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Sandia Technology logo A quarterly research and development magazine.

Spring 2007
Volume 9, No. 1

SANDIA TECHNOLOGY MAGAZINE

news notes


Computer simulation tracks nuclear contraband traffic

chechnya map
A trafficking analysis computed with factors deduced from available intelligence results in a probabilistic route. Actual seizure site for this in Chechnya is depicted by the star.

A Sandia researcher has developed a simulation program designed to track the illicit trade in fissile and nonfissile radiological material to predict who is building the next nuclear weapon and where they are doing it.

“By using a cluster analysis algorithm coded into a program,” says Sandia researcher David York, “I evaluated traffic patterns and routes in which thefts, seizures, and destinations of materials were reported.” Data from these examinations allowed York to depict the A. Q. Kahn network before it was uncovered. Kahn is a Pakistani scientist linked to the illicit proliferation of nuclear technical knowledge.

Cluster analyses link data of common place, time, or material. Testing a computer simulation on a known past event is one accepted means of establishing the program’s validity. In the Kahn analysis, York looked at networked routes indicative of a nuclear trafficking scheme between countries. In several verified incidents, inspectors seized uranium enriched to 80 percent, as well as other items indicative of small-scale development of crude nuclear devices.

david york and john reynolds
David York (left) shows John Reynolds a simulation program designed to track illicit trade in radiological materials.
(Photo by Randy Montoya)
York developed the program as part of his master’s thesis while a student intern at Sandia. He collected and collated data from 800 open-source incidents, from 1992 to the present. He plotted the incidents on a geographic information system software platform. He came up with a network of countries and routes between countries indicative of an illicit nuclear and radiological trafficking scheme.

“The number of incidents and the quantity and quality of material seized is disturbing,” York says, “particularly because this may represent a small percentage of the actual amount of material being trafficked.” The situation may be worse than it appears because much information about nuclear material traffic is classified, he says.

York presented his results in October at the International Safeguards Conference sponsored by the United Nation’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria. He has also been invited to present his methods and conclusions to the European Union’s Illicit Trafficking Working Group at a summer meeting of the IAEA.

For the tool to be effective, “Enough information must be collected under a cooperative international framework,” York says. “Then info must be analyzed to separate patterns from noise, essentially creating intelligence.” “We’re trying to develop a market niche for this kind of tracking program,” says Sandia manager Gary Rochau, “and I think we’re ahead of everyone’s headlights.”

The method can be used to track other materials, such as drugs. “We have a lot of interest from a lot of agencies,” says Rochau.

Technical contact: Gary Rochau (505) 845-7543, gerocha@sandia.gov
Media contact: Neal Singer (505) 845-7078, nsinger@sandia.gov