Publications

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Conventional cyber defenses require continual maintenance: virus, firmware, and software updates; costly functional impact tests; and dedicated staff within a security operations center. The conventional defenses require access to external sources for the latest updates. The whitelisted system, however, is ideally a system that can sustain itself freed from external inputs. Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), have the following unique traits: digital commands are physically observable and verifiable; possible combinations of commands are limited and finite. These CPS traits, combined with a trust anchor to secure an unclonable digital identity (i.e., digitally unclonable function [DUF] - Patent Application #15/183,454; CodeLock), offers an excellent opportunity to explore defenses built on whitelisting approach called 'Trustworthy Design Architecture (TDA).' There exist significant research challenges in defining what are the physically verifiable whitelists as well as the criteria for cyber-physical traits that can be used as the unclonable identity. One goal of the project is to identify a set of physical and/or digital characteristics that can uniquely identify an endpoint. The measurements must have the properties of being reliable, reproducible, and trustworthy. Given that adversaries naturally evolve with any defense, the adversary will have the goal of disrupting or spoofing this process. To protect against such disruptions, we provide a unique system engineering technique, when applied to CPSs (e.g., nuclear processing facilities, critical infrastructures), that will sustain a secure operational state without ever needing external information or active inputs from cybersecurity subject-matter experts (i.e., virus updates, IDS scans, patch management, vulnerability updates). We do this by eliminating system dependencies on external sources for protection. Instead, all internal communication is actively sealed and protected with integrity, authenticity and assurance checks that only cyber identities bound to the physical component can deliver. As CPSs continue to advance (i.e., IoTs, drones, ICSs), resilient-maintenance free solutions are needed to neutralize/reduce cyber risks. TDA is a conceptual system engineering framework specifically designed to address cyber-physical systems that can potentially be maintained and operated without the persistent need or demand for vulnerability or security patch updates.

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The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates the annual cost from cyber crime to be more than $400 billion. Most notable is the recent digital identity thefts that compromised millions of accounts. These attacks emphasize the security problems of using clonable static information. One possible solution is the use of a physical device known as a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF). PUFs can be used to create encryption keys, generate random numbers, or authenticate devices. While the concept shows promise, current PUF implementations are inherently problematic: inconsistent behavior, expensive, susceptible to modeling attacks, and permanent. Therefore, we propose a new solution by which an unclonable, dynamic digital identity is created between two communication endpoints such as mobile devices. This Physically Unclonable Digital ID (PUDID) is created by injecting a data scrambling PUF device at the data origin point that corresponds to a unique and matching descrambler/hardware authentication at the receiving end. This device is designed using macroscopic, intentional anomalies, making them inexpensive to produce. PUDID is resistant to cryptanalysis due to the separation of the challenge response pair and a series of hash functions. PUDID is also unique in that by combining the PUF device identity with a dynamic human identity, we can create true two-factor authentication. We also propose an alternative solution that eliminates the need for a PUF mechanism altogether by combining tamper resistant capabilities with a series of hash functions. This tamper resistant device, referred to as a Quasi-PUDID (Q-PUDID), modifies input data, using a black-box mechanism, in an unpredictable way. By mimicking PUF attributes, Q-PUDID is able to avoid traditional PUF challenges thereby providing high-performing physical identity assurance with or without a low performing PUF mechanism. Three different application scenarios with mobile devices for PUDID and Q-PUDID have been analyzed to show their unique advantages over traditional PUFs and outline the potential for placement in a host of applications.

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For critical infrastructure facilities, mitigation techniques for insider threats are primarily non-technical in nature and rely heavily on policies/procedures. Traditional access control measures (access cards, biometrics, PIN numbers, etc.) are built on a philosophy of trust that enables those with appropriate permissions to access facilities without additional monitoring or restrictions. Systems based on these measures have three main limitations: 1) access is typically bound to a single authentication occurrence; 2) the authentication factors have little impact against human (insider) threats to security systems; and 3) many of the authentication systems inconvenience end-users. In order to mitigate the aforementioned deficiencies, we propose utilizing the concept of Ephemeral Biometrics to construct strong, persistent authentication protocols.

Current physical and cybersecurity systems have been relying on traditional three factor authentication to mitigate the threats posed by insider attacks. Typically, systems use one or two of the following factors to authenticate end-users: what you know (e.g., password), what you have (e.g., RSA ID), or what you are (e.g., fingerprint). Systems based on these factors have the following limitations: 1) access is typically bound to a single authentication occurrence leading to remote vulnerabilities, 2) the factors have little impact against persistent insider threats, and 3) many of the authentication systems violate system design principles such as user psychological acceptability by inconveniencing the end-users. In order to mitigate the identified limitations, we propose the usage of 'where you are' as a complementary factor that can significantly improve both cybersecurity and physical security. Having accurate location tracking as a new factor for authentication: 1) provides continuous identification tracking and continuous mediation of access to resources, 2) requires remote threats to acquire a physical presence, 3) allows for the enforcement of cybersecurity and physical security policies in real-time through automation, and 4) provides enhanced security without inconveniencing the end-users. Using the strength of location as an authentication factor, this paper specifies design requirements that must be present in an insider-threat Prevention System (iTPS) that is capable of actively monitoring malicious insider behaviors. iTPS has the potential to radically change the physical protection systems and cybersecurity landscape by providing practitioners with the first-of-its-kind tool for real-time insider-threat prevention capabilities. iTPS is particularly suited to address the safety and security needs of critical infrastructure, nuclear facilities, and emergency response situations. © 2012 IEEE.