This Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) fulfills all quarterly reporting requirements set forth in the Compliance Order on Consent. Sections included are the Environmental Restoration Consolidated Report, the Perchlorate Screening Quarterly Groundwater Monitoring Report, and the Technical Area-V in-Situ Bioremediation Treatability Study Full Scale Operation Results.
This Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) fulfills all quarterly reporting requirements set forth in the Compliance Order on Consent. Table I-1 lists the six sites remaining in the corrective action process. This edition of the ER Quarterly Report does not include Section II "Perchlorate Screening Quarterly Groundwater Monitoring Report" because no groundwater samples were analyzed for perchlorate during this reporting period. Additionally, Section III is not included in this edition of the ER Quarterly Report because there is no detailed Technical Area-V Groundwater information to present.
This Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) fulfills all quarterly reporting requirements set forth in the Compliance Order on Consent. Table 1-2 lists the 12 sites in the corrective action process. This ER Quarterly Report presents activities and data as follows: SECTION I: Environmental Restoration Operations Consolidated Quarterly Report, April — June 2018. SECTION II: Perchlorate Screening Quarterly Groundwater Monitoring Report, April — June 2018. SECTION III: Technical Area (TA)-V In-Situ Bioremediation Treatability Study Pilot Test Results.
This Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report provides the status of ongoing corrective action activities being implemented at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) during the January, February, and March 2018 quarterly reporting period.
This Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) fulfills all quarterly reporting requirements set forth in the Compliance Order on Consent.
This Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) fulfills all quarterly reporting requirements set forth in the Compliance Order on Consent. The 12 sites in the corrective action process are listed in Table I-1. This ER Quarterly Report presents activities and data.
Cochran, John R.; Bennett, David G.; Degnan, Paul; Grout, Chris; Liebenberg, Gert; Little, Richard; Ramsey, Jack; Van Blerk, Japie; Van Marcke, Philippe
This Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) provides the status of ongoing corrective action activities being implemented at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) during the April, May, and June 2017 quarterly reporting period. Table I-1 lists the Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) identified for corrective action at SNL/NM. Sections I.2.1 and I.2.2 summarize the work completed during this quarter. Section I.2.1 summarizes the quarterly activities at sites undergoing corrective action field activities. Field activities are conducted at the three groundwater AOCs (Burn Site Groundwater [BSG AOC], Technical Area [TA]-V Groundwater [TAVG AOC], and Tijeras Arroyo Groundwater [TAG AOC]). Section I.2.2 summarizes quarterly activities at sites where the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) Hazardous Waste Bureau (HWB) issued a certificate of completion and the sites are in the corrective action complete (CAC) regulatory process. Currently, SWMUs 8 and 58, 68, 149, 154, and 502 are in the CAC regulatory process. Corrective action activities are deferred at the Long Sled Track (SWMU 83), the Gun Facilities (SWMU 84), and the Short Sled Track (SWMU 240) because these three sites are active mission facilities. These three active mission sites are located in TA-III.
This Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) provides the status of ongoing corrective action activities being implemented at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) during the January, February, and March 2017 quarterly reporting period. Table I-1 lists the Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) identified for corrective action at SNL/NM. Sections I.2.1 and I.2.2 summarize the work completed during this quarter. Section I.2.1 summarizes the quarterly activities at sites undergoing corrective action field activities. Field activities are conducted at the three groundwater AOCs (Burn Site Groundwater [BSG AOC], Technical Area [TA]-V Groundwater [TAVG AOC], and Tijeras Arroyo Groundwater [TAG AOC]). Section I.2.2 summarizes quarterly activities at sites where the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) Hazardous Waste Bureau (HWB) issued a certificate of completion and the sites are in the corrective action complete (CAC) regulatory process. Currently, SWMUs 8 and 58, 68, 149, 154, and 502 are in the CAC regulatory process. Corrective action activities are deferred at the Long Sled Track (SWMU 83), the Gun Facilities (SWMU 84), and the Short Sled Track (SWMU 240) because these three sites are active mission facilities. These three active mission sites are located in TA-III. This Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) fulfills all quarterly reporting requirements set forth in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Facility Operating Permit and the Compliance Order on Consent.
This Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) fulfills all quarterly reporting requirements set forth in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Facility Operating Permit and the Compliance Order on Consent. The 12 sites in the corrective action process are listed in Table I-1.
This Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) provides the status of ongoing corrective action activities being implemented at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) during the July, August, and September 2016 quarterly reporting period. The Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) identified for corrective action at SNL/NM are listed in Table I-1. Sections I.2.1 and I.2.2 summarize the work completed during this quarter. Section I.2.1 summarizes the quarterly activities at sites undergoing corrective action field activities. Field activities are conducted at the three groundwater AOCs (Burn Site Groundwater [BSG AOC], Technical Area [TA]-V Groundwater [TAVG AOC], and Tijeras Arroyo Groundwater [TAG AOC]). Section I.2.2 summarizes quarterly activities at sites where the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) issued a certificate of completion and the sites are in the corrective action complete (CAC) regulatory process. Currently, SWMUs 8 and 58, 68, 149, 154, and 502 are in the CAC regulatory process. Corrective action activities are deferred at the Long Sled Track (SWMU 83), the Gun Facilities (SWMU 84), and the Short Sled Track (SWMU 240) because these three sites are active mission facilities. These three active sites are located in TA-III.
This Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) provides the status of ongoing corrective action activities being implemented by Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) for the April, May, and June 2016 quarterly reporting period.
This Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) fulfills all quarterly reporting requirements set forth in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Facility Operating Permit, and the Compliance Order on Consent. The 13 sites in the corrective action process are listed in Table I-1. This ER Quarterly Report presents activities and data in sections as follows: SECTION I: Environmental Restoration Operations Consolidated Quarterly Report, January – March 2016. Semiannual sampling at the Burn Site Groundwater Area of Concern currently includes perchlorate analyses at one groundwater monitoring well. Due to the semiannual nature of the sampling, no groundwater samples were collected for perchlorate analyses during this reporting period. Therefore, this edition of the ER Quarterly Report does not include Section II “Perchlorate Screening Quarterly Groundwater Monitoring Report.”
This Environmental Restoration Operations Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) provides the status of ongoing corrective action activities being implemented by Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) for the October, November, and December 2015 quarterly reporting period.
This Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) fulfills all quarterly reporting requirements set forth in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Facility Operating Permit, and the Compliance Order on Consent.
This Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) provides the status of ongoing corrective action activities being implemented by Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) for the July, August, and September 2015 quarterly reporting period. The Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) identified for corrective action at SNL/NM are listed in Table I-1. The work completed during this quarter is reported below in Sections I.2.1 and I.2.2. Section I.2.1 summarizes the quarterly activities at sites undergoing corrective action field activities (SWMUs 8 and 58, 68, 149, 154, and 502, and three groundwater AOCs). Section I.2.2 summarizes quarterly activities at sites where the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) has issued a certificate of completion and the site is in the corrective action complete (CAC) regulatory process. Currently, the Mixed Waste Landfill (MWL, SWMU 76) is the only site in the CAC regulatory process. Corrective action activities have been deferred at the Long Sled Track (SWMU 83), the Gun Facilities (SWMU 84), and the Short Sled Track (SWMU 240) because these are active mission facilities.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has embarked on the Deep Borehole Field Test (DBFT), which will investigate whether conditions suitable for disposal of radioactive waste can be found at a depth of up to 5 km in the earth’s crust. As planned, the DBFT will demonstrate drilling and construction of two boreholes, one for initial scientific characterization, and the other at a larger diameter such as could be appropriate for waste disposal (the DBFT will not involve radioactive waste). A wide range of geoscience activities is planned for the Characterization Borehole, and an engineering demonstration of test package emplacement and retrieval is planned for the larger Field Test Borehole. Characterization activities will focus on measurements and samples that are important for evaluating the long-term isolation capability of the Deep Borehole Disposal (DBD) concept. Engineering demonstration activities will focus on providing data to evaluate the concept’s operational safety and practicality. Procurement of a scientifically acceptable DBFT site and a site management contractor is now underway. The concept of deep borehole disposal (DBD) for radioactive wastes is not new. It was considered by the National Academy of Science (NAS 1957) for liquid waste, studied in the 1980’s in the U.S. (Woodward–Clyde 1983), and has been evaluated by European waste disposal R&D programs in the past few decades (for example, Grundfelt and Crawford 2014; Grundfelt 2010). Deep injection of wastewater including hazardous wastes is ongoing in the U.S. and regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 2001). The DBFT is being conducted with a view to use the DBD concept for future disposal of smaller-quantity, DOE-managed wastes from nuclear weapons production (i.e., Cs/Sr capsules and granular solid wastes). However, the concept may also have broader applicability for nations that have a need to dispose of limited amounts of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors. For such nations the cost for disposing of volumetrically limited waste streams could be lower than mined geologic repositories.
Traditional methods cannot be used to handle and emplace radioactive wastes in boreholes up to 16,400 feet (5 km) deep for disposal. This paper describes three systems that can be used for handling and emplacing waste packages in deep borehole: (1) a 2011 reference design that is based on a previous study by Woodward–Clyde in 1983 in which waste packages are assembled into “strings” and lowered using drill pipe; (2) an updated version of the 2011 reference design; and (3) a new concept in which individual waste packages would be lowered to depth using a wireline. Emplacement on coiled tubing was also considered, but not developed in detail. The systems described here are currently designed for U.S. Department of Energy-owned high-level waste (HLW) including the Cesium- 137/Strontium-90 capsules from the Hanford Facility and bulk granular HLW from fuel processing in Idaho.
This memo describes rough-order-of-magnitude (ROM) cost estimates for a set of off-normal (accident) scenarios, as defined for two waste package emplacement method options for deep borehole disposal: drill-string and wireline. It summarizes the different scenarios and the assumptions made for each, with respect to fishing, decontamination, remediation, etc.
This Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) fulfills all quarterly reporting requirements set forth in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Facility Operating Permit, and the Compliance Order on Consent.
This report presents conceptual design information for a system to handle and emplace packages containing radioactive waste, in boreholes 16,400 ft deep or possibly deeper. Its intended use is for a design selection study that compares the costs and risks associated with two emplacement methods: drill-string and wireline emplacement. The deep borehole disposal (DBD) concept calls for siting a borehole (or array of boreholes) that penetrate crystalline basement rock to a depth below surface of about 16,400 ft (5 km). Waste packages would be emplaced in the lower 6,560 ft (2 km) of the borehole, with sealing of appropriate portions of the upper 9,840 ft (3 km). A deep borehole field test (DBFT) is planned to test and refine the DBD concept. The DBFT is a scientific and engineering experiment, conducted at full-scale, in-situ, without radioactive waste. Waste handling operations are conceptualized to begin with the onsite receipt of a purpose-built Type B shipping cask, that contains a waste package. Emplacement operations begin when the cask is upended over the borehole, locked to a receiving flange or collar. The scope of emplacement includes activities to lower waste packages to total depth, and to retrieve them back to the surface when necessary for any reason. This report describes three concepts for the handling and emplacement of the waste packages: 1) a concept proposed by Woodward-Clyde Consultants in 1983; 2) an updated version of the 1983 concept developed for the DBFT; and 3) a new concept in which individual waste packages would be lowered to depth using a wireline. The systems described here could be adapted to different waste forms, but for design of waste packaging, handling, and emplacement systems the reference waste forms are DOE-owned high- level waste including Cs/Sr capsules and bulk granular HLW from fuel processing.
This Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) fulfills all quarterly reporting requirements set forth in the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) Module of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit, and the Compliance Order on Consent. The 33 sites in the Corrective Action regulatory process are listed in Table I-1. The 33 sites consist of 25 Solid Waste Management Units and 8 Areas of Concern (AOCs). A summary of post-closure care activities performed in accordance with the Chemical Waste Landfill Post-Closure Care Permit is also included in this document. The Burn Site Groundwater and Technical Area V Groundwater AOCs are not included on the current HSWA Permit, but have been added as AOCs to the revised Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, which is pending approval by the New Mexico Environment Department at this time, and are included within this Consolidated Quarterly Report for completeness. Suspect waste includes radionuclides, metals, organic compounds, and explosives.
This Environmental Restoration Operations (ER) Consolidated Quarterly Report (ER Quarterly Report) provides the status of ongoing corrective actions and related Long- Term Stewardship (LTS) activities being implemented by Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) ER for the April, May, and June 2014 quarterly reporting period. Section 2.0 provides the status of ER Operations activities including closure activities for the Mixed Waste Landfill (MWL), project management and site closure, and hydrogeologic characterizations. Section 3.0 provides the status of LTS activities that relate to the Chemical Waste Landfill (CWL) and the associated Corrective Action Management Unit (CAMU). Section 4.0 provides the references noted in Section I of this report.
The Radiation Protection Center of the Iraqi Ministry of Environment is developing a groundwater monitoring program (GMP) for the Al-Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center located near Baghdad, Iraq. The Al-Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center was established in about 1960 and is currently being cleaned-up and decommissioned by Iraqs Ministry of Science and Technology. This Groundwater Monitoring Program Plan (GMPP) and Conceptual Site Model (CSM) support the Radiation Protection Center by providing: A CSM describing the hydrogeologic regime and contaminant issues, recommendations for future groundwater characterization activities, and descriptions of the organizational elements of a groundwater monitoring program. The Conceptual Site Model identifies a number of potential sources of groundwater contamination at Al-Tuwaitha. The model also identifies two water-bearing zones (a shallow groundwater zone and a regional aquifer). The depth to the shallow groundwater zone varies from approximately 7 to 10 meters (m) across the facility. The shallow groundwater zone is composed of a layer of silty sand and fine sand that does not extend laterally across the entire facility. An approximately 4-m thick layer of clay underlies the shallow groundwater zone. The depth to the regional aquifer varies from approximately 14 to 17 m across the facility. The regional aquifer is composed of interfingering layers of silty sand, fine-grained sand, and medium-grained sand. Based on the limited analyses described in this report, there is no severe contamination of the groundwater at Al-Tuwaitha with radioactive constituents. However, significant data gaps exist and this plan recommends the installation of additional groundwater monitoring wells and conducting additional types of radiological and chemical analyses.
Because of past military operations, lack of upkeep and looting there are now enormous radioactive waste problems in Iraq. These waste problems include destroyed nuclear facilities, uncharacterized radioactive wastes, liquid radioactive waste in underground tanks, wastes related to the production of yellow cake, sealed radioactive sources, activated metals and contaminated metals that must be constantly guarded. Iraq currently lacks the trained personnel, regulatory and physical infrastructure to safely and securely manage these facilities and wastes. In 2005 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed to organize an international cooperative program to assist Iraq with these issues. Soon after, the Iraq Nuclear Facility Dismantlement and Disposal Program (the NDs Program) was initiated by the U.S. Department of State (DOS) to support the IAEA and assist the Government of Iraq (GOI) in eliminating the threats from poorly controlled radioactive materials. The Iraq NDs Program is providing support for the IAEA plus training, consultation and limited equipment to the GOI. The GOI owns the problems and will be responsible for implementation of the Iraq NDs Program.
The purpose of this report is to develop a project management plan for maintaining and monitoring liquid radioactive waste tanks at Iraq's Al-Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center. Based on information from several sources, the Al-Tuwaitha site has approximately 30 waste tanks that contain varying amounts of liquid or sludge radioactive waste. All of the tanks have been non-operational for over 20 years and most have limited characterization. The program plan embodied in this document provides guidance on conducting radiological surveys, posting radiation control areas and controlling access, performing tank hazard assessments to remove debris and gain access, and conducting routine tank inspections. This program plan provides general advice on how to sample and characterize tank contents, and how to prioritize tanks for soil sampling and borehole monitoring.
The Al Tuwaitha nuclear complex near Baghdad contains a number of facilities from Saddam Hussan's nuclear weapons program. Past military operations, lack of upkeep and looting have created an enormous radioactive waste problem at the Al Tuwaitha complex, which contains various, uncharacterized radioactive wastes, yellow cake, sealed radioactive sources, and contaminated metals that must be constantly guarded. Iraq has never had a radioactive waste disposal facility and the lack of a disposal facility means that ever increasing quantities of radioactive material must be held in guarded storage. The Iraq Nuclear Facility Dismantlement and Disposal Program (the NDs Program) has been initiated by the U.S. Department of State (DOS) to assist the Government of Iraq (GOI) in eliminating the threats from poorly controlled radioactive materials, while building human capacities so that the GOI can manage other environmental cleanups in their country. The DOS is funding the IAEA to provide technical assistance via Technical Cooperation projects. Program coordination will be provided by the DOS, consistent with GOI policies, and Sandia National Laboratories will be responsible for coordination of participants and waste management support. Texas Tech University will continue to provide in-country assistance, including radioactive waste characterization and the stand-up of the Iraq Nuclear Services Company. The GOI owns the problems in Iraq and will be responsible for implementation of the NDs Program.
Because of past military operations, lack of upkeep and looting there are now enormous radioactive waste problems in Iraq. These waste problems include destroyed nuclear facilities, uncharacterized radioactive wastes, liquid radioactive waste in underground tanks, wastes related to the production of yellow cake, sealed radioactive sources, activated metals and contaminated metals that must be constantly guarded. Iraq currently lacks the trained personnel, regulatory and physical infrastructure to safely and securely manage these facilities and wastes. In 2005 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed to organize an international cooperative program to assist Iraq with these issues. Soon after, the Iraq Nuclear Facility Dismantlement and Disposal Program (the NDs Program) was initiated by the U.S. Department of State (DOS) to support the IAEA and assist the Government of Iraq (GOI) in eliminating the threats from poorly controlled radioactive materials. The Iraq NDs Program is providing support for the IAEA plus training, consultation and limited equipment to the GOI. The GOI owns the problems and will be responsible for implementation of the Iraq NDs Program. Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) is a part of the DOS's team implementing the Iraq NDs Program. This report documents Sandia's support of the Iraq NDs Program, which has developed into three principal work streams: (1) training and technical consultation; (2) introducing Iraqis to modern decommissioning and waste management practices; and (3) supporting the IAEA, as they assist the GOI. Examples of each of these work streams include: (1) presentation of a three-day training workshop on 'Practical Concepts for Safe Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste in Arid Settings;' (2) leading GOI representatives on a tour of two operating low level radioactive waste disposal facilities in the U.S.; and (3) supporting the IAEA's Technical Meeting with the GOI from April 21-25, 2008. As noted in the report, there was significant teaming between the various participants to best help the GOI. On-the-ground progress is the focus of the Iraq NDs Program and much of the work is a transfer of technical and practical skills and knowledge that Sandia uses day-to-day. On-the-ground progress was achieved in July of 2008 when the GOI began the physical cleanup and dismantlement of the Active Metallurgical Testing Laboratory (LAMA) facility at Al Tuwaitha, near Baghdad.
This report summarizes the results of three detailed studies of the physical protection systems for the protection of nuclear materials transport in Japan, with an emphasis on the transportation of mixed oxide fuel materials1. The Japanese infrastructure for transporting nuclear fuel materials is addressed in the first section. The second section of this report presents a summary of baseline data from the open literature on the threats of sabotage and theft during the transport of nuclear fuel materials in Japan. The third section summarizes a review of current International Atomic Energy Agency, Japanese and United States guidelines and regulations concerning the physical protection for the transportation of nuclear fuel materials.
Sandia National Laboratories and the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research, Taiwan have collaborated in a technology transfer program related to low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal in Taiwan. Phase I of this program included regulatory analysis of LLW final disposal, development of LLW disposal performance assessment capabilities, and preliminary performance assessments of two potential disposal sites. Performance objectives were based on regulations in Taiwan and comparisons to those in the United States. Probabilistic performance assessment models were constructed based on limited site data using software including GoldSim, BLT-MS, FEHM, and HELP. These software codes provided the probabilistic framework, container degradation, waste-form leaching, groundwater flow, radionuclide transport, and cover infiltration simulation capabilities in the performance assessment. Preliminary performance assessment analyses were conducted for a near-surface disposal system and a mined cavern disposal system at two representative sites in Taiwan. Results of example calculations indicate peak simulated concentrations to a receptor within a few hundred years of LLW disposal, primarily from highly soluble, non-sorbing radionuclides.
This report is a review of open literature concerning threats including sabotage and theft related to fissile material transport in Japan. It is intended to aid Japanese officials in the development of a design basis threat. This threat includes the external threats of the terrorist, criminal, and extremist, and the insider threats of the disgruntled employee, the employee forced into cooperation via coercion, the psychotic employee, and the criminal employee. Examination of the external terrorist threat considers Japanese demographics, known terrorist groups in Japan, and the international relations of Japan. Demographically, Japan has a relatively homogenous population, both ethnically and religiously. Japan is a relatively peaceful nation, but its history illustrates that it is not immune to terrorism. It has a history of domestic terrorism and the open literature points to the Red Army, Aum Shinrikyo, Chukaku-Ha, and Seikijuku. Japan supports the United States in its war on terrorism and in Iraq, which may make Japan a target for both international and domestic terrorists. Crime appears to remain low in Japan; however sources note that the foreign crime rate is increasing as the number of foreign nationals in the country increases. Antinuclear groups' recent foci have been nuclear reprocessing technology, transportation of MOX fuel, and possible related nuclear proliferation issues. The insider threat is first defined by the threat of the disgruntled employee. This threat can be determined by studying the history of Japan's employment system, where Keiretsu have provided company stability and lifetime employment. Recent economic difficulties and an increase of corporate crime, due to sole reliability on the honor code, have begun to erode employee loyalty.
A radioactive sealed source is any radioactive material that is encased in a capsule designed to prevent leakage or escape of the radioactive material. Radioactive sealed sources are used for a wide variety of applications at hospitals, in manufacturing and research. Typical uses are in portable gauges to measure soil compaction and moisture or to determine physical properties of rocks units in boreholes (well logging). Hospitals and clinics use radioactive sealed sources for teletherapy and brachytherapy. Oil exploration and medicine are the largest users. Accidental mismanagement of radioactive sealed sources each year results in a large number of people receiving very high or even fatal does of ionizing radiation. Deliberate mismanagement is a growing international concern. Sealed sources must be managed and disposed effectively in order to protect human health and the environment. Effective national safety and management infrastructures are prerequisites for efficient and safe transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal. The Integrated Management Program for Radioactive Sealed Sources in Egypt (IMPRSS) is a cooperative development agreement between the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority (EAEA), Egyptian Ministry of Health (MOH), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), the University of New Mexico (UNM), and Agriculture Cooperative Development International (ACDI/VOCA). The EAEA, teaming with SNL, is conducting a Preliminary Safety Assessment (PSA) of an intermediate-depth borehole disposal in thick arid alluvium in Egypt based on experience with the U.S. Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD). Goldsim has been selected for the preliminary disposal system assessment for the Egyptian GCD Study. The results of the PSA will then be used to decide if Egypt desires to implement such a disposal system.
Millions of sealed radioactive sources (SRSs) are being used for a wide variety of beneficial purposes throughout the world. Security experts are now concerned that these beneficial SRSs could be used in a radiological dispersion device to terrorize and disrupt society. The greatest safety and security threat is from those highly radioactive Category 1 and 2 SRSs. Without adequate controls, it may be relatively easy to legally purchase a Category 1 or 2 SRS on the international market under false pretenses. Additionally, during transfer, SRSs are particularly susceptible to theft since the sources are in a shielded and mobile configuration, transportation routes are predictable, and shipments may not be adequately guarded. To determine if government controls on SRS are adequate, this study was commissioned to review the current SRS import and export controls of six countries. Canada, the Russian Federation, and South Africa were selected as the exporting countries, and Egypt, the Philippines, and the United States were selected as importing countries. A detailed review of the controls in each country is presented. The authors found that Canada and Russia are major exporters, and are exporting highly radioactive SRSs without first determining if the recipient is authorized by the receiving country to own and use the SRSs. Available evidence was used to estimate that on average there are tens to possibly hundreds of intercountry transfers of highly radioactive SRSs each day. Based on these and other findings, this reports recommends stronger controls on the export and import of highly radioactive SRSs.
A probabilistic, risk-based performance-assessment methodology has been developed to assist designers, regulators, and stakeholders in the selection, design, and monitoring of long-term covers for contaminated subsurface sites. This report describes the method, the software tools that were developed, and an example that illustrates the probabilistic performance-assessment method using a repository site in Monticello, Utah. At the Monticello site, a long-term cover system is being used to isolate long-lived uranium mill tailings from the biosphere. Computer models were developed to simulate relevant features, events, and processes that include water flux through the cover, source-term release, vadose-zone transport, saturated-zone transport, gas transport, and exposure pathways. The component models were then integrated into a total-system performance-assessment model, and uncertainty distributions of important input parameters were constructed and sampled in a stochastic Monte Carlo analysis. Multiple realizations were simulated using the integrated model to produce cumulative distribution functions of the performance metrics, which were used to assess cover performance for both present- and long-term future conditions. Performance metrics for this study included the water percolation reaching the uranium mill tailings, radon gas flux at the surface, groundwater concentrations, and dose. Results from uncertainty analyses, sensitivity analyses, and alternative design comparisons are presented for each of the performance metrics. The benefits from this methodology include a quantification of uncertainty, the identification of parameters most important to performance (to prioritize site characterization and monitoring activities), and the ability to compare alternative designs using probabilistic evaluations of performance (for cost savings).
In this report we describe the performance of the ALEGRA shock wave physics code on a set of gas dynamic shock reflection problems that have associated experimental pressure data. These reflections cover three distinct regimes of oblique shock reflection in gas dynamics--regular, Mach, and double Mach reflection. For the selected data, the use of an ideal gas equation of state is appropriate, thus simplifying to a considerable degree the task of validating the shock wave computational capability of ALEGRA in the application regime of the experiments. We find good agreement of ALEGRA with reported experimental data for sufficient grid resolution. We discuss the experimental data, the nature and results of the corresponding ALEGRA calculations, and the implications of the presented experiment--calculation comparisons.
A probabilistic, risk-based performance-assessment methodology is being developed to assist designers, regulators, and involved stakeholders in the selection, design, and monitoring of long-term covers for contaminated subsurface sites. This report presents an example of the risk-based performance-assessment method using a repository site in Monticello, Utah. At the Monticello site, a long-term cover system is being used to isolate long-lived uranium mill tailings from the biosphere. Computer models were developed to simulate relevant features, events, and processes that include water flux through the cover, source-term release, vadose-zone transport, saturated-zone transport, gas transport, and exposure pathways. The component models were then integrated into a total-system performance-assessment model, and uncertainty distributions of important input parameters were constructed and sampled in a stochastic Monte Carlo analysis. Multiple realizations were simulated using the integrated model to produce cumulative distribution functions of the performance metrics, which were used to assess cover performance for both present- and long-term future conditions. Performance metrics for this study included the water percolation reaching the uranium mill tailings, radon flux at the surface, groundwater concentrations, and dose. Results of this study can be used to identify engineering and environmental parameters (e.g., liner properties, long-term precipitation, distribution coefficients) that require additional data to reduce uncertainty in the calculations and improve confidence in the model predictions. These results can also be used to evaluate alternative engineering designs and to identify parameters most important to long-term performance.
Liquid, mixed, high-level radioactive waste (HLW) has been stored in 149 single-shell tanks (SSTS) located in tank farms on the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Hanford Site. The DOE is developing technologies to retrieve as much remaining HLW as technically possible prior to physically closing the tank farms. In support of the Hanford Tanks Initiative, Sandia National Laboratories has addressed the requirements for the regulatory closure of the radioactive component of any SST residue that may remain after physical closure. There is significant uncertainty about the end state of each of the 149 SSTS; that is, the nature and amount of wastes remaining in the SSTS after retrieval is uncertain. As a means of proceeding in the face of these uncertainties, this report links possible end-states with associated closure options. Requirements for disposal of HLW and low-level radioactive waste (LLW) are reviewed in detail. Incidental waste, which is radioactive waste produced incidental to the further processing of HLW, is then discussed. If the low activity waste (LAW) fraction from the further processing of HLW is determined to be incidental waste, then DOE can dispose of that incidental waste onsite without a license from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC). The NRC has proposed three Incidental Waste Criteria for determining if a LAW fraction is incidental waste. One of the three Criteria is that the LAW fraction should not exceed the NRC's Class C limits.
This report documents a preliminary evaluation of the ability of the greater confinement disposal boreholes at the Nevada Test Site to provide long-term isolation of radionuclides from the disposal of vitrified byproduct material. The byproduct material is essentially concentrated residue from processing uranium ore that contains a complex mixture of radionuclides, many of which are long-lived and present in concentrations greater than 100,000 picoCuries per gram. This material has been stored in three silos at the fernald Environmental Management Project since the early 1950s and will be vitrified into 6,000 yd{sup 3} (4,580 m{sup 3}) of glass gems prior to disposal. This report documents Sandia National Laboratories` preliminary evaluation for disposal of the byproduct material and includes: the selection of quantitative performance objectives; a conceptual model of the disposal system and the waste; results of the modeling; identified issues, and activities necessary to complete a full performance assessment.
This report documents US Department of Energy (DOE)-funded activities that have adapted the US Navy`s Surface Towed Ordnance Locator System (STOLS) to meet DOE needs for a ``... better, faster, safer and cheaper ...`` system for characterizing inactive hazardous waste sites. These activities were undertaken by Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia), the Naval Research Laboratory, Geo-Centers Inc., New Mexico State University and others under the title of the Magnetometer Towed Array (MTA).
Magnetometers are frequently used to characterize hazardous waste sites. Due to cost and time considerations, data are typically collected on a coarse grid with nodes on 3 to 6 meter (m) centers. Hardware and software are now available which allow the rapid and cost effective collection of information on a much finer sampling grid. In this paper we present and compare total field magnetometery data collected on 3 m centers to total field magnetometery data collected on a grid with centers of 0.5 m or less. We also compare the magnetometery data to time-domain electromagnetic (EM) data collected on a 1 m by 0.2 m grid using the recently introduced Geonics Ltd. EM61 metal detector. All three data sets were collected at an abandoned landfill radioactive Burial Site No. 11 (RB-11) is located on Kirtland Air Force Base near Albuquerque, New Mexico.