

Bank of Finland Simulation Seminar and Workshop

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Network topology and payment system resilience - first results

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The views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of their respective institutions

Research problem and approach

- How does the topology of the payment network affect its resilience?
- Devise a simple model to test the impact of topology:
 1. stochastic instruction arrival process
 2. “prototypical” topologies of interbank relationships
 3. simple reflexive bank behavior, and
 4. single disrupted bank

1. Stochastic instruction arrival process

- Each bank has a given level of customer deposits (D_i)
- Each unit of deposits has the same probability of been transformed into a payment instruction


$$\langle I_i(t) \rangle = \lambda_i \cdot \frac{D_i(t)}{D_i(0)}$$

- where λ_i is the initial rate
- When a bank receives a payment its deposits increase
-> the instructions arrival increases
- When a bank sends a payment its deposits decrease
-> the instructions arrival decreases


2. “Prototypical” topologies of interbank relationships

Homogeneous deposit distribution


400 banks, 8×400 links



lattice




complete




random

Heterogeneous deposit distribution








random




scale-free

2.1 Network statistics


		average degree	Degree range	average path length
	lattice	8	8	6.7
	random – homogeneous	8	8	3.1
	complete	399	399	1
	random – heterogeneous	8	1 – 19	3.1
	scale-free	8	1 – 225	2.6

2.2 Real networks...



Source: The Topology of Interbank Payment Flows
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr243.pdf

3. Simple reflexive bank behavior




4. Single disrupted bank


- An “operational incident”
- Other banks are not aware: the bank can receive, but cannot send payments
- The single bank acts as a liquidity sink. Eventually all liquidity is at the failing bank and no payments can be settled
- We examine the **liquidity absorption rate** and system **throughput** in the time period until all liquidity is at the failing bank

Example: queues in a lattice network, 10,000 nodes, low liquidity


before:



after:




Steady state performance



Steady state performance is varies under the alternative network topologies


Queues in steady state



Queues in steady state: scale free network

Highest degree
heterogeneity


-> higher degree
heterogeneity and a longer
average path length
increase the level of
queues in the steady state




Liquidity absorption rate

The amount of liquidity absorbed
by the failing bank
by each instruction arriving to the system

Liquidity absorption rate




Liquidity absorption rate: scale free network



Throughput

The fraction of arriving instructions
that the bank can settle
in a given time interval
(the remaining being queued)


Throughput



Throughput: scale-free network

Throughput decreases with increased **degree** **heterogeneity** and the **removal of larger banks**

Highest degree heterogeneity,
largest failing bank



Summary

- First investigation into the impact of topology in “payment system” type of network dynamics
- Topology matters
 - both for normal performance and
 - for performance under stress
 - efficient topologies are not necessarily less resilient
- Next steps
 - Investigate alternative times for other banks’ knowledge of failure and failure resumption times
 - Impact of the existence of a market?
 - Perturbations in market?
 - Build behavior for banks