Publications

Abstract not provided.

This report describes the findings of the effort initiated by the Arab Science and Technology Foundation and the Cooperative Monitoring Center at Sandia National Laboratories to identify, contact, and engage members of the Iraqi science and technology (S&T) community. The initiative is divided into three phases. The first phase, the survey of the Iraqi scientific community, shed light on the most significant current needs in the fields of science and technology in Iraq. Findings from the first phase will lay the groundwork for the second phase that includes the organization of a workshop to bring international support for the initiative, and simultaneously decides on an implementation mechanism. Phase three involves the execution of outcomes of the report as established in the workshop. During Phase 1 the survey team conducted a series of trips to Iraq during which they had contact with nearly 200 scientists from all sections of the country, representing all major Iraqi S&T specialties. As a result of these contacts, the survey team obtained over 450 project ideas from Iraqi researchers. These projects were revised and analyzed to identify priorities and crucial needs. After refinement, the result is approximately 170 project ideas that have been categorized according to their suitability for (1) developing joint research projects with international partners, (2) engaging Iraqi scientists in solving local problems, and (3) developing new business opportunities. They have also been ranked as to high, medium, or low priority.

Abstract not provided.

The study of ecology is taking on increasing global importance as the value of well-functioning ecosystems to human well-being becomes better understood. However, the use of technological systems for the study of ecology lags behind the use of technologies in the study of other disciplines important to human well-being, such as medicine, chemistry and physics. The authors outline four different kinds of large-scale data needs required by land managers for the development of sustainable land use strategies, and which can be obtained with current or future technological systems. They then outline a hypothetical resource management scenario in which data on all those needs are collected using remote and in situ technologies, transmitted to a central location, analyzed, and then disseminated for regional use in maintaining sustainable grazing systems. They conclude by highlighting various data-collection systems and data-sharing networks already in operation.

Representatives of the Department of Energy, the national laboratories, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), and others gathered to initiate the development of broad-based concepts and strategies for transparency monitoring of nuclear materials at the back end of the fuel/weapons cycle, including both geologic disposal and monitored retrievable storage. The workshop focused on two key questions: ''Why should we monitor?'' and ''What should we monitor?'' These questions were addressed by identifying the range of potential stakeholders, concerns that stakeholders may have, and the information needed to address those concerns. The group constructed a strategic framework for repository transparency implementation, organized around the issues of safety (both operational and environmental), diversion (assuring legitimate use and security), and viability (both political and economic). Potential concerns of the international community were recognized as the possibility of material diversion, the multinational impacts of potential radionuclide releases, and public and political perceptions of unsafe repositories. The workshop participants also identified potential roles that the WIPP may play as a monitoring technology development and demonstration test-bed facility. Concepts for WIPP'S potential test-bed role include serving as (1) an international monitoring technology and development testing facility, (2) an international demonstration facility, and (3) an education and technology exchange center on repository transparency technologies.

This paper argues that cooperative monitoring plays a critical role in the implementation of regional security agreements and confidence building measures. A framework for developing cooperative monitoring options is proposed and several possibilities for relating bilateral and regional monitoring systems to international monitoring systems are discussed. Three bilateral or regional agreements are analyzed briefly to illustrate different possibilities. These examples illustrate that the relationship of regional or bilateral arms control or security agreements to international agreements depends on a number of factors: the overlap of provisions between regional and international agreements; the degree of interest in a regional agreement among the international community; efficiency in implementing the agreement; and numerous political considerations. Given the importance of regional security to the international community, regions should be encouraged to develop their own infrastructure for implementing regional arms control and other security agreements. A regional infrastructure need not preclude participation in an international regime. On the contrary, establishing regional institutions for arms control and nonproliferation could result in more proactive participation of regional parties in developing solutions for regional and international problems, thereby strengthening existing and future international regimes. Possible first steps for strengthening regional infrastructures are identified and potential technical requirements are discussed.

The post cold war security environment poses both difficult challenges and encouraging opportunities. Some of the most difficult challenges are related to regional conflict and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. New and innovative approaches to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are essential. More effort must be focused on underlying factors that motivate countries to seek weapons of mass destruction. Historically the emphasis has been on denial: denying information, denying technology, and denying materials necessary to build such weapons. Though still important, those efforts are increasingly perceived to be insufficient, and initiatives that address underlying motivational factors are needed. On the opportunity side, efforts to establish regional dialogue and confidence-building measures are increasing in many areas. Such efforts can result in cooperative agreements on security issues such as border control, demilitarized zones, weapons delivery systems, weapons of mass destruction free zones, environmental agreements, and resource sharing. In some cases, implementing such cooperative agreements will mean acquiring, analyzing, and sharing large quantities of data and sensitive information. These arrangements for ``cooperative monitoring`` are becoming increasingly important to the security of individual countries, regions, and international institutions. However, many countries lack sufficient technical and institutional infrastructure to take full advantage of these opportunities. Constructing a peaceful twenty-first century will require that technology is brought to bear in the most productive and innovative ways to meet the challenges of proliferation and to maximize the opportunities for cooperation.

This paper argues that cooperative monitoring plays a critical role in the implementation of regional security agreements and confidence building measures. A framework for developing cooperative monitoring options is proposed and several possibilities for relating bilateral and regional monitoring systems to international monitoring systems are discussed. Three bilateral or regional agreements are analyzed briefly to illustrate different possibilities: (1) the demilitarization of the Sinai region between Israel and Egypt in the 1970s; (2) the 1991 quadripartite agreement for monitoring nuclear facilities among Brazil, Argentina, The Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency; and (3) a bilateral Open Skies agreement between Hungary and Romania in 1991. These examples illustrate that the relationship of regional or bilateral arms control or security agreements to international agreements depends on a number of factors: the overlap of provisions between regional and international agreements; the degree of interest in a regional agreement among the international community; efficiency in implementing the agreement; and numerous political considerations.Given the importance of regional security to the international community, regions should be encouraged to develop their own infrastructure for implementing regional arms control and other security agreements. A regional infrastructure need not preclude participation in an international regime. On the contrary, establishing regional institutions for arms control and nonproliferation could result in more proactive participation of regional parties in developing solutions for regional and international problems, thereby strengthening existing and future international regimes. Possible first steps for strengthening regional infrastructures are identified and potential technical requirements are discussed.

Relationships between countries generally exist somewhere in the grey area between war and peace. Crisis prevention activities are important in this area, and should have two goals: stabilizing tense situations that could push countries toward war, and supporting or reinforcing efforts to move countries toward peace. A Crisis Prevention Center (CPC) should facilitate efforts to achieve these goals. Its functions can be grouped into three broad, interrelated categories: establishing and facilitating communication among participating countries; supporting negotiations and consensus-building on regional security issues; and supporting implementation of agreed confidence and security building measures. Technology will play a critical role in a CPC. Technology is required for establishing communication systems to ensure the timely flow of information between countries and to provide the means for organizing and analyzing this information. Technically-based cooperative monitoring can provide an objective source of information on mutually agreed issues, thereby supporting the implementation of confidence building measures and treaties. Technology can be a neutral subject of interaction and collaboration between technical communities from different countries, thereby providing an important channel for improving relationships. Potential first steps for a CPC in the Middle Ease could include establishing communication channels and a dedicated communications center in each country, together with an agreement to use the system as a ``Hot Line` in bilateral and multilateral-lateral emergency situations. Bilateral cooperative monitoring centers could be established to assist with implementation of agreements. A centrally located CPC could serve as a regional communications hub, coordinating a number of functions aimed at stabilizing regional tensions and supporting confidence building activities. Specific recommendations for confidence building activities are discussed.

Sandia National Laboratories and the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation hosted a workshop on the application of cooperative monitoring to the Middle East. The workshop, held in Albuquerque, New Mexico, from July 17 through 21, 1994, was sponsored by the US Department of Energy, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the US Department of State. The meeting, which focused on use of technical monitoring tools and sharing of collected information to facilitate regional agreements, included participants from five regional countries as well as from American universities, the US government, and US National Laboratories. Some attendees previously participated in meetings of the Arms Control and Regional Security working group of the Middle East Multilateral Peace Talks. The workshop combined presentations, demonstrations and hands-on experimentation with monitoring hardware and software. An exercise was conducted to evaluate and recommend cooperative monitoring options for a model agreement between two hypothetical countries. Historical precedents were reviewed and the role of environmental and natural resource conflicts explored. These activities were supplemented by roundtable discussions covering Middle East security issues, the relationship of ``national means`` to cooperative monitoring, and cooperative monitoring of ballistic missiles in the Middle East.

Relationships between countries normally war and peace. Crisis prevention activities will be particularly important in this area, and should have two goals: (1) stabilizing tense situations that could push countries toward war and (2) supporting or reenforcing efforts to move countries toward a state of peace. A Crisis Prevention Center (CPC) will facilitate efforts to achieve these goals and its functions can be grouped into three broad, inter-related categories: (1) establishing and facilitating communication among participating countries, (2) supporting negotiations and consensus-building on regional security issues, and (3) supporting implementation of agreed confidence and security building measures. Appropriate activities in each of these categories will depend on the relations among participating countries. Technology will play a critical role in a establishing communication systems to ensure the timely flow of information between countries and to provide the means for organizing and analyzing this information. Technically-based cooperative monitoring can provide an objective source of information on mutually agreed issues, thereby supporting the implementation of confidence building measures and treaties. In addition, technology itself can be a neutral subject of interaction and collaboration between technical communities from different countries. Establishing a CPC in Northeast Asia does not require the existence of an Asian security regime. Indeed, activities that occur under the auspices of a CPC, even highly formalized exchanges of agreed information, can increase transparency, and thereby pave the way for future regional cooperation. Major players in Northeast Asian security are Japan, Russia, China, North and South Korea, and the United States.

Analysis of the electrohydrodynamic (EHD) equations of motion of a planar liquid-lithium surface in the presence of a normal electric field suggest that liquid lithium may provide a large-area ion source for intense ion-beam diodes. Such sources are being developed for the Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator II at Sandia National Laboratories. In this paper, theoretical and experimental studies of the planar EHD ion source will be reviewed. When a planar liquid surface is subjected to an electric field of sufficient magnitude, EHD instabilities produce an array of cusps on the surface. The electric field enhancement at the apex of each cusp is sufficient to permit field evaporation of ions. The time delay between application of the electric field and ion emission depends on the magnitude and rate of increase of the applied electric field, and on the initial amplitude of the surface perturbation. Above 10 MV/cm, theory indicates that field emission will occur on a nanosecond time scale and that the characteristic spacing of emitters will be less than one micrometer. At these fields, the source should have an intrinsic divergence of less than 6 mrad and the effects of space charge from neighboring emitters should not inhibit emission significantly. Experimental measurements of wavelength and cusp-formation-times for water and ethanol at electric fields near the critical field for instability have agreed well with theory. 11 refs., 4 figs.