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SIGNAL Game Manual

Lakkaraju, Kiran L.; Epifanovskaya, Laura W.; Letchford, Joshua L.; Whetzel, Jonathan H.; Armenta, Mika; Goldblum, Bethany L.; Tibbetts, Jake T.

SIGNAL is a first of its kind experimental wargame developed as part of the Project on Nuclear Gaming (PoNG). In this document we describe the rules and game mechanics associated with the online version of SIGNAL created by team members from the University of California, Berkeley, Sandia National Laboratories, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The game was developed as part of a larger research project to develop the experimental wargaming methodology and explore its use on a model scenario: the impact of various military capabilities on conflict escalation dynamics. We discuss the results of this research in a forthcoming paper that will include this manual as an appendix. It is our hope that this manual will both contribute to our players' understanding of the game prior to play and that it will allow for replication of the SIGNAL game environment for future research purposes. The manual begins by introducing the terminology used throughout the document. It then outlines the technical requirements required to run SIGNAL. The following section provides a description of the map, resources, infrastructure, tokens, and action cards used in the game environment. The manual then describes the user interface including the chat functions, trade mechanism, currency and population counts necessary for players to plan their actions. It then turns to the sequence of player actions in the game describing the signaling, action, and upkeep phases that comprise each round of play. It then outlines the use of diplomacy including alliances with minor states and trade between players. The manual also describes the process for scoring the game and determining the winner. The manual concludes with tips for players to remember as they embark upon playing the game.

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Online games for studying human behavior

Social-Behavioral Modeling for Complex Systems

Lakkaraju, Kiran L.; Epifanovskaya, Laura W.; Stites, Mallory C.; Letchford, Joshua L.; Reinhardt, Jason C.; Whetzel, Jonathan H.

Much has been written on the potential for games to enhance our ability to study complex systems. In this chapter we focus on how we can use games to study national security issues. We reflect on the benefits of using games and the inherent difficulties that we must address. As a means of grounding the discussion, we will present a case study of a retrospective analysis of gaming data.

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Modeling Economic Interdependence in Deterrence Using a Serious Game

Journal on Policy and Complex Systems

Epifanovskaya, Laura W.; Lakkaraju, Kiran L.; Letchford, Joshua L.; Stites, Mallory C.; Reinhardt, Jason C.; Whetzel, Jonathan H.

In order to understand the effect of economic interdependence on conflict and on deterrents to conflict, and to assess the viability of online games as experiments to perform research, an online serious game was used to gather data on economic, political, and military factors in the game setting. These data were operationalized in forms analogous to variables from the real-world Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) dataset. A set of economic predictor variables was analyzed using linear mixed effects regression models in an attempt to discover relationships between the predictor variables and conflict outcomes. Differences between the online game results and results from the real world are discussed.

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Toward a Quantitative Approach to Data Gathering and Analysis for Nuclear Deterrence Policy

Springer Proceedings in Complexity

Epifanovskaya, Laura W.; Lakkaraju, Kiran L.; Letchford, Joshua L.; Stites, Mallory C.; Reinhardt, Jason C.

The doctrine of nuclear deterrence and a belief in its importance underpins many aspects of United States policy; it informs strategic force structures within the military, incentivizes multi-billion-dollar weapon-modernization programs within the Department of Energy, and impacts international alliances with the 29 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The doctrine originally evolved under the stewardship of some of the most impressive minds of the twentieth century, including the physicist and H-bomb designer Herman Kahn, the Nobel Prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling, and the preeminent political scientist and diplomat Henry Kissinger.

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14 Results
14 Results