Publications

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International nuclear safeguards are technical measures implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify the correctness and completeness of declarations made by States about their nuclear activities. The systems used to verify such activities include electronic and digital hardware and software components capable of data collection, processing, analysis, storage and transmission. Despite increasing efforts to protect digital systems against unauthorized access or attack through cybersecurity measures, these systems are not immune to cyber exploitation that could compromise their integrity or reliability. Previous versions of these systems did not include capabilities that exist today, such as BluetoothTM and GPS. The inclusion of these new capabilities, as well as new data processing and storage mechanisms, adds new attack vectors and opportunities for adversaries to exploit the devices that did not previously exist. As mentioned in the above referenced Cybersecurity for Safeguards study, cyber-domain vulnerabilities present risks to the equipment used to perform the international nuclear safeguards mission. The IAEA has produced guidance on the protection of nuclear facilities and their computer systems against cyber threats, but these documents do not specifically address the risks to safeguards or safeguards equipment. In response, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Safeguards/Safeguards Technology Development (NA-241) sponsored Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia, SNL) and the Idaho National Laboratory (Idaho, INL) to conduct a one-year study to evaluate cyber related vulnerabilities in safeguards equipment and develop recommendations for the mitigation of any identified risks.

One of the challenges of implementing safeguards for geological repositories will be the long-term preservation of safeguards-related data for 100 years or more. While most countries considering the construction and operation of such facilities agree that safeguards information should be preserved, there are gaps with respect to standardized requirements, guidelines, timescales, and approaches. This study analyzes those gaps and explores research to clarify stakeholder needs, identify current policies, approaches, best practices and international standards, and explores existing safeguards information management infrastructure. The study also attempts to clarify what a safeguards data classification system might look like, how long data should be retained, and how information should be exchanged between stakeholders at different phases of a repository’s life cycle. The analysis produced a variety of recommendations on what information to preserve, how to preserve it, where to store it, retention options and how to exchange information in the long term. Key findings include the use of the globally recognized international records management standard, ISO15489, for guidance on the development of information management systems, and the development of a Key Information File (KIF). The KIF could be used to identify only the most relevant, high-level safeguards information and the history of decision making about the repository. The study also suggests implementing on-site and off-site records storage in digital and physical form; developing a safeguards data classification system; long-term records retention with periodic reviews every 5 to 10 years during each phase of the repository life cycle; and establishing transition procedures well in advance so that data shepherds and records officers can transfer information with incoming facility managers effectively and efficiently. These and other recommendations are further analyzed in this study.

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Deep borehole disposal (DBD) has been suggested as an option for disposing spent nuclear fuel in a number of countries, including several countries that are subject to international safeguards. While potential benefits of deep borehole disposal include increased safety, reduced cost, and greater flexibility, the method could also impact the implementation of international safeguards. DBD presents some unique safeguards challenges compared to a conventional MGR. These challenges include 1) verifying borehole design below the surface; 2) strong reliance on CoK up to and including disposal; 3) limitations on the ability to observe or verify successfully emplaced canisters; and 4) successfully monitoring a closed and sealed DBD facility over the long term. In some cases, such challenges may prove easier for a DBD facility than for a conventional MGR, others more difficult, and still others may require new methodologies (or existing methodologies newly applied to safeguards). Long-term monitoring in particular might be somewhat less onerous.

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Action Sheet 1 between the United States Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Forschungszentrum Julich (FZJ) for "Assessment of Lifecycle Challenges for the Electronic Optical Sealing System (EOSS)" explores the lifecycle challenges of the EOSS and identifies a strategy for the further management of the EOSS within the context of Germany's safeguards implementation. Specifically, the assessment explores lifecycle challenges for use of the seal during reactor operation, shutdown and removal of spent fuel, and the decommissioning process in Germany, identifying possible upgrades to the seal, and providing recommendations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) on what should be done to ensure the reliability and usability of the EOSS over the next decade.

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