited resources for critical infrastructure protection. These resource allocation strategies are randomized to prevent a strategic attacker from using surveillance to learn and exploit patterns in the allocation. Past work has typically assumed that the attacker has perfect knowledge of the defender's randomized strategy or can learn the defender's strategy after conducting a fixed period of surveillance. In consideration of surveillance cost, these assumptions are clearly simplistic since attackers may act with partial knowledge of the defender's strategies and may dynamically decide whether to attack or conduct more surveillance. In this paper, we propose a natural model of limited surveillance in which the attacker dynamically determine a place to stop surveillance in consideration of his updated belief based on observed actions and surveillance cost. We show an upper bound on the maximum number of observations the attacker can make and show that the attacker's optimal stopping problem can be formulated as a finite state space MDP. We give mathematical programs to compute optimal attacker and defender strategies. We compare our approaches with the best known previous solutions and experimental results show that the defender can achieve significant improvement in expected utility by taking the attacker's optimal stopping decision into account, validating the motivation of our work. Copyright © 2013, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.

More Details
TYPE Conference YEAR 2013
ScopusOSTI

Computing Stackelberg equilibria in discounted stochastic games

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy V.; Singh, Satinder

Stackelberg games increasingly influence security policies deployed in real-world settings. Much of the work to date focuses on devising a fixed randomized strategy for the defender, accounting for an attacker who optimally responds to it. In practice, defense policies are often subject to constraints and vary over time, allowing an attacker to infer characteristics of future policies based on current observations. A defender must therefore account for an attacker's observation capabilities in devising a security policy. We show that this general modeling framework can be captured using stochastic Stackelberg games (SSGs), where a defender commits to a dynamic policy to which the attacker devises an optimal dynamic response. We then offer the following contributions. 1) We show that Markov stationary policies suffice in SSGs, 2) present a finite-time mixed-integer non-linear program for computing a Stackelberg equilibrium in SSGs, and 3) present a mixed-integer linear program to approximate it. 4) We illustrate our algorithms on a simple SSG representing an adversarial patrolling scenario, where we study the impact of attacker patience and risk aversion on optimal defense policies. Copyright © 2012, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence. All rights reserved.

More Details
TYPE Conference YEAR 2012
ScopusOSTI
Results 1–25 of 49
Results 1–25 of 49