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Since its inception in 1996, the purpose of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) has been to provide advice and assistance to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Member States on strengthening and enhancing the effectiveness of their state system of physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Since the protection of nuclear materials and facilities is a Member State`s responsibility, participation within the IPPAS program is voluntary. At the request of a Member State, the IAEA forms a multinational IPPAS team consisting of physical protection specialists. These specialists have broad experience in physical protection system design, implementation, and regulatory oversight. The exact make-up of the team depends upon the needs of the requesting state. IPPAS missions to participating states strive to compare the domestic procedures and practices of the state against international physical protection guidelines (IAEA Information Circular 225) and internationally accepted practice. The missions utilize a top to bottom approach and begin by reviewing the legal and regulatory structure and conclude with reviews of the implementation of the state regulations and international guidelines at individual facilities. IPPAS findings are treated as IAEA Safeguards Confidential Information. To date, IPPAS missions have been concluded in Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Poland.

During the January 1996 meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) was identified as one of the additional sites for cooperative projects on upgrading Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC and A). Since June 1996, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Pacific Northwest National Laboratories (PNNL), and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) have worked with BNPP to upgrade MPC and A at the facility. Some unique challenges were encountered because BNPP has an operating BN-600 600-Megawatt breeder reactor. SNL has been responsible for working with BNPP to implement physical protection upgrades to the Central Alarm Station, Fresh Fuel Storage building, Spent Fuel Storage Area, and Vehicle/Personnel Portal. In addition, improved communication equipment for the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) guards and training of personnel were provided. PNNL has been responsible for coordinating Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) upgrades at BNPP. PNNL, in conjunction with LANL, has implemented such MC and A upgrades as a computerized nuclear materials accounting system, training in MC and A elements, nondestructive assay instrumentation for fresh fuel, installation of a fork detector for measuring spent fuel, and installation of an underwater video camera for verification of spent fuel serial numbers.

The Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) is located in Zarechny, approximately 60 km east of Ekaterinberg along the Trans-Siberian Highway. Zarechny, a small city of approximately 30,000 residents, was built to support BNPP operations. It is a closed city to unescorted visitors. Residents must show identification for entry. BNPP is one of the first and oldest commercial nuclear power plants in Russia and began operations in 1964. As for most nuclear power plants in the Russian Federation, BNPP is operated by Rosenergoatom, which is subordinated to the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (Minatom). BNPP is the site of three nuclear reactors, Units 1, 2, and 3. Units 1 and 2, which have been shut-down and defueled, were graphite moderated reactors. The units were shut-down in 1981 and 1989. Unit 3, a BN-600 reactor, is a 600 MW(electric) sodium-cooled fast breeder reactor. Unit 3 went on-line in April 1980 and produces electric power which is fed into a distribution grid and thermal power which provides heat to Zarechny. The paper also discusses the SF NIKIET, the Sverdiovsk Branch of NIKIET, Moscow, which is the research and development branch of the parent NIKEIT and is primarily a design institute responsible for reactor design. Central to its operations is a 15 megawatt IVV research reactor. The paper discusses general security and fissile material control and accountability at these two facilities.

Approximately five years ago, the United States and countries of & Former Soviet Union (FSU) started the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. The program`s purpose was to accelerate reduction of the risk of nuclear proliferation, including such threats as theft, diversion, and unauthorized possession of nuclear materials. This goal would be accomplished through near-term upgrades to strengthen the nuclear material protection, control, and accounting systems within the FSU countries. In addition to this near-term goal, a long-term goal of the U.S. Department of Energy`s (DOE) Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program is to promote a new safeguards culture and to support the establishment of a sustaining MPC&A infrastructure in the FSU. This long-term goal is vital to assuring that the near-term upgrades remain effective for safeguarding nuclear material as these countries experience political and social changes. The MPC&A program is managed by DOE`s Russia/Newly Independent States (NIS) Nuclear Materials Security Task Force. A coordinated effort is underway to promote and to help establish a new safeguards culture and a sustaining infrastructure. Elements being implemented at both the national and site levels include system operational performance evaluations, development of MPC&A training, operational procedures, national MPC&A regulations, and adaptation of modern MPC&A methodologies to suit the conditions in the FSU countries. This paper identifies current efforts in several countries that are undergoing transition from near-term upgrades to sustainable MPC&A systems.

Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) upgrades have begun at the Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics (ITEP), a site that has significant quantities of direct-use nuclear materials. Cooperative work was initiated at this Moscow facility as a part of the U.S.-Russian Government-to-Government program to upgrade MPC&A systems. An initial site visit and assessment was conducted in September 1996 to establish communication between ITEP and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the participating U.S. national laboratories. Subsequently, the parties reached an agreement to develop two master plans for MPC&A upgrades. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) would assist in developing a plan for Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) upgrades, and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) would assist in developing a plan for Physical Protection (PP) upgrades. The MC&A plan included MC&A training, a mass measurement program, nondestructive assay instrumentation, item identification (bar coding), physical inventory taking, and a nuclear materials accounting system. The PP plan included basic PP system design training, Central Alarm Station (CAS) location and equipment upgrades, site and critical-building access control system, intrusion detection alarm assessment, and guard force communications.

Since 1994, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has provided cooperative assistance to the non-nuclear weapons states of the Former Soviet Union. This effort, within DOE`s program of Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A), identified the Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) in Uzbekistan and the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP) in Lithuania as sites for cooperative MPC&A projects. The INP, located just outside of Tashkent, is the site of a 10-megawatt WWR-SM research reactor. This reactor is expected to remain operational as a major nuclear research and isotope production reactor for Central Asia. The INPP, located 100 kilometers northeast of the capital city of Vilnius, consists of two Russian-made RBMK reactors with a combined power output of 3,000 megawatts (electric). This power plant has been the subject of international safety and security concerns, which prompted DOE`s cooperative assistance effort. This paper describes U.S. progress in a multi-national effort directed at implementing physical protection upgrades in Lithuania and Uzbekistan. The upgrades agreed upon between DOE and the INP and between DOE and the INPP have been designed to interface with upgrades being implemented by other donor countries. DOE/INPP upgrade projects include providing training on U.S. approaches to physical protection, access control through the main vehicle portal, a hardened central alarm station, and improved guard force communications. DOE/INP upgrade projects in Uzbekistan include an access control system, a hardened fresh fuel storage vault, an interior intrusion detection and assessment system, and an integrated alarm display and assessment system.

Since 1978, Sandia National Laboratories has provided training courses in the systematic design of Physical Protection Systems (PPS). One such course, the International Training Course (TC) on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials, is sponsored by the Department of Energy`s International Safeguards Division , the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Department of State. Since 1978, twelve 3- and 4-week classes have been conducted by Sandia for these sponsors. One- and two-week adaptations of this course have been developed for other customers, and, since 1994, nine of these abbreviated courses have been presented in the Russian language to participants from the Former Soviet Union (SU). These courses have been performed in support of the Department of Energy`s program on Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) for the Russian Federation and the Newly Independent States. MPC&A physical protection training assumes participants have more narrowly defined backgrounds. In using affective approaches, the overall goal of training in the context of the MPC&A Program is to develop modern and effective, indigenous capabilities for physical protection system design and analysis within the SU. This paper contrasts the cognitive and affective approaches to training and indicates why different approaches are required for the ITC and the MPC&A Programs.