

Pakistan's Strategic Culture: Formulation of Counterterrorism Policy

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Abstract

The Islamist attack on the twin towers changed the world, but Pakistan's strategic culture did not change. President Musharraf publicly withdrew support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, and declared discontinuation of cross-border infiltration in Indian-held Kashmir. In reality, support continued to certain sections of the Afghan Taliban, and acts of terrorism in India, exemplified the facetious transformation in strategic culture. The confusion in stance left a void in strategic culture and the strategic environment. Pakistan's strategy of sub-conventional warfare has led to a backlash inside the country, in the form of Islamist subversion of the rule of law. The failure of the state to formulate a coherent counterterrorism policy has given way to non-state actors. This policy void has endangered the country's national identity and territorial integrity. In the absence of such a policy, Islamism festers. Resultantly, the state is faced with an Islamist take over. This has consequences for regional and global stability as well as nuclear security. Pakistan should formulate counterterrorism policy, transform strategic culture, and seek connectivity with the rest of the world to overcome the threat of Islamism.

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Acronyms

ANP	Awami National Party
APC	All Parties Conference
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FC	Frontier Corps
HDI	Human Development Index
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence directorate
JSD	Joint Strategic Directive
KPK	Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa province
NACTA	National Counter Terrorism Authority
NADRA	National Database and Registration Authority
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NWS	Nuclear-Weapons State
PML (N)	Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PTI	Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
TTP	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States

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Executive Summary

Pakistan is at a tipping point. While there is gradual strengthening of electoral democracy, there is also the growing power of Islamist extremism. The internal security problem caused by Islamist violence poses a strategic threat. In the regional domain, foreign policy is stagnant vis-à-vis the strategic environment. Pakistan's India-centered threat perception and involvement in Afghanistan has not paid off. India's economic trajectory, Iran's rapprochement with the U.S., and Afghanistan's post-withdrawal situation, are the regional trends that should coax Pakistan to reevaluate its strategic culture paradigm.

The domestic trend, however, is moving toward right-wing ascendancy. For this right-wing consensus in society to stand in opposition to ultra-right Islamism, the role of the military and strategic culture increases in significance. Strategic culture is concerned with identification of threat, and the institutionalization of national strategy to deal with that threat. In the case of Pakistan, the main sources of regional threat perception were India and Afghanistan. In order to deal with these threats, Pakistan opted for strategies of nuclear deterrence and sub-conventional warfare. The continuation of the latter policy has become untenable due to the evolving strategic environment and the backlash of Islamist violence, causing an internal security problem.

There are three possible scenarios for the future of Pakistan, which correspond to the three mindsets prevalent in the Pakistani society. These three mindsets can be identified as: Islamist, nationalist and internationalist. Each of these mindsets could become the causal factors for realization of each scenario. The first scenario is a takeover of Pakistani state/government by Islamists. It corresponds to the radical Islamist mindset in the society. The second scenario is continued governmental ambiguity toward Islamists. It corresponds to the nationalists giving ground gradually to Islamists for supposed realpolitik reasons. The third scenario is the defeat of Islamists. It corresponds to the internationalist/realist mindset in the society.

Islamism can be defeated numerically and intellectually by an alliance of the two remaining mindsets i.e. realist and nationalist. But for this to happen, the nationalists and realists would have to reach a modus vivendi. The basis of their alliance could be the affiliation with the 1973 constitution and the will to modernize. But the dilemma of the nationalist thought process in Pakistan is that it harbors components of both realism and Islamism within its intellectual landscape. With the socially ascendant Islamist mindset, the nationalist mindset shares images of India as regional and the U.S. as global hegemon and tyrant. The only way the realists can win is through an alliance with the nationalists, which the nationalists would have to affect in their own enlightened self-interest after distancing themselves from the Islamist mindset.

To achieve the desired scenario of defeat of Islamism, Pakistan's counterterrorism policy should focus not just on the military aspect, but also on the political and socio-economic aspects of the conflict. Secondly, there should be realization of the importance of international connectivity. Thirdly, Pakistan and its various religious communities should resist confessional identity-formation. The Shia Muslims make up about 20 percent of Pakistan's population of 180 million. The Shia-Sunni schism has gradually turned violent since the anti-Shia era of General Zia ul-Haq (1977-88).

According to Human Rights Watch, more than 800 Shias have been killed in attacks in Pakistan since the beginning of 2012. The Shia and other minorities e.g. Christians, Hindus, and Ahmedi Muslims, should be given protection because they are currently in danger of being subjected to genocide at the hands of Islamist groups, which would also be devastating to Pakistan's image and identity.

Since terrorism poses a strategic threat, it naturally follows that it should elicit a strategic response. This response entails changes in strategic culture in tandem with formulation of counterterrorism policy. The first change is the focus on internal security. The external threat should not be exaggerated whereby it hinders the pursuit of critical internal focus needed for internal stability. For this purpose, Pakistan would have to complete the post-September 11th shift in strategic culture of abandoning sub-conventional warfare vis-à-vis India and support for Taliban in Afghanistan, which cause an internal fallout and backlash. Secondly, civil-military relations should be streamlined to ensure rule of law and nuclear security. And thirdly, there should be enhanced sensitivity to role of technology.

The tools of modern technology are instrumental in managing and educating the sixth largest population in the world, and presenting the counter narrative to lethal Islamist discourse that is harmful to the image of Pakistan and Islam. The U.S. and international community could help Pakistan improve its technological capability through education in science and technology.

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1. Problem Statement

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is planned for 2014. Resultantly, Pakistan could have insecure borders on both east and west, further compounded by internal security problem. Due to rampant crime in rural areas, and terrorism in urban areas, there is near anarchy in Pakistan. The trends of violent activity suggest that the internal security problem of Pakistan is not a routine activity issue rather it poses a strategic threat. This is because terrorism poses an existential threat to Pakistan. So far, the problem has been dealt with by ritualistic and rhetorical responses by the political elite since it is still viewed in conventional terms. However, critical thinking is required to adequately deal with the problem in the future. The existential threat posed by the internal security problem has to be recognized by the strategic culture, because culture cannot remain oblivious to such a threat.

The problem of Islamism is global in scope. It is a hard problem to solve because of its global reach and ideological complexity. It is caused by both indirect and direct factors. The indirect factors are lack of good governance, and lack of religious reformation in the Muslim World. And the direct factor is the specific geopolitical and geostrategic situation of the state concerned. The nation-state is on the front line of this conflict, because Islamism is supranational in its objectives. It rejects the premise of the nation-state. This article looks at the Islamist problem from the Pakistani angle. Due to Islamism's expansion, governmental authority is unraveling in Pakistan. Pakistan's survival in its tug-of-war with Islamism is critical to peace in general and nuclear security in particular, in the region and beyond. The problem has been caused by Pakistan's vulnerability to foreign influences e.g. sectarian strife in the wider Middle Eastern region. And it is also due to the backlash of the foreign policy tools employed by Pakistan in the past i.e. sub-conventional warfare. Pakistan has to launch a two-pronged effort. First is the ideological counter narrative to challenge the Islamist mindset. And secondly, Pakistan has to formulate a concrete counterterrorism policy that includes post-conflict rehabilitation and modernization.

Pakistan's stance of running with the hare and hunting with the hound is partly because the Islamists are now so powerful that the state does not want to stir the hornet's nest for fear of upsetting the apple cart. In this sense, the state's appeasement of Islamists demonstrates to them that the state believes it is living on borrowed time. In order to comprehend the situation, this article looks at three possible future scenarios. These depictions of the future would hopefully point to the need for the right direction to achieve the desired scenario. The scenarios considered here include, Pakistan's steady movement on the road to modernization and moderation; Pakistan's gradually going under the encroaching influence of Islamism; or Pakistan's suddenly falling into the full-scale control of Islamism. These scenarios correspond to the three prevailing mindsets in Pakistani society, which are: the internationalists who want Pakistan to join the international community, nationalists who wish for the state to survive in its current form, and

Islamists who seek supremacy of their interpretation of Islam, which would lead to global isolation and hostility with grave consequences for Pakistan.

The research questions for the study are:

1. What is the nature of internal security threat to Pakistan?
2. Can Pakistan's strategic culture remain intact despite pervasive Islamism at societal level?

The main hypothesis of the study is: "Terrorism poses a strategic threat to Pakistan. Pakistan's strategic culture must adapt to the objective strategic environment, and adopt a concrete counterterrorism policy to maintain the strategic culture's pragmatic realist paradigm".

Counterterrorism policy and strategic culture must work in conjunction, for the fulfillment of national objectives. The concept of strategic culture relates to national defense and is externally oriented, whereas internal security is deemed to be outside its purview. But this bifurcation is not clear-cut anymore. The internal and external notions of security are not watertight compartments. There is increasing juxtaposition of the two conceptions of security due to the ramification of one on the other. In the case of Pakistan, given the hostile relations with its eastern neighbor, tensions within and a disturbed western border, and all situations sharing a radical Islamist overtone, it is important to know how Pakistan's strategic culture affects the counterterrorism policy, and vice versa.

In order to get out of this policy limbo, Pakistan would have to provide a single direction to the nation and thereby evolve a common identity and common national purpose. The slogan of 'national honor in danger', anti-American hysteria, and sectarian identity-formation, would have to be eschewed in favor of moderation and enlightened self-interest. The first step in this connection would be to abandon passion-driven foreign policy and transform the strategic culture. Pakistan's problem of Islamist terrorism was caused due to the backlash of the myopic policy of being stuck with the Taliban to hedge its bets for an Afghan endgame. The support to Taliban in Afghanistan for the post-withdrawal positioning should be curbed in order to deal with the Islamist threat within Pakistan. Pakistan should rest assured that if there is a stable government in Kabul, whether hostile or friendly, it would ultimately be forced by geographical contiguity and demographical affinity to extend the hand of friendship. The policy of sub-conventional warfare toward India too has not served Pakistan well. In fact, both Pakistan and India should now engage in serious dialogue to resolve the Kashmir issue, water security issue and engage in other confidence building measures.




Figure 1: Map of Pakistan's Sectarian Violence (Reuters)

2. Pakistan's Strategic Culture

There is an interesting anecdote about how difficult it was for Norman Borlaug, the Nobel laureate, to introduce new cultural practices in Pakistan, India, and other countries, to bring about the agricultural revolution that would save those countries from severe food shortages.¹ Initially, government officials refused to budge from mainstream practices. But ultimately they were forced to concede to reality, and agreed to usher in the direly needed cultural changes for their own survival and self-preservation. These changes ultimately lead to the Green Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s.

Similarly, Pakistan's strategic culture must also change from within in order to affect the changes necessary to formulate counterterrorism policy. It must begin with an analysis of the national interest and the most desired scenario that the counterterrorism policy must support. This requires a paradigm shift. Bringing about structural change is always hard, but can be done for the sake of survival and enlightened self-interest. Therefore, it is important to understand strategic culture, the shifts therein, and the impact of strategic culture on counterterrorism policy.

2.1. What is Strategic Culture

Strategic culture pertains to national defense. It is the institutionalization of national strategy. In other words, strategic culture points to the organizational culture of the national security establishment. According to Jack Snyder, "The sum total of ideas, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of behavior that members of the national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy".² Thus strategic culture is able to dynamically impact upon the way a policy is formulated and also affects the way it is implemented. The purpose of strategic culture of a state would be to influence threat perception i.e. identification of threat, and provide a framework to deal with that threat i.e. military (nuclear) doctrine or posture. And for a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) these would also include the safety and security of nuclear weapons, and nonproliferation.

Strategic culture has two main sources. First is political culture that is comprised of ideas, beliefs, emotions, attitudes and behaviors of the political elite. Pakistan's strategic culture evolved in view of the Islamic outlook of political leadership, affinity with Islamic causes like Palestine and Kashmir, and role of military in political decision-making. Second is the strategic environment that has to be objectively evaluated for realistic assessment.

¹ Leon F. Hesser, *The Man Who Fed the World*, (Durban House Press, Incorporated, 2009), 81-100.

² Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options*, R-2154-AF, (Santa Monica: Calif. RAND Corporation, 1977), 8.



Figure 2: Strategic Culture

Pakistan's regional threat perception, in terms of Barry Buzan's regional security complex, revolves around India and Afghanistan. In order to deal with these perceived threats, Pakistan has opted for nuclear deterrence and sub-conventional warfare. However, the realist paradigm of the strategic culture could be undermined due to the policy of sub-conventional warfare to gain military advantage over India in the Kashmir issue, and involvement in Afghanistan.

Some broad features of Pakistani strategic culture can be identified in terms of the states that matter most. The most important states are India, U.S., Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and China. India is seen as being engaged in hegemonic-objective conflict with Pakistan in the region. With the U.S., there is an ambivalent relationship that is worsening due to hysterical rhetoric in Pakistani domestic politics and increasing gaps between the respective intelligence agencies. In Afghanistan, the Pakistani policy of propping up the Taliban against the Karzai government, and countering warming Indo-Afghan relations, is perceived as vital. And to Iran, Pakistan's sectarian Sunni identity is being crystallized in view of growing domestic sectarianization. Saudi Arabia wields considerable influence, which has been utilized in Pakistan for pumping money into the *madrassahs*, and spreading *Takfiri* Islamism. China remains the object of Pakistan's exaggerated and unreciprocated hopes for greater cooperation. Lastly, an unavoidable feature of Pakistani strategic culture is that the traditional socio-political influence of the national military has metamorphosized into pervasive influence of non-state militancy due to the officially sanctioned proliferation of Islamist militant groups. State paralysis is palpable, as some of these groups turned from assets to liabilities when they began targeting organs and institutions of the state.

2.2. Shifts in Pakistan's Strategic Culture

Strategic culture can change in cases of extraordinary pressure or crisis. This change can be debilitating for the state, because of a break in continuity, or it can be rejuvenating, as a survival mechanism to cope with the new strategic environment. Pakistan has previously experienced two major shifts in its strategic culture.³ The first was the 1972 decision to acquire a nuclear deterrent. The second change was the post-September 11th decision to end support for sub-conventional warfare in India and Afghanistan.

Pakistan's strategic culture has been oriented toward India for the past sixty-six years. During the first twenty-five years of its existence, Pakistan relied upon conventional defense. The Pakistan army under Ayub Khan assiduously refused the nuclear option up till 1969, "Khan rejected Bhutto's demand for nuclear weapons to counter India, choosing instead to increase Pakistan's conventional defenses and strengthen its security ties to the U.S."⁴ The decision to nuclearize was a strategic shift brought about by Z.A. Bhutto's government in 1972, and later taken over by General Zia's martial law regime from July 1977 onwards. The overall impact of that shift is still under debate.

Pakistan's defeat against India in 1971 is considered a watershed moment because it was a military *and* political defeat. With its ill-advised policies in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), Pakistan managed to create a situation where Indian intervention was made possible. Thanks to Bhutto's nuclear initiative, now Pakistan is once again in a position where it can pursue policies beyond its military prowess. The enduring lesson of 1971 is not that the Pakistan military was not able to repulse the Indian military on the battlefield. The enduring lesson of 1971 is that, "the majority of East Pakistani population had already been alienated from West Pakistan".⁵ The same kind of internal disarray in Pakistan could cause the next regional crisis.

The future nuclear crisis in South Asia could unfold with Islamists launching a terrorist attack on Indian soil, India responding with conventional attack, Pakistani low threshold for nuclear use resulting in the outbreak of general war turning into nuclear war. With the benefit of hindsight given the 1971 example, the most relevant escalation control would be for Pakistan to exercise control over its territory, and prevent the use of its territory or resources for precipitous terrorist attacks against India. In a similar vein, India should also work to dispel the Pakistani perception of India being an existential as opposed to an ideological threat.

The second shift in Pakistan's strategic culture was the declared abandonment of sub-conventional warfare after the September 11th attacks. Pakistan renounced support to Afghan Taliban, but this shift remains incomplete. According to the U.S. view, the Pakistanis never seriously desired to expel the Taliban from Afghanistan. The post-September 11th 'policy U-turn' was misplaced terminology because Pakistan's support of Afghan Taliban persisted.⁶ The

³ Peter R. Lavoy, "Pakistan's Strategic Culture," (Defence Threat Reduction Agency, 2006). www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/pakistan.pdf

⁴ Lavoy, "Nuclear Proliferation Over the Next Decade," *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 13, No. 3, (November 2006).

⁵ Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its army, and the wars within*, (Oxford University Press, 2008), 282.

⁶ K. Alan Kronstadt, "Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary," R41832, (Congressional Research Service, October 2011), www.crs.gov.

change under Pakistan's 'policy U-turn' was tactical logistic support e.g. acceptance of NATO passage routes through Pakistan to get supplies to Afghanistan. In statements before the Senate Arms Services Committee Admiral Mike Mullen claimed that the Haqqani network (i.e. Afghan Taliban) acted as a veritable arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI).⁷ This statement further confirmed the view that Pakistan's post-September 11th strategic orientation remained largely unchanged.

The *raison d'être* for Pakistani strategic culture's interest in Afghanistan was the policy of strategic depth. It originated in the 1980s as a means to offset the conventional military superiority of India and geographic vulnerability of Pakistan due to its linear shape. This policy views Afghanistan to be within Pakistan's sphere of influence. The strategic depth policy envisioned Pakistani influence in Afghanistan to provide geographical space to Pakistani military to regroup in case of war with India. The distance between Khyber Pass, on Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and Wagah-Lahore border with India, is around 350 miles. But two factors make this policy redundant. First, from a military strategy point of view, Pakistan's nuclear deterrent should rule out the need for the strategic depth policy. Secondly, the policy necessitates Pakistan's interest in a pliant regime in Kabul, which infuriates the Afghans who pride themselves on their independence.

2.3. Impact of Strategic Culture on Counterterrorism Policy

As Table 1 shows, the rising toll of terrorist incidents in Pakistan demonstrates how the policy of sub-conventional warfare has backfired. Pakistan's policy of using irregular forces can be traced to the 1948, 1965, and 1971 wars with India. This policy-orientation reached the current scale during the Afghan War beginning in 1979 and continues up till now. That is why sub-conventional warfare can be assumed to have become an element of the strategic culture.

⁷ Elisabeth Bumiller and Jane Perlez, "Pakistan's Spy Agency is Tied to Attack on U.S. embassy," *New York Times*, September 22, 2011.

Table 1: Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan in 2012

Province/Area	Frequency	Killed	Injured
KP	456	401	1,081
Balochistan	474	631	1,032
FATA	388	631	1,095
Punjab	17	75	184
Karachi	187	272	352
Sindh (excluding Karachi)	28	17	45
Gilgit Baltistan	26	22	33
Azad Kashmir	0	0	0
Islamabad	1	1	0
Total	1,577	2,050	3,822

Table 1: Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan in 2012⁸

However, Pakistani strategic culture's realist paradigm is incompatible with the policy of sub-conventional warfare. For example, Kashmir is important to the strategic culture. But the policy of sub-conventional warfare has tainted the international legitimacy of the Kashmiri struggle for freedom. Secondly, internal sovereignty is linked with external sovereignty. When Pakistan uses sub-conventional means to control insurgency within its borders or foment insurgency in Afghanistan, it is faced with a backlash that could result in a loss internal control.⁹

The main elements of Pakistan's strategic culture are India, Afghanistan, nuclear deterrence, and sub-conventional warfare. India is the primary threat in Pakistani strategic culture. Afghanistan on the other hand, which has never been on good terms with Pakistan, is considered friendly, a source of strategic depth, and worthy of sacrifices.¹⁰ Pakistan is stuck with its enmity for India and friendliness for Afghanistan.¹¹

But strategic culture should be interest-based not ideology- or emotion-based. It should be entrenched in realism and cost-benefit calculus i.e. assessment of trade-offs. There should be objective assessment of the strategic environment. Sub-conventional warfare has greater cost in terms of internal security than the expected benefit in terms of military advantage. Thus Pakistan

⁸ Pakistan Security Report 2012, PIPS (<http://www.san-pips.com>)

⁹ Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, "Pakistan's Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies," *JSOU Report 09-9*, (Florida: Hulbert Field, The JSOU Press, 2009).

¹⁰ Afghanistan was the only country not to vote for Pakistan's inclusion in the UN in 1947.

¹¹ For a discussion on the friend/enemy distinction in politics, see Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, (Chicago, IL: The University of the Chicago Press, 2007), 25. According to Schmitt, everything concerning the state is political and everything political carries with it the friend/enemy distinction. Schmitt makes another point that is relevant to Pakistan's current situation. He says that when the state becomes involved in non-political spheres i.e. religion, economics, science, and culture, it brings its 'political' attribute to bear on these non-political spheres, thereby imposing on to them the friend/enemy categorization and leading to violence.

should focus on restoring internal sovereignty through counterterrorism policy. This is crucial in the light of the evolving strategic environment. The goal of both strategic culture and counterterrorism policy should be a stable and prosperous state that is able to discredit Islamism ideologically and defeat it militarily. The problem of internal security poses a strategic threat because it is both ideological and existential in nature.¹²

3. Analysis of Three Possible Scenarios

The scenarios presented in this work might appear to be pessimistic, but this academic exercise is meant to provide options to prevent the worst-case scenarios. The use of alternative futures as a means of study helps provide varying lenses of observation. It enables us to make 'informed decisions' about an evolving situation.¹³ There are three possible scenarios for the future of Pakistan, which correspond to the three mindsets prevalent in the Pakistani society. These three mindsets can be identified as: Islamist, nationalist and internationalist. Each of these mindsets could become the causal factors for realization of each scenario. The first scenario is a takeover of Pakistani state/government by Islamists. It corresponds to the radical Islamist mindset in the society. The second scenario is continued governmental ambiguity toward Islamists. It corresponds to the nationalists giving ground gradually to Islamists for supposed realpolitik reasons. The third scenario is the defeat of Islamists. It corresponds to the internationalist/realist mindset in the society.

An interesting way to analyze the three mindsets is in evaluating their approach toward the U.S. Even though the U.S. has been the most important financial, political, military and diplomatic supporter of Pakistan since its formation, anti-Americanism is on the rise at societal level. The Islamist view is that U.S.-Pakistan relations are short-term, transient, and can be drastically curtailed anytime. As a result, they advocate the precipitous degradation of bilateral relations. The nationalist view is that no sudden changes should be made, in order to avoid drastic U.S. reaction. Thus, in nationalist view, Pakistan's grand strategy should be "gradual distancing from U.S." The internationalist view looks at the flip side that if the war against terrorism in Pakistan were not tackled then Pakistan's world image and reputation would be wrecked. The damage to Pakistan would be at the political, economic, diplomatic, and military levels. Therefore, Pakistan should be unilaterally aligned with the U.S.

These mindsets support the three 'terminal' narratives at loggerheads with each other, which threaten to consume the country with their 'end-of-times' outlook.¹⁴ The Islamist mindset, Islamism, is traceable to Islam's arrival in India around 800 years ago. Its most recent incarnation is the Madrassah Darul Uloom Deoband, founded in 1866, in Uttar Pradesh in India. This

¹² Muhammad Feyyaz, "Conceptualising Terrorism Trend Patterns in Pakistan, an Empirical Perspective," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, (North America, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2013). Available at <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/243>. Date accessed, 09 Jan, 2014.

¹³ Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, *The Year 2000 A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, N.Y. Collier-Macmillan Limited, London, 1967), 262-264. The piece 'Use of scenarios' by Herman Kahn can also be accessed at the website of Hudson Institute, of which he was the co-founder.

http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=2214

¹⁴ Khaled Ahmed, "Three 'terminal' narratives of Pakistan," *The Friday Times*, Vol. XX, No. 22, July 18-24, 2008.

mindset rejects modernity. It ignores facts and relies instead on hearsay and conspiracy theories. It posits that 9/11 was an inside job and al Qaeda is a CIA creation. It goes on to assert that Muslim states were American puppets, notwithstanding the fact that according to the same narrative the Muslim states collectively formed the 'ummah' (Islamic nation). This mindset asserts that instead of fighting militants within, it is more appropriate for Pakistan to fight the U.S.

The second mindset, nationalism, can be traced to Muslim reform movement that began 200 years ago as a consequence of the British rule in India. The central tenet of this mindset, and the impetus for Pakistan's foundation in 1947, was the Aligarh educational movement. Its most prominent expression was the Aligarh Muslim University formed by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan in 1875-78, in Uttar Pradesh in India. This mindset permeates the state institutions i.e. civil-military bureaucracy. It is India-centric in its approach. However, with the Islamists identifying America as the main enemy, and the internationalists focusing on Al Qaeda, the nationalist mindset is caught in between those two positions and has assumed a 'split personality'. And whenever it reverts to its India-centric approach, the Islamist approach is strengthened.

The internationalist mindset is based upon Pakistan's geopolitical realities and can be traced to the 2000-year old Silk Route, which passed through Pakistan. It is based upon facts and figures, and is well informed about the inner workings of the threat posed by Islamism e.g. Al Qaeda et al. Besides the U.S. and EU this narrative also takes into account the concerns of the regional states including India, Russia, Iran, Turkey and Uzbekistan. This mindset focuses on connectivity, economic interdependence and political coexistence.

Of the three scenarios being considered, the most preferred outcome is one where the state is able to overcome its internal security concerns.¹⁵ The state today is still the agency that retains the capacity to affect the greatest amount of good. Therefore, I argue in this study that the nationalist mindset that exalts the state must concretize its worldview in areas like ideology, economy, diplomacy, society, politics, and military. This would help the nationalists stand on their own feet, in the intellectual sense, and provide them the freedom and wherewithal to form an alliance with the internationalist mindset, instead of being forced or inclined to lean toward Islamism. The confident nationalists would be able to increase the level of connectivity with the outside world to bring about socio-economic development particularly in the field of education.

3.1. Takeover by Islamists: Least Likely/Least Desirable Scenario

The Islamists reject the nation-state and seek to establish a transnational Islamist Caliphate. Yet for expediency purposes, they view Pakistan as most powerful Muslim military power – a position from which the country, under their control, could pursue radical pan-Islamic objectives and seek its future as an important part of a bigger political and military entity. The outcome of

¹⁵ A similar notion to the three scenarios outlined in this work, albeit from the direction of US policy-making, was made by Daniel S. Markey in *No Exit from Pakistan*, (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 200-238. In his book, Markey laid down three options for the US policy toward Pakistan in the future: defensive insulation, military-first cooperation, and comprehensive cooperation.

this scenario can be characterized by the Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' thesis.¹⁶ Another relevant concept would be Buzan's regional concept of 'conflict formation'.¹⁷

The Islamists are an ideological, myth-based, and millenarian movement with transnational objectives. They are not introspective. They blame the rest of the world, particularly Europe, the U.S. and pro-West Muslim states, for domestic political dispossession or lack of regional preponderance. They seek to harm these states out of vengeance. The Islamists' objectives are rejection of modernity, use of violence, elimination of minorities in Muslim countries and non-Muslims worldwide, and bringing down apostate Muslim governments (those states that do not impose Sharia laws). Thus, they seek to displace national elites.

According to Islamists, Pakistan's policies gravitate toward an international framework under U.S. pressure. For example, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan's policy of 'compromises' toward Islamists is disrupted by U.S. military attacks, which are in-turn resented by the Islamists.

An Islamist take over in Pakistan would result in the Pakistani Islamists allying with other Islamist groups (e.g. with Islamists in Iraq and Syria). And religious extremism and calls for caliphate in Middle East and Central Asia (former Soviet republics) would be compounded.

In the region, an Islamist state would likely direct its belligerence towards India. Beyond South Asia, they would target Israel, Iran and the U.S. The Islamists would look upon nuclear weapons as providing the country with a security cover for initiating state-sponsored operations to pursue the military option in Indian-controlled Kashmir. They would be prepared to risk a costly full-scale war with India over Kashmir. Afghanistan would experience Taliban resurgence, which could result in its break up. In the Middle East region, Islamists would seek to threaten Israel, and also turn against Iran. By focusing on Iran, they would label the status of Pakistan's nuclear weapons as the "Sunni Bomb". Pakistan would be thrust into the Arab-Iranian rivalry and made to act as more than a proxy.

The Iran-Pakistan sectarian disharmony reached a high point in the 1996 Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, supported by Pakistan. To Islamists in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and UAE (three countries that recognized the Taliban regime), it was worth celebrating as the first successful Sunni revolution in the Muslim World after the 1979 Iranian Shia revolution. To Iranians it was a security concern, and when Taliban forces advanced into the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998 and murdered Iranian diplomats, the Iranian military mobilized 70,000 troops on the Afghan border. The crisis was defused through efforts by UN and U.S. Pakistan can ill-afford sectarian disharmony either domestically or regionally.

In case of Islamist takeover, nuclear de-stabilization at the regional and global level would become more likely. Islamists' nuclear doctrine would be aggressive with lowered threshold of

¹⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilization?" *Foreign Affairs*, (Summer 1993).

¹⁷ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 174-77.

nuclear use. The safety and security of nuclear weapons would be compromised. There would be greater risk of proliferation globally.

3.2. Ambiguity toward Islamists: More Likely/Less Desirable Scenario

This situation is closer to current reality. The outcome for Pakistan under a formal alliance-with-Islamists' scenario can best be characterized by Singer and Wildavsky's "Zone of Turmoil".¹⁸ According to them, the zone of turmoil possesses the following features:

1. Absence of democracy
2. Internal instability
3. Endemic violence

This scenario could lead to a situation akin to post-Arab Spring Syria, Egypt under Mohammad Morsi, and Afghanistan under Taliban. Another similar case was Pakistan's Swat Valley under the Taliban.

As shown in Figure 3, the nationalist mindset overlaps with the Islamists and internationalists mindsets. The nationalist mindset relates to civil-military bureaucracy. The future stance of the nationalists and which of the two mindsets they eventually lean toward would be critical for determining the future course of Pakistan. The nationalist view accepts the fact that Pakistan needs a combination of judicious politico-military strategy that coordinates political, economic, diplomatic, military dimensions. It acknowledges that the usual practice of political gimmickry has been harmful for Pakistan. But this view goes on to draw on the mistaken geographical distinctions within Islamism, ignoring Islamist's ideological connection, and holds that the insurgency in Pakistan has both an Afghan and local dimension

The nationalist view admits that some of these groups have been manipulated by Pakistani intelligence agencies in the past in order to improve Pakistan's regional positioning. However, it recognizes that there has to be a fair, ruthless analysis of causes of Pakistan's internal stability problems from which policy solutions should be based. It further holds that although international involvement is present in the counterterrorism situation, the situation is still in Pakistan's hands. And that Pakistan government should seriously evolve its own framework, within current domestic/international restraints. Moreover, the steep decline in relations with the U.S. should be arrested.

¹⁸ Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil*, (Chatham House, 1993). The authors describe the two types of zones in the world.




Figure 3: Three mindsets and the overlaps

The realpolitik reasoning behind Pakistan's support for Afghan Taliban was derived from the 'strategic depth' policy. Pakistan favored a Sunni Islamist regime in Kabul as opposed to other groups that might have been closer to Iran or India. Secondly, it preferred the Taliban whose Islamic identity subsumed their ethnic (Pashtoon) identity, and thereby reduced the irredentist threat to Pakistan. But this policy has ramifications for Pakistan. This policy's internal impact on Pakistan has provided greater space for militants, and put its minorities in danger.

The takeover by, or ambiguity toward, Islamists, is the worst-case scenario. Either Pakistan faces takeover by radical Islamism and its nuclear weapons fall into their hands; or Pakistan allies with radical Islamism and hands over its nuclear arsenal. While the initial case would be accepted as *fait accompli* given that all preventive measures had been exhausted, but the latter scenario is full of teachable moments for the ruling elite of the country. If a part of the elite hope to survive the radical takeover through co-optation with radicals, that must go against revolutionary patterns witnessed in France in 1789 and Iran in 1979. The crux of the revolutionary group's political objectives is to supplant the ruling elites. Pakistani ruling elite witnessed this phenomenon of the former elites' elimination in next-door Afghanistan in 1996, particularly in the capital Kabul.

In the event of an alliance with Islamists, enmity with India would be intensified. After all, the alliance between Islamists and nationalists has its roots in the obsession with India and the utilizing non-state actors to pressure India.

The nationalists deny the consequences of the passion-driven foreign policy. It tries to deny the existence of internal security problems too, but when forced by events, it tends to put the blame on 'the other', and the 'usual suspects'. According to nationalists' conspiracy theory: TTP is an agent of CIA/RAW (Indian intelligence agency) - the usual suspects. But the following questions are ignored: Why does the Pakistan military let the TTP survive? And why do political parties insist on talks with the TTP? According to nationalist/religious narrative, Pakistan should ask the U.S. to give it some time to handle the FATA situation. For the U.S., the timing is critical now to put pressure on Taliban for a successful anti-Taliban dispensation in Afghanistan in a post-withdrawal scenario.

According to nationalist mindset, the U.S.-Pakistan alliance is in need of redefinition, and even further, the whole gamut of bilateral relations needs to be reevaluated. Pakistan needs to make its own cost-benefit analysis. Unlike the Islamists who call for drastic or radical changes, entailing degradation of bilateral relations, the nationalists ask for slow, gradual changes and readjustment of policies, albeit in the same general direction. They assert that U.S.-Pakistan relations are myopic, and increasingly to the detriment of Pakistan.

According to the nationalist view everything that happens in Afghanistan or that the U.S. does there, should be attuned to Pakistan's interests as defined by the nationalists. Further, FATA has been economically backward since 1947, and security issues should be superseded by economic development. In Afghanistan, the Pashtoon integration in Afghan government is still incomplete, which causes resentment among Pashtoos, and in turn, feeds the Taliban insurgency.

Despite some pragmatic aspects of the nationalist mindset outlined above (e.g. development of FATA and preventing sudden degradation of U.S.-Pakistan relations etc.), the nationalists remain in denial on certain critical issues. First, that Pakistan's nuclear capability, and a first-use nuclear doctrine, cannot coexist with low-intensity warfare due to the Stability-Instability Paradox.¹⁹ Secondly, ignoring the need for a counterterrorism policy, the nationalists fail to realize that space should be denied to all terrorists, including 'good' ones. And this would also be in line with UN Resolution 1373. Thirdly, the Islamist threat has reached a level where it challenges the state, largely because of the mental and psychological conditioning of society done by the state along Islamist lines over the last three decades. The continuation of the collusion-with-Islamists policy can have any one of the following reasons, ideological affinity with Islamism, and fear of Islamist reprisals or delusions of political co-optation with the Islamists for the sake of realpolitik.

The continued ambiguity toward Islamists would undermine the few rational aspects in the nationalist perspective because the Islamists would be able to seize the initiative given their rapid advances so far. In order to maintain its realist character, the strategic culture must complete the paradigm shift initiated after September 11th. Contrarily, if Islamists were able to gain political ground, insider threat to nuclear weapons would increase, and if they acquired command and control of nuclear weapons, it would lead to increased risk of nuclear proliferation in the region. Nuclear doctrine would become more aggressive and there would be a lowering of nuclear threshold as in the first scenario.

3.3. Defeat of Islamists: Less Likely/Most Desirable Scenario

The outcome of this scenario would be similar to Francis Fukuyama's 'end of history' thesis.²⁰ It means the end of major warfare and security rivalries. Other relevant concepts are the 'democratic peace' theory,²¹ and Barry Buzan's 'security community'.²² This scenario could lead

¹⁹ Michael Krepon, "The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia", Henry L. Stimson Center, (May 2003), 1-20.

²⁰ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, (Free Press, Reprint edition, 2006).

²¹ Michael W. Doyle, *Liberal Peace: Selected Essays*, (New York: Routledge, 2011).

to a situation similar to Turkey, which is a corridor of energy pipelines; India, which has remained democratic and is in an upward economic trajectory, or ASEAN states that have emerged as 'Asian tigers'.

According to the internationalist view, one of the reasons why states seek regional and global stability (e.g. when they resist nuclear proliferation), is their connectivity with the global system.²³ The military and ideological defeat of Islamists would lead to global linkages and would therefore result in nuclear safety, security, arms control, and disarmament. Thus, Pakistan must adopt the modernization track, which entails democratization, industrialization, and rationalization. Only through this method would Pakistan be able to move out of the feudal economy and culture. For the achievement of these goals, Pakistan has no other option but to seek peace with India, support the constitutional political dispensation in Afghanistan, and adopt a long-term counterterrorism policy.

In the internationalist view, if the Taliban loses in a post-withdrawal Afghanistan, their fallback option would most likely be Pakistan (both tribal and settled areas). If Taliban succeeded in Kabul, Iran and other neighbors may wish to break up Afghanistan along ethnic lines in order to get rid of *Takfiri* Islamism. This would put the burden of managing restive Pashtoons on Pakistan, which it would find hard to handle. In either case, if Pakistan tried to repeat the 1989 example of relocating Islamists from Afghanistan to Kashmir, there would be more turmoil in South Asia. Another developing situation that Pakistan would have to consider is the rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran. If India and Iran subsequently drew closer and Afghanistan also joined this new bloc, then Pakistan would need to revisit its policy paradigm toward the Afghan Taliban. Most importantly, even if Pakistan's strategic objectives were met and the Taliban made a successful comeback after U.S. withdrawal, this outcome would not be conducive to long-term stability in the region as well as Pakistan's internal security.

The internationalist view laments the fact that there is a prevalence of conspiracy theories in Pakistan, including in print (particularly vernacular) and digital media, which keeps Pakistanis insulated from international realities and engaged in a contrarian discourse. A balanced future discourse can be brought about through complete media freedom, educational reforms, and some sort of interdependence via linkages with the rest of the world. Internationalists believe that the strategic culture should not be corrupted by ideological fantasy. The central issue to the internationalists is that so far not even the first step toward counterterrorism policy has been taken at the public level. This step is the 'identification of the threat'.²⁴ Even after this first step, there would still be a drawn-out effort required to overcome the threat of Islamism. The government should be prepared with a long-term counterterrorism policy.

²² Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 174-77.

²³ Etel Solingen, "Mapping Internationalization: Domestic and Regional Impacts", *International Studies Quarterly*, (Vol. 45, Issue 4, December 2001), 517-555

²⁴ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 25. The authors make the point that an issue can only be 'securitized' if the audience accepts it as such.

4. Counterterrorism Policy to Achieve the Most Desirable Scenario

The transition from ambiguity to clarity on the issue of Islamism remains incomplete. Therefore, realization of counterterrorism policy in Pakistan has been late in coming. And whatever policy framework has been formulated still requires the necessary political will for full implementation. The counterterrorism effort would be critical to make this transition. It should encompass the military, political, economic, and social dimensions of the conflict and enhance state capacity for post-conflict reconstruction. There should be greater army-police coordination. The military and civilian intelligence agencies should share information in a regular and institutionalized manner. An activated National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) with mandate similar to Department of Homeland Security in the U.S. should serve as a database where the record of each citizen's official interaction with the state and with other citizens should be maintained. NACTA should be provided with the information available with National Registration and Database Authority (NADRA) and use of latest technology including biometrics. There should be financial tracking of every Islamist individual and group. The legal issues including prosecutorial capacity of the state should be enhanced so that hardened criminals are not returned to the society. The following are the broad areas that need attention:

4.1. *Military Operations with a light Footprint*

In order to ensure population security, counterterrorism operations should carry a light footprint with minimum collateral damage. Heavyset military operations require huge public support, which is not regularly forthcoming. Therefore, operations should be carried out on a routine basis by small, devolved, and hard-hitting units. The desired result is that there should not be any ungoverned spaces on Pakistani territory.

While, the army has made changes in its doctrine, like the Infantry training manual, for better battlefield results since the Swat operation in 2009, there is room for improvement. The FC and the 11 Corps that have been at the forefront of the operations in the Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (KPK) province should be provided with increased opportunities to interact with British and U.S. counterterrorist units to hone their skills. Equally important, the police should be allowed to benefit from international training opportunities to enhance their counterterrorism capacity.

4.2. *Role of Science and Technology*

Pakistan's counterterrorism policy should put greater emphasis on science and technology. The growing use of technology by Islamists including internet, mobile phones, SMS and twitter, should force the law-enforcement agencies to utilize superior technology to circumvent and apprehend them. The state through army, police and media should launch an ideological offensive to blunt the Islamist narrative of rejection and vengeance.

The Islamist narrative that labels Pakistani forces as America's mercenaries needs to be stopped. This should be done by a Pakistani counter-narrative within the framework of a counterterrorism policy that would present Pakistan's vantage point on the ideological and policy front. The role of technology could be important in launching mass campaigns of de-radicalization of the society. Pakistan could, with the help of its international allies particularly the U.S., considerably

enhance its technological capacity to reestablish the rule of law. Islamists' financing could be checked by use of technology and international collaboration.

4.3. Preventing Sectarianization of Identity

Figure 4 shows the phenomenon of sectarian violence gaining ground in Pakistan over the last four years. Pakistan's national identity crisis extends along ethnic, linguistic, and socio-economic lines exacerbated by growing sectarianism.




Figure 4: Trends of Sectarian Violence (www.san-pips.com)

Source: Policy Brief, Sectarian Violence, Jan 2013, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)

The problem of sectarianization has both domestic and regional dimension. The Taliban and other terrorist groups belong to the *Takfiri* sub-sect of the Sunni sect of Islam.²⁵ Such *Takfiri* groups are active in the Middle Eastern region. Pakistan should insulate itself from the sectarian strife in the wider region, because since May 1998, Pakistan also possesses the role of a NWS. It is important that the sectarian tag should not be attached to its nuclear capability. This would increase Pakistan's problems in a tense South- West Asian neighborhood.

Domestically, the sectarian polarization should not be allowed to permeate the law enforcement agencies. State institutions should re-affirm the secularist principle, which is a prerequisite for good governance and justice. The interpretation of the 'two-nation theory' as espoused by Pakistan's founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, envisioned Pakistan as a Muslim, not Islamic, state.²⁶ The difference is subtle yet important. If the two-nation theory were construed to mean that Pakistan was formed to become an Islamic state, then only 'sharia laws' would be

²⁵ The phenomenon of *takfir* means the declaration of other Muslims as apostate and non-Muslim and therefore liable to be murdered.

²⁶ Two-nation theory presented by Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader) Mohammed Ali Jinnah envisioned Hindus and Muslims to be two separate nations and thus entitled to form two separate states, India and Pakistan, after the departure of the British from the Subcontinent in 1947.

imposed. Whereas a Muslim state more clearly brings out the original intent of the founding fathers to protect the socio-economic rights of the Muslims of Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. It means Pakistan seeks to pursue a way of life of its own, but gives due place to concepts of liberal democracy, economic development, and human rights particularly minority and women rights.

An ideological offensive in the form of a public relations campaign centered on secularism should be launched to counter-radicalize the Islamists, while the Islamist narrative should be deconstructed and delegitimized. Furthermore, the society should be de-radicalized. The state should change its culture of privileging overt displays of orthodox religiosity begun during General Zia's social engineering program of 'Islamization' under the shadow of the Afghan 'jihad' in the 1980s. In contemporary culture, a Taliban-looking man with long hair and baggy 'shalwar-kameez' clothes is more likely to cross the countless police check-posts all over the country, than a clean-shaven young man in blue jeans.

5. Formulation of Counterterrorism Policy: Perspectives for Strategic Culture

Since terrorism poses a strategic threat to Pakistan, it naturally follows that it should elicit a strategic response. This would entail strategic planning with thematic implications for the strategic culture. The most important implication is the preservation of the pragmatic realist paradigm of strategic culture. Second, Pakistan should improve its counterterrorism capacity. Third, there should be public relations campaign featuring counter-narrative to Islamism. And fourth, terrorists' finances should be cut-off with the help of enhanced international connectivity.

5.1. Focus on Internal Security

The currently operational Defence Policy of Pakistan 2004, identified India as the main military threat to Pakistan. The Defence Policy provides the framework and guidance for the formulation of the Joint Strategic Directive (JSD), which is comprehensive in covering all aspects including composition, structuring, development plans, training, methodology, and employment strategy etc., of the armed services including specific instructions to counter the threat identified by the Defence Policy. The last JSD, issued in 2007, specifically stated, "The only major military threat to Pakistan was perceived from the east i.e. from India".²⁷

In 2008, General Ashfaq Kayani, then chief of Pakistan army, asked the General Headquarters, to find out the reason behind Pakistan's military setbacks against the ongoing insurgency. The report concluded that the army must focus on population security.²⁸ That report was followed by the success in Swat in 2009. It showed the army's realization of the primacy of the internal threat.

²⁷ Testimony of Air Chief Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman, *Abbottabad Commission Report*, (Al Jazeera, 2013). Accessed on Dec 1, 2013. In the testimony, the former Pakistani air chief stated, that in the Defence Policy and the JSD, the U.S. was classified as a friendly country.

²⁸ See Haider Mullick, "Recalibrating U.S.-Pakistan Relations," *The Washington Quarterly*, (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Summer 2012), 93-107.

By focusing on the internal threat, Pakistani strategic culture's concern should be to manage the booming population of Pakistan (e.g. tracking the movement of men and materials). It is a stupendous task that would require joint army-police, 'whole-of-government' efforts, and would ultimately result in enhanced security and wellbeing of the people of Pakistan.

5.2. Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations in Pakistan have been tenuous at best.²⁹ Although for the last decade a democratic government has been in place, for this to remain true over the long-term, politicians should promote greater civil-military collaboration. Counterterrorism policy would have to be whole-of-government effort. Unfortunately, the general elections in May 2013 saw center-right parties that were considered Taliban-neutral if not Taliban-friendly.³⁰ Along with the traditional power-wielders i.e. civil-military bureaucracy, there are three new political players. First, there are center-right political parties in the central government and three of the four provinces. Secondly, there is a right-wing media. And thirdly, there is right-wing judiciary, revitalized as a result of the lawyers' movement in 2007.

Soft borders impact upon Pakistan's internal sovereignty. The state's weakening legitimate monopoly of violence has important implication for nuclear security. In the past, the military's intelligence agencies shortsightedly extended the means of coercion to non-state actors. Currently, private militias and 'lashkars' proliferate even though according to Article 256 of Pakistani constitution there cannot exist armed groups within the territory of Pakistan.³¹

Pakistan needs administrative and bureaucratic reform. In FATA, there needs to be a nuanced understanding of the habits and habitat of tribal people. The British administered FATA by indirect means (via tribal elders) due to its inhospitable terrain and volatile politics. Pakistan could not devise an enduring administrative mechanism for these areas after 1947. Hence FATA remained a lawless belt in Pakistani territory. Historically, the tribes excelled at double-dealing with the central government in order to gain political concessions. Both for FATA and Punjab-based Taliban, the political parties would have to sign on the counterterrorism policy, discard any right-wing bias, lead from the front to build public opinion, and exhibit firmness and maturity for the policy's success.

5.3. International Connectivity

Figure 5 demonstrates the dismal economic indicators of Pakistan. On the Human Development Index (HDI), Pakistan ranks 146th out of 187 countries. In South Asia, Pakistan is placed below the regional average. Pakistan's economy has been growing at three percent for the last three years and is projected to remain so for the coming three years. Pakistan should try to escape the

²⁹ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*, (England: Macmillan, 2000).

³⁰ "Text of the APC resolution," *Daily The News*, September 10, 2013, www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-201085-Text-of-the-APC-resolution

³¹ Article 256 of the Constitution of Pakistan reads, "Private Armies Forbidden: No private organization capable of functioning as a military organization shall be formed, and any such organization shall be illegal".

negative effects of this economic downturn. Pakistan's role as a trading nation instead of a manufacturing nation offers a way out of this pattern.




Figure 5: Pakistan - The Human Development Index³²

Pakistan possesses the potential to serve as a trade corridor and highway for pipelines. Two routes of the ancient Silk Road historically connected East and West. The northern Silk Road via China, and the southern via Pakistan. The Silk Road was re-invented as the Grand Trunk Road, which connected Kabul with Calcutta, by the 15th century Pashtoon ruler of India, Sher Shah Suri. Since independence in 1947, Pakistan has served as a barrier, rather than a conduit, between Central Asia and South Asia. That policy should change. India too should be convinced to take into account the immense potential the corridor holds for her. A non-Taliban, secure and free Afghanistan is the best possible partner for this future. All three states, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, would have to break out of the zero-sum mode. Economic linkages and interdependence, once established, can lead to war-avoidance and conflict-resolution.

The lack of education has made Pakistani society increasingly insensitive to growing violence, injustice and corruption. The increased connectivity can help Pakistan improve its level of

³² The Human Development Index (HDI) provides a composite measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health, education and income. Between 1980 and 2012 Pakistan's HDI rose by 1.3% annually from 0.337 to 0.515 today, which gives the country a rank of 146 out of 187 countries with comparable data. The HDI of South Asia as a region increased from 0.357 in 1980 to 0.558 today, placing Pakistan below the regional average. <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/PAK.html>

education. Pakistan should build on cultural links with India, Iran and Afghanistan to reform its education system, both in the public sector and the *madrassah* sector.

Finally, the emphasis of civilian U.S. support should be on four areas i.e. education, science and technology, innovation and entrepreneurship, and inculcation of good governance to entrench this policy. In defence-related collaboration, the transfer of U.S. weapons to Pakistan should be counterterrorism-oriented. The U.S. support should be aimed at disrupting terrorist communications and tracking terrorist finances. Thus U.S.-Pakistan relations should shift away from focus on traditional security to countering sub-conventional threats, and socio-political development.

6. Conclusion

Pakistan has a huge youth population. It must be gainfully employed and out of reach of terrorist recruiters. Young people ultimately develop a sense of disenfranchisement and turn against the state. If the state's position remains ambiguous toward Islamists for reasons of realpolitik or ideological affinity, it would lose the initiative at their hands. Pakistan's cultural identity could witness transformation with potentially grave consequences for its domestic outlook, policies toward regional stability, and global isolation. Similarly in case of forcible take over by Islamists, Pakistan could cause regional and global instability by seeking to become a player in the Israel-Arab and the Iran-Arab issues. The scenario of take over-by-Islamists remains least likely due to army and civilian administrative capacity. But the government ambiguity toward Islamists could be their route-to-power. The lack of state-will could provide encouragement to Islamism, which currently does not seem unlikely.

The strategic culture is the institutionalization of strategy, crafted in view of national interests. The strategic culture reflected in organizations like the military is not subject to frequent changes. However, the emergence of a crisis necessitates change. Pakistan made one such change in 1972 when it decided to forego conventional deterrence against India and opted for the nuclear option. A second change in strategic culture was necessitated after September 11th when Pakistan was forced to abandon the policy of support for Islamism in Afghanistan. However, the second change was incomplete. The policy of abandoning the Islamists was half-hearted and partial. That has led to a gap between strategy and objective environment. The Islamist non-state actors are taking advantage of this gap to the detriment of national security. Also with India, non-state actors threaten to damage the fragile cold peace that currently prevails.

Pakistan should not make facile distinctions between Islamist groups. There are currently four main categories. The Kashmir-focused; Afghanistan-focused; Shia-focused, and Pakistan-focused. However, as far as the aims, objectives and central ideology is concerned, the difference of names is just a reflection of their geographical distribution and division of labor. It would not be wrong to assume that ideologically all of these groups fall under the umbrella of Al Qaeda. Whether they are local, regional or global in reach, their objectives are the same: rejection of modernity, use of violence, elimination of minorities in Muslim countries and non-Muslims

worldwide, and bringing down apostate Muslim governments (those states that do not impose Sharia laws). Pakistan cannot retain its cultural identity if it accommodates any of these groups.

There are obstacles to counterterrorism policy at the societal level. There is unchallenged misrepresentation of Islam. Islamic discourse has not been permitted to reform at the public level due to political exigencies of successive governments in the Muslim World. There is the Pakistanis' desire to be the most righteous within their communities. Also, the Pakistani Muslims are the prisoners of words, swayed by displays of ritualistic piety. The phenomenon of quasi-liberalism in the urban classes allows regressive thinking to prevail at the political level while maintaining social liberalism.

There are certain noteworthy examples of successful counterterrorism policies. There was a long drawn effort on the part of Ottoman rulers to dismantle the elite janissaries corps, which had become very powerful. It was finally eliminated in 1826, and that allowed Turkey to evolve into a modern Turkish republic in 1923. Then there is the example of Algeria where the radical Islamists threatened the state during the 1990s, but the state did not open negotiations with them till two years after their surrender. Now Algeria is among the successful regional economies. Also, Sri Lanka fought the Tamils for two decades and finally eliminated the threat of secession. The lesson for Pakistan in these examples is to fight for its own survival in the face of existential threat from within.

The concept of territorial sovereignty exists both at the external and the internal level. While the threat to external sovereignty is posed by other states the threat to internal sovereignty comes from insurgents based inside national borders. A dangerous dimension of the threat to internal sovereignty exists in non-state actors using Pakistan's territory to launch attacks against other states. This can provoke retaliation by those states attacked by the non-state groups. Pakistan must safeguard against the possibility of being forced into an unwanted war with any state due to its inability to rein in non-state actors on its soil.

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Appendix A: A Migrant State³³

Various internal dynamics in Pakistan—including the ever-increasing importance of religion, the army's intervention in politics, the rise of ethnic movements, and the weakening of democracy—can be attributed to the phenomenon of migration. At the time of partition, both India and Pakistan received migrants from across the border: 4.4 million and 7.2 million, respectively.

However, the political impact of migration on the two countries was substantially different. In post-independence India, migrants accounted for 1 percent of the population, coming from peripheral areas of British India now included in Pakistan. However, those of migrant stock represent 20 percent of the population in Pakistan today. Every fifth household in Pakistan, every fourth in Punjab and Sindh provinces, and more than half in Karachi are “migrant.” A new ethnic hierarchy emerged with Urdu-speaking migrants, or the mohajirs, on top followed by Punjabis—both migrants and locals—with Bengalis, Pakhtuns, Sindhis, and the Baloch at the bottom. Overrepresented in cities and in the professional and commercial middle classes in Punjab and Sindh, migrants exercised a disproportionately high level of influence on the developing state and society. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the first governor-general (1947-1948), and Liaquat Ali Khan, the first prime minister (1947-1951), were both migrants.

The migrant leadership, with its constituency back in India, soon realized that elections would be disruptive for the new ruling set-up. This new elite created a bureaucratic polity that emphasized the rule of law rather than the rule of public representatives, a phenomenon that persisted through the time of the military rulers. Stemming from the tradition of the viceroys in British India, power gravitated in Pakistan into the hands of the governor general and then the president.³⁴ Constitutionalism was tempered by institutionalism and undercut by the doctrine of “state necessity.”³⁵ A power struggle emerged between the state apparatus, represented by the middle class, and the landed and tribal elite, which came to constitute the “political class.”

The migrant-led and military leadership privileged the middle class at the expense of the political class. Composed mostly of Punjabis and the mohajirs, the middle class represents the educated, professional, and commercial interests in the modern sector and is at the heart of the permanent institutions of the state represented by the officer cadre of the army and civil bureaucracy. Although socially progressive, the middle class is politically conservative; in fact, it abhors the idea of parliamentary rule, finding it akin to dispersion and dilution of state authority. Military rulers drew on the support of the middle class to “presidentialize” the parliamentary system of the country.³⁶

³³ Excerpt taken from Mohammad Waseem, *Patterns of Conflict in Pakistan: Implications for Policy*, Working Paper, Number 5, January 2011, Saban Center, Brookings, Washington D.C., U.S.

³⁴ K.B. Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), 62-63.

³⁵ Paula R. Newberg, “Balancing Act: Prudence, Impunity and Pakistan’s Jurisprudence,” in *Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal*, ed. Paul R. Brass (New York: Routledge, 2010), 182-83.

³⁶ See for example, the 1962 Constitution, the 8th Amendment passed under Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq and the 17th Amendment passed under Pervez Musharraf.

The political class is more inclusive and representative of the nation because it represents Sindhis, Pakhtuns, and the Baloch and the non-elite sections of the population in Punjab and urban Sindh. Nonetheless, the political class in Pakistan is inherently weak. It is socially and culturally conservative and less educated. In the postcolonial state of Pakistan, the only way to political power available to this class is through elections. The political class upholds the constitutional source of legitimacy in principle—and seeks to operate through the parliament and political parties—but essentially functions as a broker between the largely illiterate, inchoate, and inarticulate masses and the remote, impersonal, and English-based state for articulation of the former's interests.

About the Author

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