Publications

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The Overall Objectives of this study are: 1).Create compact gaseous and delivered liquid hydrogen reference station designs appropriate for urban locations, enabled by hazard/harm mitigations, near-term technology improvements, and layouts informed by risk (performance-based design). 2) Disseminate results and obtain feedback through reports and a workshop with stakeholders representing code/standard development organization, station developers, code officials, and equipment suppliers. 3) Identify and provide designs for compact station concepts which enable siting on 3-times the number of stations in the dense urban example of San Francisco.

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Safety standards development for maintenance facilities of liquid and compressed natural gas fueled vehicles is required to ensure proper facility design and operating procedures. Standard development organizations are utilizing risk-informed concepts to develop natural gas vehicle (NGV) codes and standards so that maintenance facilities meet acceptable risk levels. The present report summarizes Phase II work for existing NGV repair facility code requirements and highlights inconsistencies that need quantitative analysis into their effectiveness. A Hazardous and Operability study was performed to identify key scenarios of interest using risk ranking. Detailed simulations and modeling were performed to estimate the location and behavior of natural gas releases based on these scenarios. Specific code conflicts were identified, and ineffective code requirements were highlighted and resolutions proposed. These include ventilation rate basis on area or volume, as well as a ceiling offset which seems ineffective at protecting against flammable gas concentrations. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors gratefully acknowledge Bill Houf (SNL -- Retired) for his assistance with the set-up and post-processing of the numerical simulations. The authors also acknowledge Doug Horne (retired) for his helpful discussions. We would also like to acknowledge the support from the Clean Cities program of DOE's Vehicle Technology Office.

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Hydrogen Risk Assessment Models (HyRAM) is a software toolkit that provides a basis for quantitative risk assessment and consequence modeling for hydrogen infrastructure and transportation systems. HyRAM integrates validated, analytical models of hydrogen behavior, statistics, and a standardized QRA approach to generate useful, repeatable data for the safety analysis of various hydrogen systems. HyRAM is a software developed by Sandia National Laboratories for the U.S. Department of Energy. This document demonstrates how to use HyRAM to recreate a hydrogen system and obtain relevant data regarding potential risk. Specific examples are utilized throughout this document, providing detailed tutorials of HyRAM features with respect to hydrogen system safety analysis and risk assessment.

The goal of the DOE OE ESS Safety Roadmap is to foster confidence in the safety and reliability of energy storage systems.

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Several jurisdictions with critical tunnel infrastructure have expressed the need to understand the risks and implications of traffic incidents in tunnels involving hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. A risk analysis was performed to estimate what scenarios were most likely to occur in the event of a crash. The results show that the most likely consequence is no additional hazard from the hydrogen, although some factors need additional data and study to validate. This includes minor crashes and scenarios with no release or ignition. When the hydrogen does ignite, it is most likely a jet flame from the pressure relief device release due to a hydrocarbon fire. This scenario was considered in detailed modeling of specific tunnel configurations, as well as discussion of consequence concerns from the Massachusetts Department of Transportation. Localized concrete spalling may result where the jet flame impinges the ceiling, but this is not expected to occur with ventilation. Structural epoxy remains well below the degradation temperature. The total stress on the steel structure was significantly lower than the yield stress of stainless steel at the maximum steel temperature even when the ventilation was not operational. As a result, the steel structure will not be compromised. It is important to note that the study took a conservative approach in several factors, so observed temperatures should be lower than predicted by the models.

This report presents the results of instrumentation cable tests sponsored by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research and performed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The goal of the tests was to assess thermal and electrical response behavior under fire-exposure conditions for instrumentation cables and circuits. The test objective was to assess how severe radiant heating conditions surrounding an instrumentation cable affect current or voltage signals in an instrumentation circuit. A total of thirty-nine small-scale tests were conducted. Ten different instrumentation cables were tested, ranging from one conductor to eight-twisted pairs. Because the focus of the tests was thermoset (TS) cables, only two of the ten cables had thermoplastic (TP) insulation and jacket material and the remaining eight cables were one of three different TS insulation and jacket material. Two instrumentation cables from previous cable fire testing were included, one TS and one TP. Three test circuits were used to simulate instrumentation circuits present in nuclear power plants: a 4–20 mA current loop, a 10–50 mA current loop and a 1–5 VDC voltage loop. A regression analysis was conducted to determine key variables affecting signal leakage time.

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The intent of the Building Fire Consequence Index (BFCI) at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is to provide a method to rank buildings based on the consequence of a fire in that building. This indexing tool will be used to determine the frequency a building's fire protection assessment (FPA) will be performed. Per DOE O 420.1C Chg. 1, Facility Safety, a FPA must be conducted annually (for facilities with a replacement value in excess of $100 million, facilities considered a high hazard, or those in which vital programs are involved), every three years (for remaining low and ordinary hazard facilities), or at a frequency with appropriate justification approved by the Depaitinent of Energy (DOE) head of field element. The BFCI provides a method for a graded approach utilizing a scoring criteria for various categories such as replacement plant value, building content value, hazards, mission dependency index, etc. when assigning FPA frequencies1.

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Foster confidence in the safety and reliability of energy storage systems.

The goal of the DOE OE ESS Safety Roadmap is to foster confidence in the safety and reliability of energy storage systems.

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The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) current fire protection regulatory framework was initiated in response to a cable fire that occurred at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station in 1975. Following the issuance of several guidance documents, in 1981 the Commission codified deterministic requirements to provide reasonable assurance that fire would not jeopardize reactor safety (10 CFR 50.48 "Fire Protection" and Appendix R to 10 CFR 50). Since then, the results of plant operating experience, NRC inspection activities and cable fire testing programs have served to clarify the application of these requirements. In 2004, the NRC amended 10 CFR Part 50.48 to add a new subsection, 10 CFR 50.48(c), that endorses, with exceptions, the National Fire Protection Association's 805, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants — 2001 Edition," as a voluntary alternative for demonstrating compliance with Appendix R. To date, approximately half of all operating plants have transitioned to a risk-informed approach under 10 CFR 50.48(c). Regardless of the selected approach, each operating nuclear power plant should establish a comprehensive fire protection program that includes features needed to minimize the likelihood and consequence of firesl. To achieve this objective, fire protection programs integrate the NRC's long-held safety concept of defense-in-depth (DID) by providing multiple barriers against potentially unacceptable consequences of fire. To minimize the frequency and size of fires, the first lines of defense include controls for fire prevention, such as controlling combustibles and ignition sources and fire mitigation features, such as fire detection and suppression systems. In the unlikely event that a fire should start and continue to grow in spite of these features, appropriate fire protection features, such as fire-rated barriers are provided as necessary to ensure the accomplishment of essential shutdown functions. This handbook was specifically developed for NRC inspectors that may be assigned to perform elements of Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05T, "Fire Protection (Triennial)," including, (a) "Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities," (e) "Alternative Shutdown Capability," and (f) "Circuit Analyses." Thus, the document concentrates solely on the final element of defense-in-depth— ensuring reactor safety will not be compromised in the event of a serious fire. In addition to describing how the NRC's regulatory framework has evolved since the Browns Ferry Fire, the handbook illustrates the content and scope of various analyses typically referenced in a plant's fire protection licensing basis and includes techniques and insights for assessing the plant's conformance to those criteria.

This paper presents a risk assessment of a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)/diesel hybrid locomotive to identify and rank failures that could result in the release of LNG or Gaseous Natural Gas (GNG) to the surrounding environment. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) will analyze industry safety assessments of the proposed rail vehicles and the goal of this risk analysis is to identify and prioritize hazard scenarios so the FRA can ensure that they are properly addressed. For operational activities, a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was performed to identify high risk failure modes. A modified hazard and operability study (HAZOP) methodology was used to analyze hazard scenarios for the maintenance activities for the LNG and Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) dual-fuel locomotives and the LNG tender car. Because refueling operations are highly dependent on human interactions, a human factors assessment was also performed on a sample refueling procedure to identify areas of improvement and identify best practices for analyzing future procedures. The FMEA resulted in the identification of 87 total failure modes for the operational phase, three of which were deemed to have a High risk priority, all involving the cryogenic storage tank. The HAZOP for the LNG tender resulted in the identification of eight credible hazard scenarios and the HAZOP for the locomotive in the maintenance mode identified 27 credible hazard scenarios. The high and medium risk failure modes and hazard scenarios should be prioritized for further analysis.

The objective of this research is to better understand the fire-induced failure modes of instrumentation cables and evaluate the potential effect those failure modes could have on plant instrumentation circuits (i.e., circuit, component, and/or system response). In particular, this research is intended to better quantify the signal leakage that may occur before catastrophic failure in instrumentation circuits.

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A fire at a nuclear power plant (NPP) has the potential to damage structures, systems, and components important to safety, if not promptly detected and suppressed. At Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant on March 22, 1975, a fire in the reactor building damaged electrical power and control systems. Damage to instrumentation cables impeded the function of both normal and standby reactor coolant systems, and degraded the operators’ plant monitoring capability. This event resulted in additional NRC involvement with utilities to ensure that NPPs are properly protected from fire as intended by the NRC principle design criteria (i.e., general design criteria 3, Fire Protection). Current guidance and methods for both deterministic and performance based approaches typically make conservative (bounding) assumptions regarding the fire-induced failure modes of instrumentation cables and those failure modes effects on component and system response. Numerous fire testing programs have been conducted in the past to evaluate the failure modes and effects of electrical cables exposed to severe thermal conditions. However, that testing has primarily focused on control circuits with only a limited number of tests performed on instrumentation circuits. In 2001, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) conducted a series of cable fire tests designed to address specific aspects of the cable failure and circuit fault issues of concern1. The NRC was invited to observe and participate in that program. The NRC sponsored Sandia National Laboratories to support this participation, whom among other things, added a 4-20 mA instrumentation circuit and instrumentation cabling to six of the tests. Although limited, one insight drawn from those instrumentation circuits tests was that the failure characteristics appeared to depend on the cable insulation material. The results showed that for thermoset insulated cables, the instrument reading tended to drift and fluctuate, while the thermoplastic insulated cables, the instrument reading fell off-scale rapidly. From an operational point of view, the latter failure characteristics would likely be identified as a failure from the effects of fire, while the former may result in inaccurate readings.

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Building a hydrogen infrastructure system is critical to supporting the development of alternate- fuel vehicles. This report provides a methodology for implementing a performance-based design of an outdoor hydrogen refueling station that does not meet specific prescriptive requirements in NFPA 2, The Hydrogen Technologies Code . Performance-based designs are a code-compliant alternative to meeting prescriptive requirements. Compliance is demonstrated by comparing a prescriptive-based fueling station design with a performance-based design approach using Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) methods and hydrogen risk assessment tools. This template utilizes the Sandia-developed QRA tool, Hydrogen Risk Analysis Models (HyRAM), which combines reduced-order deterministic models that characterize hydrogen release and flame behavior with probabilistic risk models to quantify risk values. Each project is unique and this template is not intended to account for site-specific characteristics. Instead, example content and a methodology are provided for a representative hydrogen refueling site which can be built upon for new hydrogen applications.

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Sandia National Laboratories evaluated published safety assessment methods across a variety of industries including Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), hydrogen, land and marine transportation, as well as the US Department of Defense (DOD). All the methods were evaluated for their potential applicability for use in the LNG railroad application. After reviewing the documents included in this report, as well as others not included because of repetition, the Department of Energy (DOE) Hydrogen Safety Plan Checklist is most suitable to be adapted to the LNG railroad application. This report was developed to survey industries related to rail transportation for methodologies and tools that can be used by the FRA to review and evaluate safety assessments submitted by the railroad industry as a part of their implementation plans for liquefied or compressed natural gas storage ( on-board or tender) and engine fueling delivery systems. The main sections of this report provide an overview of various methods found during this survey. In most cases, the reference document is quoted directly. The final section provides discussion and a recommendation for the most appropriate methodology that will allow efficient and consistent evaluations to be made. The DOE Hydrogen Safety Plan Checklist was then revised to adapt it as a methodology for the Federal Railroad Administration’s use in evaluating safety plans submitted by the railroad industry.

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