CHANGE HISTORY

MN471018 – WORK PLANNING AND CONTROL MANUAL

Date
Summary
October 13, 2009
This document is no longer a CPR. This document implements the requirements of Corporate procedure ESH100.1.WPC.1, Plan and Control Work. 
June 1, 2009

Substantive

This manual has changed by 75% or more and should be read in its entirety. The manual was revised to provide improved instruction to users.

In the ES&H Glossary:

  • Add: The following definitions:
    • Activity-Level PHS: A PHS that includes all the attributes of a JSA (job safety analysis), in addition to the documented PHS output for which the PHS process is designed, which are the hazards, the major requirements for the identified hazards and controls, and the facility’s or operation's hazard classification. An activity-level PHS identifies specific and unique hazards associated with specific activity-level work, and prescribes mitigating controls for these identified hazards.

    Criteria
    Are hazards identified at the task level?

    • What are the hazards associated with each specific work procedure step?
    • Do these hazards have specific hazard-related attributes, associated with accomplishing that specific procedure step, that are not typically reflected in a PHS?

    Are controls assigned that address each specific task-level hazard?

    • Task-level hazard may need specific control(s) related to:
      • How the hazard is encountered
      • Other hazards that may be present

    Other factors associated with accomplishing the specific work procedure step

    • Aggregate Hazard: The collective effect that results when two or more hazards – usually from two or more separate primary hazard screens – are encountered simultaneously during one process, activity, or work step, and which is often greater than the effect of any one of the hazards if encountered individually during the same process, activity, or work step.
    • Controls (Work Planning and Control): Devices, methods, or practices that make an activity or process go safely, effectively, efficiently, predictably, and according to high standards to protect key assets from human error—usually taking an engineered, administrative, cultural, or oversight form.
    • Critical Step: A procedural step or series of steps, or an action that, if performed improperly, will cause irreversible harm to a system, process, component, or people, or that will significantly affect facility operation. An improperly performed critical step results in a negative consequence that can not be reversed or undone (independent of when the consequence may be realized).
    • Defense (Work Planning and Control): Means or measures (controls, barriers, and safeguards) taken to prevent or catch human error; to protect people, a facility or operation, or property against the results of human error; and to mitigate the consequences of an error.
    • Defense in Depth (Work Planning and Control): The set of redundant and diverse defenses, barriers, controls, and safeguards to protect personnel and equipment from human error, such that a failure with one defense would be compensated for by another defensive mechanism to prevent or mitigate undesirable consequences.
    • Error: A human decision or action that unintentionally departs from an expected behavior or accepted standard.
    • Error-Likely Situation: A work situation in which there is greater opportunity for error when a specified action or task is performed, because error precursors are present.
    • Error Precursor: A task-related condition for a specific activity or task that provokes human error and increases the chance of a technical error or an adverse consequence; otherwise referred to as “risk factors.” Examples include time pressure, first-time activity, lack of knowledge or experience, and interruptions.
    • Error-Tolerant: A consequence prevention technique where processes, tasks, equipment, etc., are designed such that the inevitable human error will not result in an event of consequence.
    • Flawed Defenses (Work Planning and Control): Defects with engineered, administrative, cultural, or oversight controls that, under the right circumstances, fail to:
      • Protect facility or operation equipment or people against hazards
      • Prevent the occurrence of active errors
      • Mitigate the consequences of error.
    • Management Operational Review: A review by management of safety and environmental documentation that is performed before conducting a test. Usually the review is conducted by the Department Manager but, depending on the qualitative hazard estimate, a higher level of management involvement may be needed, up to the level of Vice President.
    • Questioning Attitude (Work Planning and Control): An attitude that encourages a person's foresight to precede his or her action such that planning, judgment, and decision-making are appropriate for the situation.
    • Scope Creep: An undesired, unauthorized, and uncontrolled change (e.g., expansion) in a project’s scope, causing the project to drift away from its original purpose (and possibly the safety controls established for the project). This phenomenon can occur when the scope of a project or activity is not properly defined, documented, and controlled. As an example, if the scope of work for a project were for environmental restoration work, expanding the work to include fossil energy support services would be considered scope creep, and is not authorized under the original work scope.
    • Self-Checking (Work Planning and Control): An attention-management technique an individual can use to help identify changes in an activity and to ensure the correct component is selected for manipulation; verifies attention is focused on appropriate component and prompts the individual to think about the intended action and its expected outcome before performance.
  • Change: The following definitions:
    • Operating Envelope from: The term "operating envelope" is used to describe approved operational and administrative boundaries within which Sandia facilities, groups or individual laboratories, or capabilities may safely conduct their work activities.

    to: Approved operational and administrative boundaries within which Sandia facilities, groups, individual laboratories, or capabilities may safely conduct their work activities. Every operating envelope must contain at least one primary hazard screen.

    • Rigor (Work Planning and Control) from: The application of a graded approach to specify the degree of detail and formality in planning work, developing work instructions, specifying worker qualification and skill requirements, scheduling, determining the amount of field supervision required, and all other aspects of work planning and control; based on the importance or significance and the associated consequences of the work activity.

to: The application of a graded approach to specify the degree of discipline and formality in planning work, developing work instructions, specifying worker qualification and skill requirements, scheduling, reviewing, approving, determining the amount of field supervision required, and performing all other aspects of work planning and control; based on the complexity and the consequence associated with the work activity.

November 13, 2008

Administrative
This CPR has been revised to:

  • Add:  Attachment A, "Work Planning and Control Attributes."

In Section 4.0, Subsection 4.2.2, "Activity-Level Work Management Process," Table 3, "Required Elements of an Organizational Activity-Level WP&C Process, in the Note to the table:

  • Add:  A reference to the new Attachment A, "Work Planning and Control Attributes," in the Note to the table, as follows:  “Additional guidance for the appropriate implementation of an effective activity-level WP&C process is provided in Attachment A, ‘Work Planning and Control Attributes.’”
October 28, 2008 Substantive

Note: Over 75% of this CPR is either new or has been substantively changed and should therefore be read in its entirety.

Summary: The work planning and control (WP&C) process in this CPR has been substantively changed to provide a rigorous methodology of planning and controlling work, commensurate with the associated hazards and risks. This process establishes the minimum institutional requirements of the Sandia WP&C process necessary for the safe, efficient, and reliable conduct of work in support of Sandia missions.

These changes include:

  • Additional WP&C process requirements for applying a graded approach to work planning and control (Section 4.1 and 4.2).
  • Additional general requirements for the following WP&C process activities (Section 4.2.1):
    • Developing comprehensive organizational WP&C procedure
    • Delegating key roles
    • Defining the operating envelope
  • An added diagram of the activity-level work management process with ISMS integration (Section 4.2.2)
  • Defining the required elements of an organizational activity-level WP&C process (Section 4.2.2):
    • Define Work
    • Compare work to existing operating envelope
    • Accept work
    • Activity-level hazard identification and control
    • Management authorizes work to proceed
    • Execute work
    • Deliver to customer
    • Identify improvements
    • Revise operating envelope, work definition, decline work.
  • Added roles and responsibilities for the following individuals (Section 5.0):
    • Line managers / Supervisors
    • Researchers / Principal Investigators
    • Engineers / Technologists
    • Work Planners
    • Space Owners
  • Attachment A, "Work Planning and Control References," has been moved into the main document, with modifications, as Section 3.0, "Regulatory Drivers." The modifications include added information on requirements and WP&C requirements flowdown.
  • Attachment B, "Work Planning and Control Required Attributes," has been deleted.
May 22, 2008 Administrative
The subject matter expert wass changed from Jaime Moya to Bradley S. Elkin.
September 18, 2007 Administrative
The following changes were made to this CPR:
  • The CPR was moved from the Laboratory Management (ILMS) enterprise risk category to the ES&H category.
  • Policy sponsor was changed from Joe Polito to Michael W. Hazen
June 29, 2007 Administrative
The following changes were made to this CPR:
  • Policy sponsor was changed from Frank Figueroa to Joe Polito
  • Section 2.0: Added standard exemption process statement
January 3, 2007 Substantive
This new CPR implements NNSA attributes, best practices and guidance for effectively incorporating integrated safety management and quality assurance into activity level work control. The attribute list is provided as an attachment and organizations performing work covered under this CPR are required to promulgate implementing processes and/or procedures to implement these attributes using a graded approach tailored to their work.

Bradley S. Elkin, bselkin@sandia.gov
Al Bendure, aobendu@sandia.gov


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