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Conceptual Monitoring Options for a Southern Lebanon Withdrawal Agreement

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Conceptual Monitoring Options for a Southern Lebanon Withdrawal Agreement

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Abstract

Southern Lebanon is a key factor in a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement. Israel has had a presence in southern Lebanon since 1976 and occupied a self-described “security zone” there in 1985.

The purpose of this study is to outline options for cooperation in southern Lebanon that address the security goals of the players and may help facilitate a withdrawal agreement. Three scenarios were developed to address the security goals of the participants, each requiring increasing levels of cooperation. These scenarios and options for cooperative monitoring are described in this report.

Acronyms

GPS	Global Positioning System
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
ILMG	Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group
IRGC	Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
JMG	Joint Monitoring Group
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
MoD	Ministry of Defense
OP	Observation Post
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
SLA	South Lebanon Army
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UGS	Unattended Ground Sensors
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

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Executive Summary

Southern Lebanon is a key factor in any comprehensive Middle East peace settlement. Israel has maintained a political and military presence in southern Lebanon since 1976 and occupied a self-described “security zone” since 1985. The United Nations Security Council issued Resolution (UNSCR) 425 in March 1978 calling for the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanon and for United Nations peacekeepers to restore peace and security there. Israel largely ignored UNSCR 425 until April 1998 when the Israeli inner cabinet unanimously acknowledged the resolution. Israeli officials described two options for action:

- 1) a withdrawal based on bilateral negotiations with Lebanon, and
- 2) a unilateral withdrawal with the implied right to reenter Lebanon if deteriorating security conditions require it.

At the time of writing (spring 1999), it is not clear how the Israelis will proceed. The ultimate resolution of these issues requires major decisions about national security by Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. Each of the key players involved in southern Lebanon has specific goals that will affect their security decisions:

- Israel seeks a secure northern border.
- Members of Israel’s allied South Lebanon Army seek a way to withdraw without retribution.
- Lebanon seeks to regain sovereignty in the southern part of the country.
- Syria wants to protect its western flank and maintain political influence in Lebanon.
- Iran wants to strengthen its influence with Lebanon’s Shia population.
- Hizballah seeks to force the Israeli army out of Lebanon.

The purpose of this study is to outline options for cooperation in southern Lebanon that address the security goals of the players and may help facilitate an agreement. The study is not prescriptive and assumes that a political arrangement for Israeli withdrawal has been reached. Cooperation may take a number of forms. Israel has an interest in a stable Lebanese government in control of southern Lebanon. In some circumstances, Israeli security could benefit from Lebanese armed forces with capabilities enhanced through equipment upgrades and technical training. Direct Israeli support for these enhancements could provide the basis for cooperative monitoring of southern Lebanon by Israel and Lebanon.

Cooperative monitoring is the collection (often by the use of sensors), analyzing, and sharing of information among parties to an agreement. Three cooperative monitoring scenarios were developed to address the security goals of the participants, each requiring increasing levels of cooperation. Some options for cooperative monitoring identified in the three scenarios are:

LOW COOPERATION

- Joint military patrols along border.
- Enhanced border-crossing points between Israel and Lebanon.
- Means of notification of military activities and border incidents.
- Enhanced monitoring ability for Lebanese military.

MEDIUM COOPERATION (in addition to or in place of those in LOW)

- Border monitoring sensors that report to Israeli and Lebanese military commands.
- Procedures for coordinated operations.
- Enhanced Lebanese interior checkpoints.
- Introduction of a multinational supervisory organization.
- A shared border communications network.

HIGH COOPERATION (in addition or in place of those in MEDIUM)

- A multinational monitoring organization with operational responsibilities.
- A monitoring and coordination center, staffed by parties to an agreement.
- A real-time reporting network for the monitoring center
- Enhanced border monitoring sensors including unmanned aerial vehicles

Introduction

On April 1, 1998, the Israeli inner cabinet* unanimously accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 425, which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. The cabinet's acceptance came 20 years after the Security Council adopted UNSCR 425 and renewed domestic and international debate over the Israeli government's Lebanon policy. The future status of the Israeli military presence in Lebanon was an issue in Israel's May 1999 election. Prime Minister Ehud Barak has indicated he would like to withdraw Israeli troops from southern Lebanon although he has not yet described a plan to do so. At the time of writing (spring 1999), Israel Defense Forces (IDF) remain engaged in a guerrilla war with various armed factions in southern Lebanon. Any eventual Israeli decision for withdrawal is inextricably linked to larger regional issues, particularly relations with Syria and the dormant Middle East Peace Process.

In light of the Israeli acceptance of UNSCR 425, an examination of the potential roles cooperative monitoring could play in building confidence or implementing an agreement among the parties in southern Lebanon is timely. Cooperative monitoring is the collecting (usually through the use of sensor technology), analyzing, and complete sharing of information among parties to an agreement. The issues that surround the Lebanon imbroglio are complex, and an effective cooperative monitoring regime must account for the myriad interests there. This paper will describe the history of the conflict, the players and issues present on the contemporary Lebanon-Israel border and then discuss potential cooperative monitoring activities within this context. These measures might help support a future withdrawal agreement and improve confidence that the respective security interests were being addressed.

* Also known as the "security cabinet," this group is comprised of 11 of the Prime Minister's 18 Cabinet ministers.

Background

Israel's security dilemma in southern Lebanon began shortly after the Six-Day War of June 1967. In 1968, guerrillas of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) began to use southern Lebanon as a base for occasional attacks on Israeli border towns and military facilities (see Figure 1 for a map of Lebanon). In September 1970, the government of the Kingdom of Jordan, alarmed at the PLO's rising influence and power in its country, began a military campaign to expel the PLO from Jordan. In 1971, the PLO headquarters and its paramilitary organization relocated to Lebanon. From their new bases in southern Lebanon, the PLO escalated its military campaign of attacks, cross-border shelling, and infiltration against Israel. The government of Lebanon steadily lost functional control of the area the PLO occupied in the South. In 1975, the civil war began in Lebanon and, over time, reduced the government's effective control to a small area around Beirut. The Lebanese military splintered along religious lines and ceased to have any power in the South. By the late 1970s, Israel-Lebanon border was a battleground with recurrent conflict between the Israeli army and the PLO.

The Historical Context of the Israeli Presence in Southern Lebanon

In the summer of 1976, the Israeli presence in southern Lebanon began with Defense Minister Shimon Peres' announcement of the "Good Fence" program. This allowed local Lebanese to cross into Israel for work, medical treatment, and travel. In addition, the policy gave Israel access to both Lebanese collaborators and southern Lebanon in its battle with the Palestinian forces there. Israel allied itself with Major Sa'ad Haddad, a Greek Catholic Lebanese army officer who had been sent south by Beirut in 1976 to help organize the defense against Palestinian and leftist forces. Haddad later ignored orders and remained in the South after the collapse of the Lebanese army. He formed his own militia army, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), and became Israel's proxy in its campaign against the PLO.¹

During the next six years Israel and the SLA battled the Palestinian forces in southern Lebanon. Israel launched two major military offensives. *Operation Litani*, begun in March 1978, displaced the PLO along the border, created 200,000 civilian refugees, and caused the United Nations Security Council to approve Resolution 425 (UNSCR 425) calling for the withdrawal of Israeli and immediate deployment of a UN peacekeeping force (see Appendix A). Israel withdrew its forces by June 1978 but turned its positions over to the SLA, not the United Nation Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL).² Infiltration and cross-border attacks by rockets, although reduced in frequency, continued. In June 1982, Israel launched *Operation Peace for Galilee* to rid Lebanon of the PLO. By late 1982, the PLO headquarters and its remaining military forces evacuated Lebanon and relocated to Tunisia. Israeli forces pulled back from their positions in central Lebanon and around Beirut but remained in southern Lebanon along with the SLA.



Figure 1. Map of Lebanon

Chronology of Events in Lebanon

- 1920 France given mandate to govern Lebanon by the League of Nations.
- 1943 Lebanon gains independence from France.
- 1948 State of Israel is created. Palestinian exodus to Jordan and Lebanon occurs.
- 1958 Civil war between Christians and Muslims begins in Lebanon.
- 1959 Shia cleric Musa al-Sadr begins populist reform movement.
- 1967 Musa al-Sadr creates the Lebanese Shiite Higher Council. Israel occupies the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights after the Six Day War.
- 1968 The PLO begins raids against Israel from Lebanon.
- 1970-71 Jordan expels the PLO which then moves its bases to Lebanon.
- 1975 Civil war between Christians and Muslims begins again in Lebanon. *Amal* is formed by Musa al-Sadr.
- 1976 Syria troops intervene in Lebanon to stop the war and remain indefinitely.
- 1978 Israel invades Lebanon in "Operation Litani." United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 425 and creates UNIFIL to monitor southern Lebanon.
- 1979 The Islamic revolution in Iran changes the government.
- 1981 Israel annexes the Golan Heights.
- 1982 Israel invades Lebanon in "Operation Peace for Galilee." Lebanese guerrilla resistance against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon begins. *Hizballah* is formed.
- 1983 Suicide bombers destroy U.S. Embassy, U.S. and French military headquarters in Beirut. Israel begins military withdrawal from Lebanon.
- 1984 Hostage-taking of foreigners by various armed factions begins in Lebanon.
- 1985 Israeli forces withdraw south to the Litani River and establish a "security zone." Hizballah declares its manifesto.
- 1988 Political crisis begins in Beirut when rival prime ministers take office in east and west Beirut.
- 1989 Christian Lebanese "prime minister" declares war on Syrian army in Lebanon and is defeated. Ta'if Accord ends civil war in Lebanon.
- 1993 Israel launches "Operation Accountability" in southern Lebanon.
- 1996 Israel launches "Operation Grapes of Wrath" in southern Lebanon. *Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group* formed. Likud party wins Israeli elections.
- 1998 Israel announces acceptance of UNSCR 425.
- 1999 Ehud Barak elected as Prime Minister of Israel

This extended occupation initiated Israel's current conflict with the Shia Moslem Lebanese who have historically lived in southern Lebanon. Lebanon's southern Shia population is the poorest and largest community in the country³ and has been historically underrepresented in the government. Many Shia have been attracted to groups promising a change in the status quo.⁴ The movement of the PLO to southern Lebanon in 1971 largely displaced the central government. Over time, the Shia felt they were under foreign occupation. Consequently, when Israel invaded in 1982, the Shia initially welcomed the Israelis. In 1983 Shia attitudes towards Israel began to change when they realized that the Israelis were not going to withdraw. The Shia concluded that they had exchanged one foreign occupation for another. The IDF viewed the shift in Shia support as challenging their authority. Several violent confrontations occurred between the IDF and the Shia.

In November 1983, a guerilla war began between the Shia militias and the IDF. The goal of the militias was, and still is, to force a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. By 1984, the Shia were launching frequent attacks against the IDF. In response, Israel withdrew the bulk of its forces in Lebanon between January and June 1985 but created a "security zone" averaging 10 km wide along the Israel-Lebanon border patrolled by an IDF garrison along with the SLA.⁵ The areas controlled by the IDF and SLA are shown in Figure 2. Shia militias continued their fight against the SLA and IDF in Lebanon throughout the rest of the 1980s and early 1990s and used the area to launch attacks on Israel's northern settlements and as an infiltration route to conduct terrorist operations inside Israel.



Figure 2. Israeli Security Zone in Southern Lebanon

By the early 1990s the Hizballah militia had become the primary Shia guerrilla force fighting to oust the Israelis. IDF casualties sharply increased in 1992 as Hizballah improved both its weapons and military organization. The Shia militias received money, training, and arms from Syria (to pressure Israel) and Iran (to support Islamic revolution). In response, Tel Aviv launched its third major offensive in southern Lebanon, *Operation Accountability*, on 25 July 1993. The goal was to cripple the military capability of Hizballah and apply pressure on Syria to disarm Hizballah.

By the end of July 1993 American mediation efforts had stopped the fighting and led to an unwritten "understanding" under which Hizballah forces would stop launching rockets into Israel. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher brokered the understanding with "...Israel, Syria and Lebanon and through indirect contacts with Iran."⁶ Israeli officials declared victory saying their offensive resulted in the Hizballah pledge not to fire on northern Israel. Hizballah publicly vowed to continue its fight against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, which the "understandings" did not prohibit, but said it would stop its rocket attacks "...as long as Israeli forces [did] not fire on Lebanese civilians."⁷

Although conflict in the security zone continued, shelling of northern Israel ceased. The unwritten understandings of 1993 collapsed on April 11, 1996 with the beginning of Israel's fourth military offensive into Lebanon, *Operation Grapes of Wrath*. The offensive was in retaliation for a surge of Hizballah attacks against Israeli troops and northern Israel. Tel Aviv targeted Lebanese infrastructure in Beirut, such as electrical supply stations, to put a new form of pressure on the Lebanese and Syrian governments to restrain Hizballah. On April 18, Israeli artillery shells landed inside the UN military compound in Qana killing approximately 100 civilian refugees and injuring another 100. Allegations were made that the shelling was deliberate.

Whatever the cause of the Qana tragedy, Israeli public support for the operation evaporated and the Clinton Administration began to apply significant pressure on Israel to implement a cease-fire. Secretary Christopher negotiated an end to the fighting and the so-called "April 26, 1996 Understanding," between Israel and the government of Lebanon. The agreement protects civilians by prohibiting attacks on civilian targets or from civilian areas (see Appendix B). The April 26 Understanding added a new feature in an attempt to stabilize conditions in southern Lebanon: the *Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group* (ILMG). The ILMG is an independent monitoring group composed of representatives from Israel, Lebanon, Syria, France, and the United States with the goal of assessing the application of the April 26 Understanding.

Conditions in southern Lebanon are largely unchanged at the time of writing. Shia militias attack IDF/SLA positions and attempt to infiltrate into Israel.

Key Players and Their Goals


The political and military context for the conflict in southern Lebanon is among the most complex in the Middle East. As the previous discussion illustrates, activities there impact the interests of state and non-state actors, primarily Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and Hizballah. Each sees southern Lebanon's future in terms of its respective goals. Understanding the players and their goals is central to application of cooperative monitoring.

Israel: Secure Its Border

Since the late 1970s, Israel's stated goal has been to secure its northern border against military, guerrilla, and terrorist attack. Israel's efforts originally were focused on the threat posed by the PLO. After being forced out of Jordan, the PLO established bases throughout Lebanon and used the South to launch repeated attacks against Israel's northern towns. The government of Israel established the self-declared "security zone" to provide an armed buffer zone between PLO forces and Israel.

Israel's costly success in driving the PLO from Lebanon and establishing its buffer zone ironically produced a new threat: the Shia resistance. Just as the PLO before them, but with less local resentment, the militias used the South to launch attacks against Israeli forces, northern towns, and as an infiltration route to conduct terrorist operations inside Israel.

Israel's response to the Shia militias was similar to that against the PLO. IDF forces used the "security zone" as a buffer between the armed groups and Israel and as a base for operations against them. Today, Israel maintains about 1,500 soldiers in Lebanon. Guerrilla groups attack almost daily and inflict casualties on the IDF (see Figure 3).



(Casualty data from Israel Defense Forces, Spokesperson's Office, Information Branch from the Internet)

Figure 3. IDF Casualties in Lebanon, 1990-1998

The South Lebanon Army: Just Fade Away

The SLA has fought beside the IDF from the very beginning as Israel's Lebanese proxy. The group has been funded by Israel and does not have clearly defined political goals. It is difficult to imagine the group's continued existence after an IDF pullback. The rank and file of the 2,200-man SLA (about 55 percent Muslim and 45 percent Christian) probably would not have much difficulty returning to their villages and civilian life. The senior leadership, however, could face severe reprisals. The Lebanese government in late 1996 sentenced current SLA Commander Antoine Lahd to death *in absentia* for his collaboration with Israel. SLA senior leadership likely would flee to Israel or other countries outside the region to escape Lebanese retribution. Some of these officers, including Lahd, reportedly have already acquired foreign passports.⁸

Lebanon: Regain Its Sovereignty

Since the end of the civil war in 1990, the internationally recognized government in Beirut has remained a peripheral player in the conflict due to its subordinate relationship with Syria. Syria strongly influences Lebanon's foreign policy decisions, given the power of 30,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon remained after the civil war. The 60,000-man Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) collapsed during the civil war and has lately focused on rebuilding itself. The LAF is not deployed throughout the country. The government in Beirut has said that once the Israelis withdraw, the LAF will deploy south. Lebanon has largely placed its goal of regaining its sovereignty in the South in the hands of the international community.

Syria: Protect Its Flank

Syria is a key participant in southern Lebanon. Beginning in 1970, Syria's primary interest in Lebanon became one of protecting its western flank, politically as well as a militarily. When the PLO took up residence in Lebanon, Syrian President Asad became "... intensely interested in every twist of Palestinian politics."⁹ Israel's close relations with Lebanon's Christian community and its nascent war with the leftists and PLO there left Asad with the threat of either a significant gain in Israeli influence, or a war on his border that could eventually involve Syria.

When civil war erupted in 1975 among Lebanon's Palestinian, Muslim and Christian camps, security became Asad's primary concern. If Syria remained on the sidelines, the Christians might win and set up a separate Christian state with Israel as protector. If the Christians lost, Israel might intervene to protect its interests. Asad attempted to negotiate with the warring factions to stave off a Lebanese collapse but with the disintegration of the LAF into its religious factions in March 1976; Asad saw no alternative to intervention. During the night of May 31, 1976, Syrian regular army units crossed into Lebanon "...to teach the Palestinians sense and to keep the Christians Arab."¹⁰ Syria's intervention in Lebanon was no surprise to Israel. As a result of American negotiation, Israel had agreed to a limited incursion in an

unwritten “red-line” agreement, which limited the number of Syrian troops south of the Damascus-Beirut road and restricted air and naval deployments.

By late 1976, Syria’s military intervention had ended the fighting. In October, Asad attended a Saudi Arabian-sponsored peace summit, which legitimized Syria’s presence in Lebanon. Syrian forces in Lebanon became part of an “Arab Deterrent Force” funded by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and supported by troops from other Arab militaries. Syrian forces gained control over all of Beirut by November, the militias fled, and the civil war was declared over.¹¹ Despite his success in ending the fighting, Asad’s efforts to keep the Israelis out of Lebanon failed. In 1983 Israel and Lebanon signed a joint security agreement that provided for an Israeli withdrawal if the Syrians withdrew. Syria rejected this offer.

Fighting among the various religious groups within Lebanon resumed in the mid-1980s again drawing Syrian forces into the conflict. By 1988 the deep rifts between these groups resulted in a presidential secession crisis in Lebanon. A leadership vacuum and renewed fighting followed. With the Lebanese economy in shambles and a breakdown in public services looming, 62 members of the Lebanese parliament -- evenly split between Christian and Muslim -- met in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia in late 1989. The meeting produced the “Document of National Understanding,” more commonly referred to as the *Ta’if Accord*. The accord implicitly recognized the necessity of compromise while not abandoning the ultimate goal of political unification under a “national” government, superior to the religious groups. The Ta’if Accord, accepted by the Lebanese legislature in 1990, effectively ended the civil war. It also formalized Lebanon’s “special relationship” with Syria and only required Asad to redeploy his forces to the Bekaa Valley within two years.¹² Today, Syrian forces not only remain in the Bekaa Valley, but also in Beirut and northern Lebanon.¹³

Syria’s presence in Lebanon has become inextricably linked to Asad’s agenda in the stalled Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Syria’s 30,000 troops in Lebanon are the ultimate guarantor of Asad’s interests there and were critical to the successful disarming of the various militias at the end of the civil war. Asad allowed Hizballah to retain its weapons, however, to support the guerrilla action against the Israelis in the South. Syria defined Hizballah operations as legitimate resistance to Israeli occupation. Syrian support to Hizballah also includes serving as a resupply conduit for Iranian assistance.¹⁴

Syrian support to the Hizballah guerrillas figures prominently in Asad’s strategic posturing with Israel. President Asad’s primary goal in any peace deal with Israel is a return to the June 4, 1967 border that returns the Golan Heights to Syrian control. Asad apparently concluded that he could not retake this strategic plateau lost to Israel in 1967 by force. Instead he looked to the diplomatic arena for a solution. However, with the collapse of MEPP negotiations with Israel in 1996, Asad turned again to his “Hizballah card” to keep pressure on Israel and remind it of the costs of not having a comprehensive peace agreement. When Israel floated proposals in 1996 for resolving

the security issues with Lebanon bilaterally, Syria and Lebanon publicly restated the linkage between the return of the Golan, quiet along the Lebanon border and comprehensive peace with Israel. Asad told reporters, “Syria and Lebanon first - at the same time, in the same steps.”¹⁵ Asad’s manipulation of Hizballah guerrilla activities in southern Lebanon provides the only real leverage Syria enjoys over Israel.

Iran: Strengthen the Shia

Iran’s interests in Lebanon have been closely linked to the plight of the Shia Muslims there. A charismatic Iranian cleric of Lebanese ancestry provided a political outlet for Shia fervor. Musa al-Sadr began a populist reform movement after his return to Lebanon in 1959 and by 1975 had organized his own armed militia, *Amal* (an acronym of *Afwaq al Nuqawamah al Lubnanya*, the “Units of the Lebanese Resistance”). Musa al-Sadr said *Amal* was distinct from other militias in Lebanon in that its men were “...trained to go to the South and fight Israel.”¹⁶ Tehran’s efforts have been channeled through various Shia groups (indirectly through *Amal* at first and directly through Hizballah more recently) and intended to improve conditions for the Shia and to spread the Islamic “revolution” started by Ayatollah Khomeini.¹⁷

By the time of Israel’s invasion of 1982, however, *Amal* had split into two factions. One was secular in nature, rejected an “Islamic Republic of Lebanon,” and sought political accommodation with Israel. This group also was more beholden to Syria for support. The other faction “...viewed *Amal* as the vanguard of revolutionary struggle ... based on the model and ideals of the Iranian revolution”¹⁸ and won Iran’s favor. In June 1982 several senior members of *Amal* allied to the Iranian faction split and started the *Islamic Amal* based in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley.

Iranian support for the ideals of Islamic *Amal* was strengthened with the arrival in mid-1982 of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Tehran sent a small contingent of IRGC to Lebanon ostensibly to fight Israeli forces in the South but this role was “...blocked by Syria as well as Khomeini himself for strategic reasons.”¹⁹ The IRGC did play a critical role in the immediate survival of Islamic *Amal*, however, and in its eventual merging with other radical Lebanese Shia movements to create *Hizballah* in late 1982.

Iranian goals in Lebanon appear to be less revolutionary and more pragmatic today. Iran appears willing to reap the additional political benefits of an Israeli withdrawal and cease its armed struggle through its Hizballah proxy. Iranian Minister of Culture Ayatollah Mohajerani said as much in April 1998, “If Israel withdraws from southern Lebanon within a security framework to defined, secure borders, there will be no further need for Hizballah oppositionist activities in southern Lebanon.”²⁰

Hizballah: Liberate Lebanon

After quietly organizing itself in the wake of Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the “Party of God” (*hizballah* in Arabic), issued its manifesto in February 1985. In it,

Hizballah declared its pan-Islamic character, allegiance to Khomeini's Iran, and hatred of Israel and its patron, the United States. The manifesto legitimized armed struggle: "Freedom is not freely given or granted, but it is retrieved through the exertion of souls and blood. We can no longer be patient for we have been patient for tens of years."²¹ Hizballah's campaign has included hostage taking and the destruction of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut as well as its guerrilla war against Israel in the South.

Hizballah became the Shia standard bearer in the fight against the IDF after Amal's power peaked in 1985. Hizballah gained increasing popular support as Amal moved into the political mainstream.²² By the 1990s, Hizballah guerrillas were the primary force fighting Israel in southern Lebanon earning them "recognition" during American mediation efforts to end Israel's "Operation Accountability." The April 26, 1996 Understandings went even further by implicitly legitimizing Hizballah's right to attack Israeli forces in Lebanon.

Hizballah is moderating its public image. With Iranian support, Hizballah has established itself "as the country's only effective means of resistance, earning it some respect from across Lebanon's fractured political spectrum."²³ Iran has sought to capitalize on that respect and has redirected some of its support of Hizballah to establishing schools, hospitals and other social services in Shia communities. Hizballah has moved into the mainstream political life in Lebanon as a political party with representatives in Parliament. Hizballah has learned to adapt to the changing domestic and international political climate as well, even though its ideology has not officially changed much since its 1985 manifesto.²⁴ The deputy chief of Hizballah's political bureau reportedly said, "There's a difference between ... ideological beliefs and ... political stands."²⁵ Hizballah realizes its war with Israel serves a purpose for its patrons, Syria and Iran. Once that purpose is no longer served, Hizballah understands its role must change, much the same as Amal's did before it.

As Hizballah moves closer to the political mainstream, an unanswered question is whether other factions will continue to launch attacks against Israel even if the IDF withdraws. There are elements within Hizballah that are more "radical" than others and may decide that moderation is abandonment of the revolution. It was just that kind of ideological rift in Amal that produced Hizballah in 1982-83. Recent Israeli press reports citing defense officials say that Hizballah is already in the midst of a "violent split." Hizballah's secretary-general Hasan Nasrallah heads the more moderate camp. Subhi al-Tufayli, Hizballah's first secretary-general and former Amal member leads the other camp. The report says that Tufayli is more extreme than Nasrallah and has been advocating a more "confrontational policy."²⁶ Tufayli launched a "Revolution of the Hungry" in July 1997 and led a civil revolt in the Bekaa Valley demanding that the Lebanese government provide more resources to the Shia living there, the poorest in the country. Tufayli's actions have forced him out of the Hizballah mainstream, and he has been in hiding since February 1998. What role

Tufayli and his followers could play in Lebanon after an Israeli withdrawal is uncertain.

There have been reports recently that suggest Amal is reasserting itself in the conflict in the South, especially since Israel began discussing withdrawal publicly. These reports say that Amal cannot afford to let Hizballah take all the credit for an Israeli pullout. Recently, a booby-trapped videocassette that had been given to a SLA official exploded and killed one and wounded several others in Lebanon near the Israeli border. This incident was attributed to Amal and cited as evidence of one of its “more spectacular” attacks aimed at regaining attention for Amal. Moreover, the group reportedly has stepped up its conventional attacks on IDF and SLA forces in southern Lebanon, which now average about one a day.²⁷

Current Monitoring Efforts

The United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group (ILMG) both currently serve in a “monitoring” capacity in southern Lebanon.

United Nations

The United Nations Security Council established UNIFIL in 1978 with Resolution 425. UNIFIL was chartered to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore international peace and security, and assist the Government of Lebanon in regaining its effective authority in the area (see Appendix A). The first contingent of UNIFIL troops arrived in Lebanon on March 23, 1978. Even though Israel withdrew most of its troops by June 1978, it handed over its positions to its Lebanese proxy, the SLA, not UNIFIL. Moreover, Israel’s 1982 invasion - which UNIFIL was powerless to prevent - left the UN force behind the IDF’s lines and limited its role to providing humanitarian assistance and some protection to the local population. Israel partially withdrew its forces in 1985 but maintained its “security zone” along the border. Consequently, UNIFIL has never fulfilled its mandate. It has served as the UN’s “eyes and ears” in the area and tries to prevent its area of operations from being used by armed Lebanese groups to attack Israeli forces. Both armed Lebanese groups and the IDF have attacked UNIFIL forces over the years. Currently, the force consisted of about 4500 soldiers provided by Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, India, and Poland.²⁸ UNIFIL, IDF/SLA, and LAF positions are shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4. UNIFIL, IDF/SLA, and LAF Positions and Zones of Control

Multilateral

The United States, France, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria established the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group (ILMG) in July 1996 as part of the “understanding” that ended Israel’s “Operation Grapes of Wrath.” The ILMG is independent of the United Nations. France and the U.S. jointly chair the ILMG, alternating as chair and co-chair every five months. The group serves as a forum for hearing complaints of violation of the April 26, 1996 Understanding, which forbids attacks on civilians or attacks launched from civilian areas. The goal of the agreement is to protect civilian life and property and prevent escalation in tensions. The members meet at facilities provided by UNIFIL at its headquarters in Naqura, Lebanon, where the ILMG reviews complaints, reports to member governments, and issues a press statement. Because the ILMG operates on the principle of unanimity, its statements tend to be factual accounts of the complaining party’s arguments without judgement.

The ILMG meets regularly to hear complaints of violation from Israel and Lebanon. After more than three years, the April 26, 1996 Understanding appears to be holding. Even though the ILMG has no enforcement power, it has helped to prevent escalation that has proved so damaging in the past. One example came after a recent Israeli attack on a senior Shia militia official. With approval of the Israeli inner cabinet, the IDF launched a helicopter attack that killed a top Amal militia official in southern Lebanon on August 25, 1998. Immediately following the attack, Hizballah rocketed towns in northern Israel wounding at least 19 people.²⁹ Initial press reports linked the rocket attacks to the Israeli assassination. Subsequent reports, however, said that the Hizballah attack was in response to Israeli shelling of Lebanese villages during the same timeframe.³⁰ Regardless of the reason for the rocket attack, in the past Israel did not tolerate attacks on northern Israel and historically has responded with military operations against Hizballah targets in Lebanon. This time, the ILMG convened on August 31, 1998 to discuss the incident and no escalation was reported.

The monitoring group has apparently forced the IDF to limit its operations to avoid civilian casualties. An Israeli artillery commander in Lebanon recently said that he has “... clear instructions not to fire within 500 meters of any settlement,” and added, “There are very few places where I can fire freely.”³¹ At a minimum, the ILMG’s continued existence - the only forum where Israeli, Lebanese, and Syrian government representatives meet - demonstrates commitment of the parties to cooperate and keep this line of communication open.

Recent Israeli Proposals for Withdrawal

Israel's April 1998 acceptance of UNSCR 425 prompted much discussion over when and how the IDF might withdraw from Lebanon. At the time, Israel publicly floated two approaches:

- One, supported by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, was based on bilateral negotiations with Lebanon. An IDF withdrawal was dependent on security guarantees to be made by the Lebanese government in Beirut. Lebanese and Syrian government officials responded that Resolution 425 could not be negotiated and that Lebanon would not enter into any discussions over it. Resolution 425 calls for Israel to immediately withdraw its forces and does not provide for Lebanese security guarantees. Moreover, Syria has no interest in allowing the Lebanese government to negotiate with Israel bilaterally and insists that any discussion of IDF withdrawal from Lebanon be tied to an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights as part of comprehensive peace negotiations.³² Further, Syria may be concerned that if an IDF pullback withdrawal occurs there will be calls to remove its own forces from Lebanon.
- Then Infrastructure Minister Ariel Sharon - the former Defense Minister who launched Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon - championed the second idea that called for a unilateral, staged pullout. Without explicit Lebanese and Syrian security guarantees, a unilateral IDF withdrawal is fraught with complications and is a non-starter, according to the views of some Israeli analysts. A unilateral withdrawal "... will not only result in perennial instability in the region, with Israeli forces popping in and out of Lebanon each time there is a [rocket] attack, but also in the mass slaughter of Israel's [South Lebanon Army] allies."³³

If Withdrawal Comes...

For the purposes of this paper, a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon is assumed. This study is based on conditions in early 1999 and is an assessment of potential cooperative monitoring scenarios and does not try to predict the likelihood or form of an IDF pullback. The underlying assumption is that without a formal or informal political agreement between Israel, Lebanon, and most likely Syria, there will be no withdrawal scenario in which cooperative monitoring could be practical. Moreover, all parties are assumed to have an interest in making the agreement and any subsequent monitoring program work.

Any formal or informal agreement would probably include the following provisions:

- Complete withdrawal of the IDF from southern Lebanon
- A cease-fire by Hizballah and potentially the withdrawal of its units from southern Lebanon
- Re-establishment of a Lebanese Army presence in southern Lebanon
- Disbanding of the South Lebanon Army
- An understanding that Syria would not move its military forces into areas vacated by the IDF

Given the mutual distrust of the participants, cooperative monitoring (possibly with third party assistance) might be seen as a way to establish an environment that is acceptable to all parties. In addition, organized cooperation would act to build confidence between the parties.

Cooperative Monitoring Options

Introduction

Cooperative monitoring involves collecting, analyzing, and sharing agreed information among parties to an agreement. Cooperative monitoring systems typically rely on the use of commercially available sensor technology. When combined with techniques for data management and analysis, these technologies become useful tools for implementing security-related agreements. Cooperative monitoring systems should have the following three features:

- Technologies that are sharable among all parties to the agreement
- The means to analyze and equally share information acquired by the system
- Procedures for dealing with anomalous data and false alarms

This section presents and assesses a spectrum of cooperative monitoring options that might be implemented in southern Lebanon. The monitoring regimes are based on the assumption that a political agreement has been achieved and Israeli withdrawal has occurred.

The participants in the cooperative monitoring process would include, as a minimum, Lebanon and Israel. Israel has an interest in a stable Lebanese government in control of southern Lebanon. Consequently, in some circumstances, Israel may benefit from an enhancement of the capability of the Lebanese security forces. The provision of new equipment and technical training to the LAF could provide a basis for cooperative monitoring of southern Lebanon by Israel and Lebanon. Additional participants could include other countries presently involved: Syria, France, and the U.S. Non-state players such as the Shia militias are not expected to be official parties to an agreement for withdrawal.

Three conceptual monitoring regimes were developed to address the security goals of the participants, each requiring increasing levels of cooperation: a low cooperation regime, a medium cooperation regime, and a high cooperation regime. These conceptual regimes are intended to stimulate discussion and to define a spectrum of options for cooperative monitoring. They are not exclusive and other regimes may fall between these three options.

Possible Monitoring Options

Given the history of the conflict in southern Lebanon, there may be no formal agreement. The Israelis are concerned about rocket and mortar attacks and infiltration into Israel. The Lebanese and Syrians are concerned about another Israeli movement into Lebanon. Thus, there are three physical objectives of a cooperative monitoring system in southern Lebanon: 1) detect significant incursions by conventional forces into southern Lebanon, 2) detect crossings of the Israel-Lebanon border, and 3) detect military or paramilitary activities that could lead to cross-border incursions or attacks. The system needs to have a significant, although not absolute, probability of detecting

these activities. The cooperative monitoring system is intended to serve as a neutral system that supplements national means. Israel will certainly continue to use its national means to monitor southern Lebanon. Syria will do the same, although its capability is likely to be less sophisticated than Israel's. The system would serve a constructive basis for engagement and confidence building by the parties in either a formal or informal agreement. In addition, it would act as a deterrent to violations and provide confidence to Israel and Syria that the Lebanese Government is in control of the South.

The observables* that a cooperative monitoring system should detect are movement by military or paramilitary forces on foot or by vehicle toward and across the border and threatening paramilitary activity within southern Lebanon. Detection of large numbers of vehicles associated with conventional military movements is much easier than detecting small numbers of paramilitary members with light weapons. A list of the monitoring options considered in this report follows:

- Patrols
- Manned and unmanned observation posts with technical sensors
- Overflights using Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs)
- Checkpoint monitoring using sensors that detect contraband aboard vehicles
- Fence, seismic, magnetic, acoustic, and weight sensing unattended ground sensors (UGS)

A number of other options were considered but rejected. Commercial satellite imagery was assessed to be too unresponsive to deal with the situation in southern Lebanon, where the time available for detecting and responding to suspicious activity is very short. In addition, even the 1-meter resolution of new commercial satellites is insufficient to identify some violations. A violator may be a single person with short-range rockets mounted on a pack animal. Overflights using manned aircraft could detect violations, but UAVs are perceived as less intrusive and, thus, more acceptable. Sensors to detect air vehicles, such as radars, were considered to be unnecessary as well as too expensive.

The following sections describe the three conceptual cooperative monitoring regimes. The monitoring options were chosen after consideration of the available types of monitoring technologies, cost, political acceptability and the tolerance for undetected violations.

A Low Cooperation Regime

As a first option, we discuss a regime designed such that minimal cooperation between Israel and Lebanon is required. This regime would involve the least infringement upon Lebanese sovereignty and might be the most the Lebanese government could accept politically. It would also require the least resources to

* *Observables* are objects or activities that are distinctive and can be used to detect and identify subjects of interest to a monitoring system.

implement. The emphasis of this regime is on strengthening the ability of the LAF to control the area, increasing Israel's confidence in the security of its northern border. There would be no multilateral monitoring organization with operational responsibilities, nor would there be real time sharing of data between Israel and Lebanon, except in one specific, limited case.

Features of the Low Cooperation Regime

An Enhanced Lebanese Military. The goal is to enhance the ability of the LAF to control southern Lebanon and to detect activities that might endanger an agreement. The LAF, supported by a reliable communications network, would operate a system of patrols, checkpoints and observation posts on natural avenues of movement to monitor movement in the area.

The LAF observation posts (OPs) would be equipped with sensors and other technical tools to improve their capability to monitor adjacent terrain. Hardware would include night vision devices, ground surveillance radar, and unattended ground sensors (UGS) that report to the observation posts. Applicable UGS include seismic, magnetic, acoustic, or weight sensors and could monitor locations where local topography blocks direct observation from an OP. Figure 5 shows examples of various types of UGS. In addition, the sensor system can be designed to provide a permanent record of detections.




Figure 5. Representative Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS)

Technology can enhance other LAF monitoring functions. Patrols would be equipped with night vision devices and a communications system integrated with the OP network. Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers would permit accurate

navigation and position reporting. Checkpoints would be established on traffic routes within the southern Lebanon region.

An effective communications net would be installed in southern Lebanon so that suspicious activity could be reported promptly up the Lebanese chain of command. Lateral communications between observation posts would be established. Due to the limited nature of cooperation in this scenario, the information collected by the OPs or other LAF monitoring activity would not be communicated directly to a multinational monitoring group or Israel.

Joint Parallel Border Patrols. The LAF and IDF would conduct joint patrols on their respective side of the border. These patrols would move on parallel roads that follow the border and maintain visual contact and short-range communications with each other. Neither side would cross the border itself, and their respective commanders would maintain control of each part of the patrol. The purpose of this feature is to ensure joint knowledge of border incidents.

The patrols would be equipped with night vision devices, GPS receivers for position reporting, short-range communications so they can maintain contact with each other, and long-range communications to report up their respective chains of command. A joint report would be filed at the end of each patrol.

Enhanced Border Checkpoints. To enhance security at border crossings, checkpoints would receive new monitoring capabilities. Vehicle inspection equipment such as weighing devices, X-ray equipment, and explosive detectors would be installed. Each party would operate its own equipment and would not be required to share data. There would be two cooperative features, however. First, each party would have its own set of inspectors on its own side of the border. Television cameras would be installed so that the each side might view the activities of the other inspectors. This is to instill confidence that each side is fulfilling its duties in a conscientious manner. There would also be voice communication between the two sides at the crossings. The other cooperative feature is the exchange of lists of individuals who are to be stopped at the border. These lists would presumably come from the security services of both countries.

Notification of Incidents. There would be standardized procedures for notification of incidents to the appropriate government authority.

Notification of Military Activities. Significant military activities in the border region would be subject to notification requirements. Reportable activities would include movements of significant numbers of troops or weapons, construction of new military facilities, or exercises. The installation of direct communication links between the LAF and IDF would aid the implementation of this commitment.

Advantages and Disadvantages of the Low Cooperation Regime

The low cooperation regime would improve the ability of Lebanon to control its southern region. It would also provide some additional capability for the Israelis to detect border crossings. The main advantages of the low cooperation regime are political. It minimizes intrusion on Lebanese sovereignty. It also offers considerable incentives to the Lebanese in the form of improved security capabilities for their army. We believe these enhanced capabilities would give Israel more confidence in the ability of Lebanon to control its border.

The major disadvantage of this regime is that it may make the Israelis feel that they are giving up a great deal for relatively little in return. They would lose the additional warning time that their occupation of southern Lebanon has given them. They would have to rely to some extent on Lebanon, in spite of their national means of monitoring, to provide early warning along the border region. In addition, the lack of a means for quick communications between the Lebanese and Israelis at the tactical level may lead to misunderstandings and contribute to incidents.

A Medium Cooperation Regime

The medium cooperation regime would have the following features in addition to or in place of those described in the low cooperation regime.

Features of the Medium Cooperation Regime

A Joint Monitoring Group (JMG). A joint monitoring group with a permanent staff would act as a facilitator of monitoring policy and procedures. It would receive data and reports from both sides for archiving. Regular reports from both sides would be given to the group. Under this regime, the JMG would not have an operational role, nor would it receive data in real time. The JMG could be a bilateral Lebanese-Israeli activity, or all national parties could be involved, including Syria.

A Joint Cooperative Border Strip and Fence. As a counterpart to the present border fence, which is controlled by the Israelis, a second fence would be established on the Lebanese side of the border. This fence and the strip between it and the border, which might be up to 1 km wide, would be monitored and the data would be sent directly to local Lebanese and Israeli officials. Possible sensors include fence motion sensors and UGS to detect movement within the intervening strip. Sensor reports would be archived by the JMG. The joint parallel border patrols could take place within the strip, or the LAF could patrol there alone with an IDF patrol on the Israeli side of the border. The fence would provide the Lebanese with a measure of control over border crossings and complement the Israeli fence.

Enhanced Checkpoints in southern Lebanon. Internal checkpoints in southern Lebanon would be enhanced with the same technology used in the border checkpoints in the low cooperation regime. Reports would be sent to the JMG for archiving.

A Cooperative Communication Net between OPs. While direct data sharing would not be implemented under this regime, a voice communication net between OPs that included Israeli participation would be established. This would permit better responses to indications of activity and could prevent misunderstandings that could cause incidents.

Advantages and Disadvantages of the Medium Cooperation Regime

The medium cooperation regime offers more capability to detect activity in southern Lebanon than the low cooperation regime. In particular, the cooperatively monitored border strip offers more assurance of detecting border crossings and gives the parties more time to respond. In addition, the expanded communication net can help avert misunderstandings that could contribute to an incident. Personnel in the border region could communicate much faster than if all communications were at the senior commander level. There is a benefit in the establishment of a multilateral group to help facilitate the agreement and serve as a repository for information.

This regime would cost more than the low cooperation regime. Also, the introduction of the JMG as a “third party” might complicate acceptance.

A High Cooperation Regime

The high cooperation regime would have the following features in addition to or in place of those described in the medium cooperation regime.

Features of the High Cooperation Regime

A Joint Monitoring Group with Operational Responsibilities. The role of the JMG would be expanded to include responsibility for operating and maintaining the cooperative monitoring equipment. As before, the group would be multi-national in character and include representatives from all parties to the agreement. Data from sensors and reports from observers would be sent in real time to a central site. From there, reports would be sent to Israeli and Lebanese officials. Any necessary response could be coordinated from this central site as well.

Joint Border Patrols. The joint border patrols would be supervised and tracked by the JMG using real time communications. The patrols would issue a report to the JMG, which in turn would include this information in periodic reports of normal activity and incident reports to the parties to the agreement.

Cooperative Border Fence. The sensors associated with the cooperative fence in the border strip would transmit data in real time to the JMG.

Observation Posts. The OPs would use real time communications links to report data directly to the JMG. This would include both voice messages from manned OPs, sensor data from UGS, and data from imaging devices.

Cooperative UAV Patrols. Several UAVs could be operated and maintained by the JMG. They would be used for occasional surveys and for quick response to reports

from the OPs and patrols. The UAVs would be based at the center and would be maintained by the JMG. A possible candidate for this role is the Israel Aircraft Industries Pioneer UAV. The Pioneer is a relatively old system that has been widely exported. A picture of a Pioneer is shown in Figure 6. Possible sensors for monitoring are video cameras and thermal imagers. This would permit day and night operation and would create a permanent record of images.



Photo courtesy of the U.S. Department of Defense

Figure 6. Pioneer UAV

JMG reports. The JMG would issue judgements and reports on activity in the border region relevant to the terms of an agreement. These would be transmitted to the parties of the agreement through their representatives in the JMG.

Advantages and Disadvantages of the High Cooperation Regime

This regime would require the most cooperation by all parties and could build on the success of the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group. The JMG would provide all parties with a more independent picture of the activities in the border region, which could prevent misunderstandings and improve confidence. In addition, the UAV capability would permit quick responses to reports of suspicious activities

The main disadvantage of the high cooperation regime is its requirement for an active multi-national group with operational responsibilities and the significantly higher costs associated with it. The inherent intrusiveness of a JMG may prove too much for Lebanese and/or Israeli acceptance. Having to filter data through the JMG may make response time to suspicious activity slower than would be acceptable to either Israel or Lebanon.

Comparison of the Three Regimes

Table 1. Functional Components of the Three Cooperative Monitoring Regimes

Monitoring Component	Low Cooperation Regime	Medium Cooperation Regime	High Cooperation Regime
Declarations and notifications	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Patrols	Parallel patrols on own side of border	Parallel patrols on own side of border along the cooperative fence	Patrols tracked by JMG, real time communication with JMG
Border Checkpoints	Enhanced capability separate checkpoints with TV and voice communication	Enhanced capability separate checkpoints with TV and voice communication	Enhanced capability separate checkpoints with TV and voice communication, reporting to JMG
Internal Checkpoints	Under Lebanese control	Enhanced Lebanese technical capability	Enhanced technical capability, reporting to JMG
Observation Posts	Enhanced capability to report within Lebanese chain of command	Establish ability to communicate between Israeli and Lebanese security forces	Reports made in real time to JMG
Overflights	No	No	Jointly operated UAV
Joint Monitoring Group (JMG)	No	Data storage and policy facilitation	Operational control of monitoring system
Cooperatively Monitored Border Strip	No	Jointly maintained fence and border strip with sensors	Fence and border strip with sensors under control of JMG

National Means

Cooperative monitoring is not intended to replace national means used by the parties. The monitoring system would complement national means that monitor an agreement.

The Role of UN Peacekeepers

The effectiveness of UNIFIL is limited by Israeli reluctance to cooperate. An Israeli withdrawal might lead to a greater role for UNIFIL. UNIFIL might confirm the withdrawal of the IDF and perform interim monitoring until the LAF is able to regain control of southern Lebanon and/or cooperative monitoring is implemented.

Summary and Conclusions

Each of the key players involved in Lebanon has specific goals that will affect their security decisions:

- Israel seeks a secure northern border.
- Members of Israel's allied South Lebanon Army seek a safe way to withdraw.
- The government of Lebanon seeks to regain sovereignty in southern Lebanon.
- Iran wants to strengthen its influence with Lebanon's Shia Muslim population.
- Hizballah seeks to force the Israeli army to leave Lebanon.
- Syria seeks to protect its western flank and maintain political influence in Lebanon.

An agreement that included an Israeli withdrawal and the reestablishment of effective Lebanese military control of the Israel-Lebanon border could contribute to the goals of the various parties. Cooperative monitoring could help build confidence among the parties that their respective security interests were being addressed.

Three possible cooperative monitoring regimes have been described in this report, each requiring different levels of cooperation. Each has relative advantages and disadvantages. A feature of each regime is that it permits Israel to, in effect, monitor the Lebanese monitors in southern Lebanon and gain confidence that they are performing their mission. In general, the regimes with less cooperation may be more attractive to the Lebanese, as the perceived infringement on their sovereignty is likely to be less. The Israelis may prefer a relatively high level of cooperation, as that would give them more information about activities in southern Lebanon that potentially threaten their security.

Appendix A: Relevant United Nations Resolutions

RESOLUTION 425 (1978)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2074th meeting
on 19 March 1978,

The Security Council,

Taking note of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon and from the Permanent Representative of Israel,

Having heard the statement of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel,

Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace,

Convinced that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East,

1. Calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;
2. Calls upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;
3. Decides, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the Force to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four hours on the implementation of the present resolution.

RESOLUTION 426 (1978)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2075th meeting
On 19 March 1978,

The Security Council,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978), contained in document S/12611 of 19 March 1978,
2. Decides that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon shall be established in accordance with the above-mentioned report for an initial period of six months, and that it shall continue in operation thereafter if required, provided the Security Council also decides.

RESOLUTION 427 (1978)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2076th meeting
On 3 May 1978

The Security Council,

Having considered the letter dated 1 May 1978 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978,

1. Approves the increase in the strength of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon requested by the Secretary-General from 4,000 to approximately 6,000 troops;
2. Takes note of the withdrawal of Israeli forces that has taken place so far;
3. Calls upon Israel to complete its withdrawal from all Lebanese territory without further delay;
4. Deplores the attacks on the United Nations Forces that have occurred and demands full respect for the United Nations Force from all parties in Lebanon.

Appendix B: Text of April 26, 1996 Cease-fire Understanding

“The United States understands that after discussions with the governments of Israel and Lebanon, and in consultation with Syria, Lebanon and Israel will ensure the following:

1. Armed groups in Lebanon will not carry out attacks by Katyusha rockets or by any kind of weapon into Israel.
2. Israel and those cooperating with it will not fire any kind of weapon at civilians or civilian targets in Lebanon.
3. Beyond this, the two parties commit to ensuring that under no circumstances will civilians be the target of attack and that civilian populated areas and industrial and electrical installations will not be used as launching grounds for attacks.
4. Without violating this understanding, nothing herein shall preclude any party from exercising the right of self-defense.

A Monitoring Group is established consisting of the United States, France, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. Its task will be to monitor the application of the understanding stated above. Complaints will be submitted to the Monitoring Group.

In the event of a claimed violation of the understanding, the party submitting the complaint will do so within 24 hours. Procedures for dealing with the complaints will be set by the Monitoring Group.

The United States will also organize a Consultative Group, to consist of France, the European Union, Russia and other interested parties, for the purpose of assisting in the reconstruction needs of Lebanon.

It is recognized that the understanding to bring the current crisis between Lebanon and Israel to an end cannot substitute for a permanent solution. The United States understands the importance of achieving a comprehensive peace in the region.

Toward this end, the United States proposes the resumption of negotiations between Syria and Israel and between Lebanon and Israel at a time to be agreed upon, with the objective of reaching comprehensive peace.

The United States understands that it is desirable that these negotiations be conducted in a climate of stability and tranquility.

This understanding will be announced simultaneously at 1800 hours, April 26, 1996, in all countries concerned with implementation at 0400 hours, April 27, 1996.”³⁴

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