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Biosafety Risk Assessment Methodology

Caskey, Susan A.; Gaudioso, Jennifer M.; Salerno, Reynolds M.

Laboratories that work with biological agents need to manage their safety risks to persons working the laboratories and the human and animal community in the surrounding areas. Biosafety guidance defines a wide variety of biosafety risk mitigation measures, which include measures which fall under the following categories: engineering controls, procedural and administrative controls, and the use of personal protective equipment; the determination of which mitigation measures should be used to address the specific laboratory risks are dependent upon a risk assessment. Ideally, a risk assessment should be conducted in a manner which is standardized and systematic which allows it to be repeatable and comparable. A risk assessment should clearly define the risk being assessed and avoid over complication.

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TYPE SAND Report YEAR 2010
OSTIDOI

The acquisition of dangerous biological materials: Technical facts sheets to assist risk assessments of 46 potential BW agents

Astuto Gribble, Lisa A.; Gaudioso, Jennifer M.

Numerous terrorist organizations have openly expressed interest in producing and deploying biological weapons. However, a limiting factor for many terrorists has been the acquisition of dangerous biological agents, as evidenced by the very few successful instances of biological weapons use compared to the number of documented hoaxes. Biological agents vary greatly in their ability to cause loss of life and economic damage. Some agents, if released properly, can kill many people and cause an extensive number of secondary infections; other agents will sicken only a small number of people for a short period of time. Consequently, several biological agents can potentially be used to perpetrate a bioterrorism attack but few are likely capable of causing a high consequence event. It is crucial, from a US national security perspective, to more deeply understand the likelihood that terrorist organizations can acquire the range of these agents. Few studies have attempted to comprehensively compile the technical information directly relevant to the acquisition of dangerous bacteria, viruses and toxins. In this report, technical fact sheets were assembled for 46 potentially dangerous biological agents. Much of the information was taken from various research sources which could ultimately and significantly expedite and improve bioterrorism threat assessments. By systematically examining a number of specific agent characteristics included in these fact sheets, it may be possible to detect, target, and implement measures to thwart future terrorist acquisition attempts. In addition, the information in these fact sheets may be used as a tool to help laboratories gain a rudimentary understanding of how attractive a method laboratory theft is relative to other potential acquisition modes.

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TYPE SAND Report YEAR 2007
OSTIDOI

Development of Self-Remediating Packaging for Safe and Secure Transport of Infectious Substances

Guilinger, Terry R.; Gaudioso, Jennifer M.; Aceto, Donato G.; Lowe, Kathleen M.; Tucker, Mark D.; Salerno, Reynolds M.

As George W. Bush recognized in November 2001, "Infectious diseases make no distinctions among people and recognize no borders." By their very nature, infectious diseases of natural or intentional (bioterrorist) origins are capable of threatening regional health systems and economies. The best mechanism for minimizing the spread and impact of infectious disease is rapid disease detection and diagnosis. For rapid diagnosis to occur, infectious substances (IS) must be transported very quickly to appropriate laboratories, sometimes located across the world. Shipment of IS is problematic since many carriers, concerned about leaking packages, refuse to ship this material. The current packaging does not have any ability to neutralize or kill leaking IS. The technology described here was developed by Sandia National Laboratories to provide a fail-safe packaging system for shipment of IS that will increase the likelihood that critical material can be shipped to appropriate laboratories following a bioterrorism event or the outbreak of an infectious disease. This safe and secure packaging method contains a novel decontaminating material that will kill or neutralize any leaking infectious organisms; this feature will decrease the risk associated with shipping IS, making transport more efficient. 3 DRAFT4

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TYPE SAND Report YEAR 2006
OSTIDOI

A survey of Asian life scientists :the state of biosciences, laboratory biosecurity, and biosafety in Asia

Gaudioso, Jennifer M.

Over 300 Asian life scientists were surveyed to provide insight into work with infectious agents. This report provides the reader with a more complete understanding of the current practices employed to study infectious agents by laboratories located in Asian countries--segmented by level of biotechnology sophistication. The respondents have a variety of research objectives and study over 60 different pathogens and toxins. Many of the respondents indicated that their work was hampered by lack of adequate resources and the difficulty of accessing critical resources. The survey results also demonstrate that there appears to be better awareness of laboratory biosafety issues compared to laboratory biosecurity. Perhaps not surprisingly, many of these researchers work with pathogens and toxins under less stringent laboratory biosafety and biosecurity conditions than would be typical for laboratories in the West.

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TYPE SAND Report YEAR 2006
OSTIDOI

Assembly and actuation of nanomaterials using active biomolecules

Sasaki, Darryl Y.; Koch, Steven J.; Thayer, Gayle E.; Corwin, Alex D.; De Boer, Maarten P.; Bunker, B.C.; Bachand, George B.; Rivera, Susan B.; Gaudioso, Jennifer M.; Trent, Amanda M.; Spoerke, Erik D.

The formation and functions of living materials and organisms are fundamentally different from those of synthetic materials and devices. Synthetic materials tend to have static structures, and are not capable of adapting to the functional needs of changing environments. In contrast, living systems utilize energy to create, heal, reconfigure, and dismantle materials in a dynamic, non-equilibrium fashion. The overall goal of the project was to organize and reconfigure functional assemblies of nanoparticles using strategies that mimic those found in living systems. Active assembly of nanostructures was studied using active biomolecules to drive the organization and assembly of nanocomposite materials. In this system, kinesin motor proteins and microtubules were used to direct the transport and interactions of nanoparticles at synthetic interfaces. In addition, the kinesin/microtubule transport system was used to actively assemble nanocomposite materials capable of storing significant elastic energy. Novel biophysical measurement tools were also developed for measuring the collective force generated by kinesin motor proteins, which will provide insight on the mechanical constraints of active assembly processes. Responsive reconfiguration of nanostructures was studied in terms of using active biomolecules to mediate the optical properties of quantum dot (QD) arrays through modulation of inter-particle spacing and associated energy transfer interaction. Design rules for kinesin-based transport of a wide range of nanoscale cargo (e.g., nanocrystal quantum dots, micron-sized polymer spheres) were developed. Three-dimensional microtubule organizing centers were assembled in which the polar orientation of the microtubules was controlled by a multi-staged assembly process. Overall, a number of enabling technologies were developed over the course of this project, and will drive the exploitation of energy-driven processes to regulate the assembly, disassembly, and dynamic reorganization of nanomaterials.

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TYPE SAND Report YEAR 2005
OSTIDOI

Conceptual framework for biosecurity levels

Gaudioso, Jennifer M.; Salerno, Reynolds M.

Biosecurity must be implemented without impeding biomedical and bioscience research. Existing security literature and regulatory requirements do not present a comprehensive approach or clear model for biosecurity, nor do they wholly recognize the operational issues within laboratory environments. To help address these issues, the concept of Biosecurity Levels should be developed. Biosecurity Levels would have increasing levels of security protections depending on the attractiveness of the pathogens to adversaries. Pathogens and toxins would be placed in a Biosecurity Level based on their security risk. Specifically, the security risk would be a function of an agent's weaponization potential and consequences of use. To demonstrate the concept, examples of security risk assessments for several human, animal, and plant pathogens will be presented. Higher security than that currently mandated by federal regulations would be applied for those very few agents that represent true weapons threats and lower levels for the remainder.

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TYPE Conference YEAR 2004
OSTI

Historical precedence and technical requirements of biological weapons use : a threat assessment

Salerno, Reynolds M.; Barnett, Natalie B.; Gaudioso, Jennifer M.; Estes, Daniel P.

The threat from biological weapons is assessed through both a comparative historical analysis of the patterns of biological weapons use and an assessment of the technological hurdles to proliferation and use that must be overcome. The history of biological weapons is studied to learn how agents have been acquired and what types of states and substate actors have used agents. Substate actors have generally been more willing than states to use pathogens and toxins and they have focused on those agents that are more readily available. There has been an increasing trend of bioterrorism incidents over the past century, but states and substate actors have struggled with one or more of the necessary technological steps. These steps include acquisition of a suitable agent, production of an appropriate quantity and form, and effective deployment. The technological hurdles associated with the steps present a real barrier to producing a high consequence event. However, the ever increasing technological sophistication of society continually lowers the barriers, resulting in a low but increasing probability of a high consequence bioterrorism event.

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TYPE SAND Report YEAR 2004
OSTIDOI
72 Results
72 Results