Publications

Interest in launching payloads through the atmosphere to ever higher velocity is robust. For hundreds of years, guns and rockets have been improved for this purpose until they are now considered to be near to their performance limits. While the potential of electromagnetic technology to increase launch velocity has been known since late in the nineteenth century, it was not until about 1980 that a sustained and large-scale effort was started to exploit it. Electromagnetic launcher technology is restricted here to mean only that technology which establishes both a current density, J, and a magnetic field, B, within a part of the launch package, called the armature, so that J {times} B integrated over the volume of the armature is the launching force. Research and development activity was triggered by the discovery that high velocity can be produced with a simple railgun which uses an arc for its armature. This so called ``plasma-armature railgun`` has been the launcher technology upon which nearly all of the work has focused. Still, a relatively small parallel effort has also been made to explore the potential of electromagnetic launchers which do not use sliding contacts on stationary rails to establish current in the armature. One electromagnetic launcher of this type is called an induction coilgun because armature current is established by electromagnetic induction. In this paper, we first establish terminology which we will use not only to specify requirements for successful endoatmospheric launch but also to compare different launcher types. Then, we summarize the statuses of the railgun and induction coilgun technologies and discuss the issues which must be resolved before either of these launchers can offer substantial advantage for endoatomospheric launch.

To analyze the vulnerability of nuclear materials to theft or sabotage, Department of Energy facilities have been using, since 1989, a computer program called ASSESS, Analytic System and Software for Evaluation of Safeguards and Security. During the past year Sandia National Laboratories has began using an additional program, SEES, Security Exercise Evaluation Simulation, enhancing the picture of vulnerability beyond what either program achieves alone. ASSESS analyzes all possible paths of attack on a target and, assuming that an attack occurs, ranks them by the probability that a response force of adequate size can interrupt the attack before theft or sabotage is accomplished. A Neutralization module pits, collectively, a security force against the interrupted adversary force in a fire fight and calculates the probability that the adversaries are defeated. SEES examines a single scenario and simulates in detail the interactions among all combatants. Its output includes shots fired between shooter and target, and the hits and kills. Whereas ASSESS gives breadth of analysis, expressed statistically and performed relatively quickly, SEES adds depth of detail, modeling tactical behavior. ASSESS finds scenarios that exploit the greatest weaknesses of a facility. SEES explores these scenarios to demonstrate in detail how various tactics to nullify the attack might work out. Without ASSESS to find the facility weaknesses, it is difficult to focus SEES objectively on scenarios worth analyzing. Without SEES to simulate the details of response vs. adversary interaction, it is not possible to test tactical assumptions and hypotheses. Using both programs together, vulnerability analyses achieve both breadth and depth.

To analyze the vulnerability of nuclear materials to theft or sabotage, Department of Energy facilities have been using, since 1989, a computer program called ASSESS, Analytic System and Software for Evaluation of Safeguards and Security. During the past year Sandia National Laboratories has begun using an additional program, SEES, Security Exercise Evaluation Simulation, enhancing the picture of vulnerability beyond what either program achieves alone. Assess analyzes all possible paths of attack on a target and, assuming that an attack occurs, ranks them by the probability that a response force of adequate size can interrupt the attack before theft or sabotage is accomplished. A Neutralization module pits, collectively, a security force against the interrupted adversary force in a fire fight and calculates the probability that the adversaries are defeated. SEES examines a single scenario and simulates in detail the interactions among all combatants. its output includes shots fired between shooter and target, and the hits and kills. Whereas ASSESS gives breadth of analysis, expressed statistically and performed relatively quickly, SEES adds depth of detail, modeling tactical behavior. ASSESS finds scenarios that exploit the greatest weakness of a facility. SEES explores these scenarios to demonstrate in detail how various tactics to nullify the attack might work out. Without ASSESS to find the facility weakness, it is difficult to focus SEES objectively on scenarios worth analyzing. Without SEES to simulate the details of response vs. adversary interaction, it is not possible to test tactical assumptions and hypotheses. Using both programs together, vulnerability analyses achieve both breadth and depth.

Anomalous features in Gulf Coast Salt domes exhibit deviations from normally pure salt and vary widely in form from one dome to the next, ranging considerably in length and width. They have affected both conventional and solution mining in several ways. Gas outbursts, insolubles, and potash (especially carnallite) have led to the breakage of tubing in a number of caverns, and caused irregular shapes of many caverns through preferential leaching. Such anomalous features essentially have limited the lateral extent of conventional mining at several salt mines, and led to accidents and even the closing of several other mines. Such anomalous features, are often aligned in anomalous zones, and appear to be related to diapiric processes of salt dome development. Evidence indicates that anomalous zones are found between salt spines, where the differential salt intrusion accumulates other materials: Anhydrite bands which are relatively strong, and other, weaker impurities. Shear zones and fault displacement detected at Big Hill and Weeks Island domes have not yet had any known adverse impacts on SPR oil storage, but new caverns at these sites conceivably may encounter some potentially adverse conditions. Seismic reflection profiles at Big Hill dome have shown numerous fractures and faults in the caprock, and verified the earlier recognition of a major shear zone transecting the entire salt stock and forming a graben in the overlying caprock. Casing that is placed in such zones can be at risk. Knowledge of these zones should create awareness of possible effects rather than preclude the future emplacement of caverns. To the extent possible, major anomalous zones and salt stock boundaries should be avoided. Shear zones along overhangs may be particularly hazardous, and otherwise unknown valleys in the top of salt may occur along shear zones. These zones often can be mapped geophysically, especially with high-resolution seismic techniques.

Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory have been designated as the technical lead for Security, Safeguards and Computer/Information Security systems for all the DOE Complex 21/Weapons Complex Reconfiguration (WCR) facilities. The physical protection systems in these facilities will be required to meet the most current DOE orders and incorporate the latest physical protection technologies, proven state-of-the-art systems and strategies. The planned approach requires that security assistance and information be provided to the designers (e.g. the Complex 21 Architect & Engineer and the Weapons Complex Lead Laboratories) as early as possible and throughout all design phases. The outcome should avoid the costly retrofits to existing facilities that have occurred in the past and result in effective and comprehensive protection against current and projected threats with minimal impact on operations, safety and costs. This paper discusses the physical protection considerations being promoted for the integrated design effort for the Complex 21/Reconfiguration facilities, such as the tritium, uranium/lithium, plutonium processing and storage, high explosive and assembly and disassembly facilities.

The purpose of this report is to summarize the status of computational analysis of hypervelocity impact lethality in relatively nontechnical terms from the perspective of the author. It is not intended to be a review of the technical literature on the problems of concern. The discussion is focused by concentrating on two phenomenology areas which are of particular concern in computational impact studies. First, the material`s equation of state, specifically the treatment of expanded states of metals undergoing shock vaporization, is discussed. Second, the process of dynamic fragmentation is addressed. In both cases, the context of the discussion deals with inaccuracies and difficulties associated with numerical hypervelocity impact simulations. Laboratory experimental capabilities in hypervelocity impact for impact velocities greater than 10.0 km/s are becoming increasingly viable. This paper also gives recommendations for experimental thrusts which utilize these capabilities that will help to resolve the uncertainties in the numerical lethality studies that are pointed out in the present report.

Current classified document management systems require a tremendous amount of space and extensive manpower to account for, inventory, and protect the documents. Comprehensive analysis of current control and accountability procedures reveal the main problem is the actual handling of the paper itself. The purpose of the Networked Microsoft Windows 3.1 based Classified Document Control System (CDOCS) is to eliminate the paper by scanning and storing images of pages on a personal computer using {open_quotes}write once read mostly{close_quotes} (WORM) high density optical media. By saving images on the computer, not only can manpower and space requirements be reduced, but the chance of compromise is diminished. As an added benefit, the information is now more readily available to the authorized user and is provided to the user at the user`s PC. The network target for CDOCS is Microsoft Windows for Workgroups. Thus, the system is also readily applicable to unclassified document imaging uses.

Information system requirements that are expressed as simple English sentences provide a clear understanding of what is needed between system specifiers, administrators, users, and developers of information systems. The approach used to develop the requirements is the Natural-language Information Analysis Methodology (NIAM). NIAM allows the processes, events, and business rules to be modeled using natural language. The natural language presentation enables the people who deal with the business issues that are to be supported by the information system to describe exactly the system requirements that designers and developers will implement. Computer prattle is completely eliminated from the requirements discussion. An example is presented that is based upon a section of a DOE Order involving nuclear materials management. Where possible, the section is analyzed to specify the process(es) to be done, the event(s) that start the process, and the business rules that are to be followed during the process. Examples, including constraints, are developed. The presentation steps through the modeling process and shows where the section of the DOE Order needs clarification, extensions or interpretations that could provide a more complete and accurate specification.

Transparent and secure process monitoring systems may become an important tool in the dismantlement schemes in support of bilateral and multi-lateral treaties. A prototype system, using public key cryptography to authenticate compliance data, has been developed by Sandia National Laboratories. The Authenticated In-plant Process Monitor (AIPM) is an embedded process monitoring system capable of accepting up to sixteen industry standard process variables, at sample rates of up to two samples per second. Each AIPM will synchronously sample the process, authenticate, and transmit the data in real-time to the host receiving station. The receiving station will validate the compliance data and then display in real-time while updating a relational database. This new generation of monitoring systems must include protection from a host of possible threat scenarios while providing the user authentic clear text data. Data threats are controlled by the use of a public key Treaty Data Authentication Module (TDAM) utilizing the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Digital Signature Standard. System threats are minimized by the use of a tamper indicating enclosure that monitors unauthorized entry and environmental attacks. Insider threats will be controlled by the use of an authenticated bi-directional communication link between each remote AIPM and the host receiving station. This security envelope will be monitored on a real-time basis with appropriate action taken if an attack occurs. The employment of these security features allows the inspectorate to distribute unprocessed clear text data and an attached digital signature with confidence that the data cannot be forged.

Information Surety is the enhancement of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and software systems. It is attained through sequential steps: identification of software reliability requirements and information protection needs, designing for a balanced level of risk throughout the system, and application of appropriate software and hardware technologies and procedures. The ability to apply these steps when developing systems is impaired by a general lack of understanding of surety issues by system developers, and by the fact that there are many separate areas of knowledge involved that are not currently integrated into a disciplined approach (e.g., risk assessment, information access control in computers and networks, secure messaging, trusted software development). Our best systems today are achieved by clever designers who use ad-hoc methods. In the absence of good development tools, technologies may be applied haphazardly and/or retrofitted, without yielding balanced protection. This paper will take the audience through an exploration of the elements of information surety, some common misconceptions about information surety today, and the even greater challenges on the horizon. It will end with some suggestions for research areas which will help evolve the discipline of information surety.

Sandia National Laboratories has considerable experience with monochrome video monitors used in alarm assessment video systems. Most of these systems, used for perimeter protection, were designed to classify rather than to identify intruders. There is a growing interest in the identification function of security video systems for both access control and insider protection. Because color video technology is rapidly changing and because color information is useful for identification purposes, Sandia National Laboratories established a program to evaluate the newest relevant color video equipment. This report documents the evaluation of an integral component, color monitors. It briefly discusses a critical parameter, dynamic range, details test procedures, and evaluates the results.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors must maintain continuity of knowledge on all safeguard samples and, in particular, on those samples drawn from plutonium product and spent fuel input tanks at a nuclear reprocessing plant`s blister sampling station. Integrity of safeguard samples must be guaranteed from the sampling point to the moment of sample analysis at an accepted local laboratory or at the IAEA`s Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) in Seibersdorf, Austria. The safeguard samples are drawn at a blister sampling station with inspector participation and then transferred via a pneumatic post system to the facility`s analytical laboratory. Transfer of the sample by the pneumatic post system, arrival of the sample in the operator`s analytical laboratory, and storage of the sample awaiting analysis are very time consuming activities for an inspector, particularly if continuous human surveillance is required for all these activities. These activities could be observed by ordinary surveillance methods, such as a video monitoring system, but this would be cumbersome and time consuming for both the inspector and the operator. This paper describes a secure container designed to assure sample vial integrity from the point the sample is drawn to treatment of the sample at a facility`s analytical laboratory.

The progress made in advanced packaging development at Sandia National Laboratories for integration of III-V photonic devices and CMOS IC`s on Silicon MCM substrates for planar aid stacked applications will be reported. Studies to characterize precision alignment techniques using solder attach materials compatible with both silicon IC`s and III-V devices will be discussed. Examples of the use of back-side alignment and IR through-wafer inspection will be shown along with the extra processing steps that are used. Under bump metallurgy considerations are also addressed.

A simplified explanation for gas flow instability in parallel heated channels is presented with specific applications to channels containing packed beds of power-producing particles. The explanation captures the basic governing physics of the viscosity-driven instability and hopefully removes some of the misconceptions surrounding this issue. Simple illustrative calculations, steady-state and transient, using the SAFSIM computer program are included in the explanation. The explanation points out that flow instability is common to any and all gas flow systems with parallel heated channels, that the addition of flow resistance to the entrance of a channel mitigates flow instability, and that instabilities do not occur instantaneously.

The design of a magnetically suspended six degree of freedom positioning system capable of nanometer positioning is presented. The sample holder is controlled in six degrees of freedom (DOF) over 300 micrometers of travel in X, Y and Z directions. A design and control summary, and test results indicating stability and power dissipation are included in the paper. The system is vacuum compatible, uses commercially available materials, and requires minimal assembly and setup.

Concepts for underground panel or drift seals at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant are developed to satisfy sealing requirements of the operational period. The concepts are divided into two groups. In the ``NOW`` group, design concepts are considered in which a sleeve structure is installed in the panel access immediately after excavation and before waste is emplaced. In the ``LATER`` group, no special measures are taken during excavation or before waste emplacement; the seal is installed at a later date, perhaps up to 35 years after the drift is excavated. Three concepts are presented in both the NOW and LATER groups. A rigid sleeve, a yielding sleeve, and steel rings with inflatable tubes are proposed as NOW concepts. One steel ring concept and two concrete monoliths are proposed for seals emplaced in older drifts. Advantages and disadvantages are listed for each concept. Based on the available information, it appears most feasible to recommend a LATER concept using a concrete monolith as a preferred seal for the operational period. Each concept includes the potential of remedial grout and/or construction of a chamber that could be used for monitoring leakage from a closed panel during the operational period. Supporting in situ demonstrations of elements of the concepts are recommended.

An investigation of the shock compression and release properties of silicon carbide ceramic has been performed. A series of planar impact experiments has been completed in which stationary target discs of ceramic were struck by plates of either similar ceramic or other appropriate material at velocities up to 2.2 km/s with a propellant gun facility. The particle velocity history at the interface between the back of the target ceramic and a lithium-fluoride window material was measured with laser velocity interferometry (VISAR). Impact stresses achieved in these experiments range between about 10 and 50 GPa. Numerical solutions and analytic methods were used to determine the dynamic compression and release stress-strain behavior of the ceramic. Further analysis of the data was performed to determine dynamic strength and compressibility properties of silicon carbide.

A joint US/Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) project has successfully tested a unique solar-driven chemical reactor in the CAtalytically Enhanced Solar Absorption Receiver (CAESAR) experiment. The CAESAR test was a {open_quotes}proof-of-concept{close_quotes} demonstration of carbon-dioxide reforming of methane in a commercial-scale, solar, volumetric receiver/reactor on a parabolic dish concentrator. The CAESAR design; test facility and instrumentation; thermal and chemical tests; and analysis of test results are presented in detail. Numerical models for the absorber and the receiver are developed and predicted performance is compared with test data. Post test analyses to assess the structural condition of the absorber and the effectiveness of the rhodium catalyst are presented. Unresolved technical issues are identified and future development efforts are recommended.

This report describes work performed at Sandia under a CRADA with Shell Development of Houston, Texas aimed at developing hydrous metal oxide (HMO) catalysts for oxidation of hydrocarbons. Autoxidation as well as selective oxidation of 1-octene was studied in the presence of HMO catalysts based on known oxidation catalysts. The desired reactions were the conversion of olefin to epoxides, alcohols, and ketones, HMOs seem to inhibit autoxidation reactions, perhaps by reacting with peroxides or radicals. Attempts to use HMOs and metal loaded HMOs as epoxidation catalysts were unsuccessful, although their utility for this reaction was not entirely ruled out. Likewise, alcohol formation from olefins in the presence of HMO catalysts was not achieved. However, this work led to the discovery that acidified HMOs can lead to carbocation reactions of hydrocarbons such as cracking. An HMO catalyst containing Rh and Cu that promotes the reaction of {alpha}-olefins with oxygen to form methyl ketones was identified. Although the activity of the catalyst is relatively low and isomerization reactions of the olefin simultaneously occur, results indicate that these problems may be addressed by eliminating mass transfer limitations. Other suggestions for improving the catalyst are also made. 57 refs.

A mission hazard assessment has been performed for the Strategic Target System Mission 1 (known as STARS M1) for hazards due to potential debris impact in the Marshall Islands area. The work was performed at Sandia National Laboratories as a result of discussion with Kwajalein Missile Range (KMR) safety officers. The STARS M1 rocket will be launched from the Kauai Test Facility (KTF), Hawaii, and deliver two payloads to within the viewing range of sensors located on the Kwajalein Atoll. The purpose of this work has been to estimate upper bounds for expected casualty rates and impact probability or the Marshall Islands areas which adjoin the STARS M1 instantaneous impact point (IIP) trace. This report documents the methodology and results of the analysis.

This Fire Hazards Analysis is sponsored by Plant Engineering and is prepared to support the Safety Assessment for the CNSAC Facility. This is a preliminary fire hazards analysis of a yet to be constructed facility and is based upon the current building design and the current understanding of the potential occupancy hazards. The governing occupancy for this building is personnel offices. The CNSAC facility will be dedicated primarily to two activities: (1) arms control and verification technology and (2) intelligence. This report supplements the Safety Assessment for the CNSAC facility and follows the guidance of DOE Memorandum EH-31.3 and meets the objectives of paragraph 4 of DOE Order 5480.7A, ``Fire Protection.`` This analysis demonstrates that under ``worst case`` assumptions a fire in the CNSAC facility will result in consequences which are below DOE offsite guidelines for accident conditions. This report is based upon preliminary design information and any major changes to the building design may require additional analyses.

The Salado Two-Phase Flow Laboratory Program was established to address concerns regarding two-phase flow properties and to provide WIPP-specific, geologically consistent experimental data to develop more appropriate correlations for Salado rock to replace those currently used in Performance Assessment models. Researchers in Sandia`s Fluid Flow and Transport Department originally identified and emphasized the need for laboratory measurements of Salado threshold pressure and relative permeability. The program expanded to include the measurement of capillary pressure, rock compressibility, porosity, and intrinsic permeability and the assessment of core damage. Sensitivity analyses identified the anhydrite interbed layers as the most likely path for the dissipation of waste-generated gas from waste-storage rooms because of their relatively high permeability. Due to this the program will initially focus on the anhydrite interbed material. The program may expand to include similar rock and flow measurements on other WIPP materials including impure halite, pure halite, and backfill and seal materials. This conceptual plan presents the scope, objectives, and historical documentation of the development of the Salado Two-Phase Flow Program through January 1993. Potential laboratory techniques for assessing core damage and measuring porosity, rock compressibility, capillary and threshold pressure, permeability as a function of stress, and relative permeability are discussed. Details of actual test designs, test procedures, and data analysis are not included in this report, but will be included in the Salado Two-Phase Flow Laboratory Program Test Plan pending the results of experimental and other scoping activities in FY93.

Sandia National Laboratories maintains several libraries of equation of state tables, in a modified Sesame format, for use in hydrocode calculations and other applications. This report discusses one of those libraries, the seslan file, which contains 78 tables from the Los Alamos equation of state library. Minor changes have been made to these tables, making them more convenient for code users and reducing numerical difficulties that occasionally arise in hydrocode calculations.

The ANSI/ANS 8.1 criticality safety standard recommends validation and benchmarking of the calculational methods used in evaluating criticality safety limits for away-from-reactor applications. The lack of critical experiments with burned light-water reactor (LWR) fuel in racks or in casks necessitates the validation of burnup credit methods by comparison with LWR core criticals. These benchmarks are relevant because they test a methodology`s ability to predict spent fuel isotopic and to evaluate the reactivity effects of heterogeneities and strong absorbers. Data are available to perform analyses at precise state points. As part of the Burnup Credit Analysis Verification (BCAV) Task, the U.S. Department of Energy has sponsored analysis of selected reactor core critical configurations from commercial pressurized-water-reactors (PWRs). The initial analysis methodology used the SCALE-4 code system to analyze a set of reactor critical configurations from Virginia Power`s Slurry and North Anna reactors. However, the analysis procedure was complex and included the calculation of lumped fission products. The methodology has since been revised to simplify both the data requirements and the calculational procedure for the criticality analyst. This revised methodology is validated here by a comparison with three reactor critical configurations from Tennessee Valley Authority`s Sequoyah Unit 2 Cycle 3 and two from Virginia Power`s Slurry Unit 1 Cycle 2.

The current political and economic situations suggest that significant reductions of nuclear forces outside the US will continue. This implies that in times of crisis the rapid deployment of nuclear weapons into a theater may be required. This paper describes a proposed Mobile Integrated C{sup 3} and Security System (MICSS). The MICSS, together with associated personnel, could satisfy the command and control and security requirements of a deployed nuclear operation. Rapid deployment poses unique nuclear weapon surety difficulties that must be overcome for the operation to be effective and survivable. The MICSS must be portable, reliable, limited in size, and easily emplaced to facilitate movement, reduce the possibility of detection, and minimize manpower requirements. The MICSS will be based on existing technology. Sandia has designed prototype mobile command centers for the military. These command centers are based on an approach that stresses modularity, standards, and the use of an open architecture. Radio, telephone, satellite communications, communication security, and global positioning system equipment has been successfully integrated into the command centers. Sandia is also supporting the development of portable security systems for the military. These systems are rapidly deployable and mission flexible and are capable of intrusion detection, area and alarm display, night assessment, and wireless sensor communications. This paper is organized as follows: Background information about the prototype mobile command centers will be presented first. Background information about portable security systems concepts will then be given. Next, an integrated communications and security system will be presented, and finally, the design and status of a prototype MICSS will be described.