Cooperative Security: Implications for National Security and International Relations

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Michael Moodie
Chemical and Biological
Arms Control Institute

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For specific information on this report contact:

Arian L. Pregenzer at the above address.

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Albuquerque, NM 87185 and Livermore, CA 94550

Abstract

In the post-Cold War international system, in addition to addressing the role of force and military competition, the concept of cooperative security now entails economic and environmental security concerns as well. Economic performance rather than military capability is seen increasingly as the measure of a state’s power in the international community. A cooperative security approach is needed because many of the current problems facing countries lie beyond the capacity of any one country to resolve. Making cooperative security a major mode of interaction in the international system as the next century unfolds, however, requires that states conduct business differently than they have in the past. Change is needed in both perspective and operations. The role of technology is to provide data as well as the means to analyze and interpret the data effectively. The future of cooperative security also demands that states build a range of capabilities to implement international agreements, to build an analytical community, to address transnational threats, to prevent or resolve conflicts, and to build civil societies.
Acronyms

- ACRS Arms Control and Regional Security
- APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
- ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
- ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
- CBM confidence building measure
- CFE Conventional Forces in Europe
- CSBM confidence and security building measure
- CSCAP Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
- CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
- DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
- IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
- MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
- NGO nongovernmental organization
- NIS Newly Independent States
- NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
- OAS Organization of American States
- OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
- OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
- ROK Republic of Korea
- SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
- WMD weapons of mass destruction

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Executive Summary

Cooperative security has expanded beyond its original definition of defense-oriented military forces, multinational coalitions, and service for international purposes. The expanded meaning also includes a country’s perceptions of its economic and environmental security.

At the same time that fragmentation and decentralization of the post-Cold War security order occurs, the world is also experiencing globalization in the international economy and the information and social order. Proponents of cooperative security have the opportunity to exploit these changes. Increasingly, states define threats to their security in economic, environmental, and demographic terms. However, concerns about nontraditional security challenges have not eliminated traditional military worries. The two sets of issues combine to foster an important perception in many countries of a heightened sense of vulnerability. Perceived military deficits, a heightened sense of civilian population vulnerability, and concerns over the fragility of the national infrastructure are all part of this changed perception.

In the post-World War II environment, many countries created in the surge of decolonization have not become integrated political units, but rather are plagued by underdeveloped political infrastructures and institutions and weak economic systems. In some countries, the weakness of the central government has contributed to strengthened identity in ethnic, religious, and ideological groups. Transnational actors such as drug cartels and organized crime pose yet another challenge to state authority. The receding of government authority in many parts of the world has several implications for cooperative security: 1) The breakdown of authority translates into less freedom of action for a government seeking cooperation with its neighbor. 2) Nongovernmental entities such as ethnic groups may straddle borders, which makes it difficult for an individual government to exert control. 3) The loss of governmental authority makes it difficult for governments to deliver on promises that may be circumvented by transnational groups.

Other impediments to enhanced cooperative security involve differences in perceptions of key actors. A state may feel threatened from more than one direction by more than one neighbor. States’ perceptions of multiple security threats could make them more reluctant to pursue cooperative security because while efforts might improve one situation they could have unforeseeable consequences for another. Countries in regions of tension have seen that victory in war has brought rewards. In the area of arms control, some nonaligned states may perceive arms control as a means to control the arms of others instead of addressing their own regional security problems.

Strategic asymmetries also make security cooperation more difficult because they make the tradeoffs that might be offered in a cooperative setting harder to identify and justify. Asymmetries in geographic, topographic, demographic, and military advantages complicate cooperative efforts.

Making cooperative security a major mode of interaction in the international system as the next century unfolds requires that states conduct business differently than they have in the past. Change is needed in both perspective and operations.

States need to realize that competitive security, or confrontation, has neither kept the peace nor contributed to long-term economic growth. Also, they must realize that security need not be a zero-sum
game. Fostering regional stability will create opportunities to promote a better economic situation for all the states of a particular area.

States also need to accept the concept of asymmetric reciprocity in negotiating agreements. Some states may be required to "do more" to ensure a result that is in every country’s best interest. The question, then, is not about “fairness,” but the more far-reaching goal of a nation’s security. Cooperative agreements should be formed more on the basis of a state’s needs than merely asserting a state’s "rights."

The proper application of technology will be critical for the success of cooperative security measures. It will shape how policy tools will be applied, such as in the successful implementation of arms control agreements. Technology also can provide the physical infrastructure for cooperation among states.

In order to change the way governments approach security issues, they must change the way they operate. Such changes include establishing norms and taking small interim steps, such as adopting confidence-building measures (CBMs). With these CBMs, the critical role of transparency is introduced. By sharing data and information, states can be assured of another country’s intent. Methods for dealing with ambiguous data must be developed, as well as strong interpretation and analysis capabilities.

States need to build a range of capabilities that will support these changes. States especially need capacities to implement international agreements, to build an analytical community, to address transnational threats, to prevent or resolve conflicts, and to build civil societies.

The goal of cooperative security is not the creation of stability at any price. Rather, it is the creation of a broadly accepted, legitimate international and domestic political order in which states, and their people, have the opportunity to pursue their goals without the threat of violence and in which the inevitable conflicts that do emerge can be resolved without resorting to military force. This is not say that military conflict will be eliminated from the international environment. Predatory states and predatory regimes will remain a source of violence. Such states and regimes today, however, are in a distinct minority. One outcome of the cooperative security approach is to limit their numbers—and their impact—even further.

1. Introduction

Cooperative security—at least in its most comprehensive sense—has not become the new paradigm for the organization and operation of the international system that its proponents hoped it would when the concept emerged at the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the concept of cooperative security could have an important impact on international security politics in the next several years. Many factors, both international and domestic, are prompting states to examine new ways of defining their interests and doing their business. These new approaches reflect states’ recognition that, increasingly, the problems they confront cannot be resolved solely through their own efforts. They also reflect the growing demand for a stable and peaceful international environment needed to advance the ever more highly prized goal of economic progress. Pressures have strengthened to bring under control the legacy of the Cold War in terms of the weapons arsenals—particularly nuclear weapons—built up over the 45 years of the East-West confrontation.

Cooperative security was originally intended to address the role of force in future international affairs. In particular, force would be defense-oriented, with militaries structured to make it difficult to conduct offensive operations; multinational, with coalitions taking action against miscreants; and in service of international purpose, such as buttressing global norms, rather than promoting national interest. Cooperative security also entailed the notion that reassurance, transparency, and building confidence were central requirements for promoting stable relationships with possible adversaries.
With the expansion of the concept of security in the post-Cold War era to encompass economics and the environment, however, the notion of cooperative security must also be expanded without necessarily losing the original focus. For purposes of this paper, "cooperative security" will be defined as "a process whereby countries with common interests work jointly through agreed mechanisms to reduce tensions and suspicion, resolve or mitigate disputes, build confidence, enhance economic development prospects, and maintain stability in their regions." This definition gives ample scope to explore how cooperation can be promoted to deal with new concerns while giving primary consideration to cooperative security's relationship to violent conflict and the instruments by which it is waged.

1.1 Why Is Cooperative Security Important?

Cooperative security is a concept worth promoting for several reasons.

First, many current problems lie beyond the capacity of any one country to resolve. The most obvious contemporary challenges not amenable to national resolution are transnational issues, which reflect the seemingly opposite trends of fragmentation and decentralization of the security order after the Cold War, on one hand, and globalization of both the international economy and the international information and social order, on the other. Terrorism, environmental problems, migration, organized crime, and the drug trade are the most frequently cited examples. But even traditional issues have become more complex in ways that make it impossible for a single country to secure its interests on its own.

The upheavals in central Africa provide a striking illustration of how current conflicts mix interstate rivalries with internal conflicts and transnational ethnic problems.

Another example is proliferation, not just of weapons of mass destruction but of advanced military technology. The fact that the technology now put to military use increasingly has its origin in the private sector and is basically "dual use" in application makes the nonproliferation strategy of technology denial through unilateral national export controls more and more difficult to sustain.

The heightened complexity of security dynamics in a world marked by fragmentation and globalization, however, is not all negative; it also has positive aspects. It creates, for example, opportunities for nontraditional players in the security realm such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), peoples' movements, social or cultural entities, or scientific and technical communities.

Second, "competitive security" has not been successful. In the post-Cold War environment, those states that have sought to achieve their security goals through more traditional means—such as building military arsenals or seeking local or regional dominance—have not found themselves better off. It is just as likely that they have exacerbated their security problems. Iraq, for example, paid a steep price for its aggression against Kuwait. It is not clear that either India or Pakistan improved its national security through its nuclear tests in the spring of 1998. Iran's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction has made its neighbors distinctly wary. More generally, one could argue that the general disposition of states such as North Korea and Iraq to deemphasize cooperation is one of the characteristics that make those states "rogues."

Finally, cooperative security assumes heightened importance in an environment in which the disintegration of internal political structures raises questions about the ability of some states to maintain their coherence and provide basic necessities for their people. "Failing states," for example, the former Soviet Union or Somalia, have become a more prominent feature of the international landscape. State failures tend to foment greater levels of violence that may not be contained within individual state boundaries. The regional and potentially global implications of the disintegration of political structures within states argue for cooperation to limit their deleterious impact. More broadly, it may be only in the context of regional cooperation that domestic political stability and the strengthening of domestic political, economic, and social structures in beleaguered states can be achieved.
2. Cooperative Security Requirements

It has become a cliche in commentary on current international affairs to point to the dramatic changes—for good and ill—that have marked the international security environment since the end of the Cold War. Cooperative security is one among many possible responses to a world in the throes of that change. If cooperative security is to become the predominant response to change, it will be a result only of self-conscious efforts to exploit positively the changes that have occurred in international security and to overcome a number of difficult impediments.

2.1 Exploiting Changes

2.1.1 Conceptual Challenges

The impetus for cooperation is prompted, at least in part, by a major conceptual shift since the end of the Cold War. Today, nontraditional problems are often at the top of the security agenda of many states that feel more threatened by such challenges than by traditional concerns about interstate war. Increasingly, states define threats to their security in economic, environmental, and demographic terms. In his 1992 *Agenda for Peace*, then-United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali identified "new risks for stability: ecological damage, disruption of family and community life, greater intrusion into the lives and rights of the individual," and he pointed out that "a porous ozone shield could pose a greater threat to an exposed population than a hostile army. Drought and disease can decimate no less mercilessly than the weapons of war." Environmental challenges range from pollution and disputes over water to energy and food scarcity, and the extent to which these issues are the origin of security problems or prolong political violence is the subject of considerable interest and some dispute. Demographic problems, including population growth, migration, refugees, and health issues, are also deemed to be new factors either causing or contributing to contemporary conflict. Added to these nontraditional security challenges are transnational problems mentioned earlier such as the international drug trade, global organized crime, smuggling, and piracy.

Concerns about nontraditional security challenges have not eliminated traditional military worries, however. Indeed, the two sets of issues have combined to foster a second important perception in many countries: that is, a heightened sense of vulnerability. This sense has many dimensions, such as:

- perception of a *military deficit* resulting from reduced defense budgets that are not likely to achieve previous levels in the foreseeable future, and an inability to field advanced military technology;
- recognition of the *heightened vulnerability of civilian populations* stemming from both terrorist threats, including weapons of mass destruction, as well as from the proliferation of advanced military capabilities such as ballistic missiles;
- concern over the *fragility of national infrastructure* such as water systems, oil production capabilities, transportation networks, and electrical grids, a concern intensified by growing dependence of national infrastructures on information technology.

One negative impact of states' growing recognition of their military deficit and increased vulnerability is the pressure it may generate to pursue "asymmetric strategies" designed not to match a potential adversary's military strength, but to exploit its vulnerabilities. In this context, weapons of mass destruction represent potentially attractive options, and the impetus to develop asymmetric strategies could be an incentive for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

On the positive side, states may seek alternative methods to secure their national interests in light of the daunting challenge presented by the demands of developing and maintaining modern military forces. Cooperation is one such alternative. Clearly, incentives and disincentives must be structured to lead decision makers to choose this path rather than a more dangerous and destabilizing course such as WMD proliferation.
2.1.2 The Primacy of Economics

A second major change in the post-Cold War international environment that the proponents of cooperative security must exploit is the growing importance of economics. Indeed, economic performance rather than military capability is seen increasingly as the measure of a state's power in the international community. Some people argue, for example, that China is respected in Asia today primarily for its economic performance, and there is greater concern about Beijing devaluing the yuan than about China's military posture. China, Iran, and, to some extent, India all claim they require a stable and secure regional political environment in order to promote badly needed economic growth. (See Box 1.)

The importance of economics in contemporary international security was illustrated by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum’s (ARF) most recent meeting. The forum was established to provide the opportunity for ASEAN and other key Asian states to build confidence among one another by discussing common security concerns. In its July 1998 session, however, representatives also "extensively" discussed the "prevailing financial situation [and] factors that caused the crisis and how to cooperate more closely in meeting the challenge posed by it." The primacy of economics in the current environment is further reinforced by the fact that in some parts of the world, subregional economic integration proceeds despite security problems among the participants. The Andean Pact remained a viable economic forum, for example, despite military conflict between Peru and Ecuador. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is also active despite the intense security problems that bedevil the subcontinent.

2.1.3 Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy

A further change that must be exploited is the increasingly tighter linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy. In part, the greater impact of domestic politics on foreign policy reflects the primacy that economics has assumed in the post-Cold War era. The trend toward democratization in many parts of the world has further redefined national priorities. In Latin America, for example, the cooperation between erstwhile rivals Brazil and Argentina was facilitated significantly after both countries installed democratically elected governments. (See Box 2.)

In many countries, democratization has also produced a decentralization or diffusion of domestic political power. In India, for example, political power has shifted away from New Delhi to decision makers in the country’s diverse states. The foreign policy concerns of these state governments are likely to be quite different from one another and from those of the central government. Foreign policy decisions in New Delhi will reflect choices made at least in part on the basis of the balance of domestic political power. In short, the growing impact of domestic politics on security affairs is creating what John Chipman, Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, has described as the "international relations of parochialism."
Box 1
Cooperative Security Example I: South Korea

The current government of South Korea sees the building of a peace process and of a regime for inter-Korean economic cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as key elements for conflict management and security enhancement on the peninsula. As a result, the administration of Kim Dae Jong has adopted a “sunshine” policy toward North Korea that essentially separates business and economics from politics. This policy is based on three key principles: 1) no armored provocation by the DPRK will be tolerated; 2) the Republic of Korea (ROK) will not try to absorb the DPRK; and 3) cooperation and reconciliation will be promoted. The policy seeks a soft landing if the regime in Pyongyang collapses, and the minimization of the severe problems, especially economic, that would be associated with reunification. The ROK leadership, therefore, emphasizes the North’s need for economic reform, including a slow shift to a market economy, and efforts to induce foreign direct investment and joint ventures in the North. These economic developments are seen as necessary prerequisites for changes in the North’s political and social structures, including gradual democratization. In the view of Seoul, this slow transformation of the North will bring it out of international isolation and pave the way for more cooperation and reconciliation. To this end, South Korea has been gradually lifting restrictions on trade with North Korea, to the extent that it is now the North’s largest trading partner.

South Korea’s policy confronts several obstacles to successful implementation. First, the distrust between the two Koreas is long-standing and deep-rooted. Both sides have created “devil” mirror images of the other, driven by the recognition of their incompatible political and social systems. Second, Pyongyang and Seoul have adopted conflicting approaches to the peace process. South Korea stresses a gradual, functional, step-by-step approach. In contrast, North Korea’s initial focus is on the removal of U.S. forces from the peninsula and the conclusion of a peace treaty. Third, neither side has yet been willing to make concessions. Fourth, the South Koreans support implementation of the 1991 Basic Agreement, which committed both sides to negotiating a package of arms control and confidence-building measures. North Korea, however, has remained silent on the issue.

Despite the stress created by these obstacles, the South has continued to emphasize its cooperative approach. Its policy withstood, for example, the tensions created by the discovery of a North Korean submarine in ROK waters. Seoul neither denounced the incident nor demanded an apology. Rather, it reaffirmed its policy, which remains overwhelmingly popular with the South Korean people.
In many ways, the countries of Latin America have led the way with respect to cooperative security. Although the trends toward greater cooperation began in the mid-1980s, they intensified significantly with the end of the Cold War. Today, rivalries for regional leadership have been replaced—at least to a great degree—by recognition of what can be accomplished by working together. Militarized competition has given way to joint efforts to restrict the growth of weapons inventories within the region and to promote regional cooperation on security issues. Transparency and openness appear to have replaced secrecy and paranoia in security-related interactions.

Argentina and Brazil led Latin America’s move toward greater cooperation on security matters, beginning with agreements relating to nuclear cooperation and transparency. The 1985 Foz de Iguazu Declaration expressed both countries’ peaceful intent with regard to nuclear matters and committed them to cooperation in the nuclear field. That commitment was strengthened by a series of annual summit declarations over the next several years. At the same time, cooperation on conventional military matters—including a series of joint staff exercises—began to be explored.

By 1990, civilian governments ruled in all of Latin America’s Southern Cone countries, and cooperative efforts took further steps forward. At this time, Brazil and Argentina began a process of negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding nuclear safeguards, a process that culminated in their 1994 ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco creating a nuclear-free zone in the region. In 1991, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile also signed the Mendoza Accord expressing their commitment to the complete elimination of chemical and biological weapons from the region. Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, and Uruguay have subsequently signed the accord.

Multilateral cooperation at the regional level was pushed forward in 1992 with the creation by the Organization of American States (OAS) of a Special Committee on Hemispheric Security, particularly to propose and coordinate regional confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). In 1995, the Declaration of Santiago formally stated the intent of OAS members to pursue confidence building measures (CBMs), a move labeled by one participant as “our Helsinki.” He was referring, of course, to the Helsinki Declaration of the early 1970s that fostered the confidence building process in Europe and resulted not only in the formal adoption of many CBMs, but in the creation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well.

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and other Latin American states have also pursued bilateral cooperative security efforts, including joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and peacekeeping coordination. Each country has also reduced the size of its military establishment and cut its defense budget. They have also taken other unilateral steps—including publication of defense white papers—meant to enhance the stability of the regional security environment.

Although many of the actions taken to promote cooperative security in Latin America are only declaratory in nature, they do reflect a changed mindset of the states in the region. That change may be the result of the transition to democracy in South America. It may also be the product of the states in the region giving priority to their economic agendas. Whatever the source of the change, old geopolitical thinking that seemed to assume regional competition, and perhaps conflict, today appears anachronistic. Concrete cooperation is the product of this change. Other regions might look to Latin America and follow its example.

The heightened importance of domestic politics for a country’s foreign and security policy creates new opportunities for the foreign policy process to be influenced by nongovernmental actors, including NGOs, people-to-people movements, special interest groups such as business alliances or trade unions, scientific associations, and so on. The activities of such actors can promote cooperation among states that have regional security problems and help transform the environment within which those security
issues are addressed. Building cooperative linkages at many levels could be one of the keys to the ultimate success of cooperative security.

To make a lasting positive contribution to cooperative security, however, at some point the activities of nongovernmental actors must help shape governmental policy. Those efforts will have a diminished impact if they are isolated from the policy context, no matter how beneficial individual interactions might be. Moreover, many of the issues that prompt security concerns remain the province of governments because they are beyond the capacity of nongovernmental actors to resolve. Translating activities of nongovernmental actors into government action, however, could be difficult. Not only are government policy makers unfamiliar, and perhaps uncomfortable, with the dynamics of some nongovernmental actors—at the people-to-people level, for example—but there is also likely to be resistance to a process beyond governmental control. Blending government and nongovernment efforts into a coherent strategy, then, will be one of the major challenges to the success of the cooperative security approach in the future.

2.2 Overcoming Impediments

Even if the proponents of cooperative security effectively exploit changes of the post-Cold War era, its success is still not guaranteed. There are also major barriers that must be overcome.

2.2.1 State Fragility and Challenges to Internal Stability

The international system since the Peace of Westphalia has been ordered around sovereign states, i.e., bordered territories occupied by a settled population under effective and, at least to some degree, civil governments that had the monopoly on violence within the defined territory. A successful state was one that provided the population within its territory with shelter against both external and internal threats, and defense, not just of territory, but of shared core values. Such states created conditions for an orderly, safe, and potentially prosperous way of life.

Of course, these ideal conditions, with the exception of defined borders, never fully existed in many of the states created in the post-World War II surge of decolonization. Many of those countries did not represent integrated political units, did not have homogeneous populations, and were plagued by underdeveloped political infrastructures and institutions as well as weak economic systems unable to provide an improving way of life. They were also highly vulnerable to internal and external challenge.

Since the end of the Cold War, these problems have intensified to the point that some states may exist juridically but not as social facts. The major problem facing many developing countries today is that the state itself lacks legitimacy. There are many reasons the situation has deteriorated to this extent: the continued failure to provide even basic welfare for the bulk of the population, repression and authoritarianism, corruption, nonexistent political infrastructures, and competing centers of authority.

An important consequence of this loss of legitimacy is that populations are turning elsewhere for basic services, not just health and education but physical security. In other words, large portions of the population identify less with their government and more with other entities that provide them whatever services they receive as well as their sense of well-being. In many cases, these other entities are ethnic groups. This may help to explain, at least to some extent, the rise of ethnic tensions as a major feature of the post-Cold War security environment. Ethnicity has become politicized to an unprecedented degree. The list of countries experiencing ethnic tension (if not conflict) range from the large (Russia, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey) to the smaller (Sudan, Sri Lanka) to the very small (Cyprus, Rwanda).

Ethnic groups, of course, are not the only entities to become the object of people’s identity and to provide some of the services of the state. Groups based on religious or ideological affiliations also challenge state authority. In Nigeria, for example, religious organizations and movements have increasingly become the voice of excluded segments of the society, whether through statements by major church leaders, the rise of new sycrhetic churches in the south, or uprisings by Islamic militants in the north.
Islamic militants have also challenged the regimes in Egypt and Algeria. Elsewhere in the Middle East, religious or ideological fundamentalists and rejectionists exist on both sides of the Israel-Palestinian dispute.

Transnational actors such as drug cartels and organized crime pose yet another challenge to state authority. They have little or no interest in achieving political control over the territory of the state but in ensuring there is no governmental interference in their activities. As a result, they have sometimes acquired a weapons inventory that is a match for that of the legitimate government. Still another reflection of the breakdown of legitimate authority in some states are the “warlords” who exercise control over limited parts of the territory nominally governed by the central government.

An example of the complexity that is created when these factors combine is provided by the current situation in Daghestan, an ethnically heterogeneous, autonomous republic in the Russian Federation. In Daghestan, the rising power centers are new ethnically based criminal networks. Each major ethnic group has its own powerful criminal leaders “who base their groups on their clan and kinship networks and compete against other ethnic groups....Their chief activities in Daghestan include weapons trading and drug smuggling across the Azeri border, sturgeon and caviar piracy, bank fraud, and, most importantly, gaining a share of control of federal subsidies.” The republic’s political leadership has come to depend on these groups for support and defense, leading to what has been called the “criminalization of politics” in a geographically strategic republic that nevertheless is increasingly creeping outside Moscow’s control.

The ultimate collapse of a government’s authority produces an eruption of violence that can be either intra- or international. But as David Keen points out in his study of the economic functions of violence in civil wars, “War is not simply a breakdown in a particular system, but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power, and even protection.” It is the final turning away from the authority whose job it was to provide basic human needs and which is seen as no longer able to do so.

The receding of governmental authority in many important parts of the world has clear and negative implications for cooperative security. First, the breakdown of authority translates into little or no freedom of action for a government seeking cooperation with neighbors with whom relations are not always cordial.

Second, nongovernmental entities such as ethnic groups frequently straddle national borders, a situation that makes it difficult for any individual government to assert control over them. Efforts to control the violence of such groups, for example, have led to the practice of “hot pursuit” across national boundaries—from Turkey into Iraq, for example, in response to actions by Kurdish separatists—leading sometimes to strained relations with the state whose sovereignty is “violated.”

Third, the loss of governmental authority makes it difficult for governments to deliver on promises made to those with whom they want to cooperate. The Russian government, for example, told the United States on several occasions that it would abide by the provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), that it remains the Russian government’s policy to do so, and that the transfer of technology to Iran was not the result of government policy but the action of rogue companies. While some analysts may doubt this claim, if true it highlights the serious credibility problems that attend the loss of governmental authority. Credibility is an essential element for successful cooperation since a willingness to cooperate often rests on trust.

2.2.2 Conflicting Perceptions

A second set of impediments to enhanced cooperative security involves differences in perceptions of key actors. One set of perceptions relates to the nature of threats. In particular, more so than during the Cold War, many states in regions of tension perceive threats from multiple sources, complicating the ability to address any one specific problem. Indeed, it is hard to identify a major security problem today that is
binary in nature. Even on the Korean peninsula, the challenge is multifaceted. North Korea’s test of a multistage missile that flew over Japan, for example, was intended to send messages to Tokyo and Washington as much as to Seoul. In the Middle East, many states feel themselves threatened from more than one direction or by more than one neighbor. The problems between Israel and the Palestinians are only a part of the region’s security dynamics; concerns in the Gulf are another, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is yet another. All of these dimensions interact and make each one individually more complicated to resolve.

States’ perceptions of multiple security threats could make them more reluctant to pursue cooperative security because, while such efforts might improve one situation, they could have unforeseen consequences for another. How India decides to deal with Pakistan on nuclear issues, for example, could have profound consequences in the eyes of New Delhi on the evolution of India’s nuclear relationship with China, which was the major rationale given by Indian leaders for pursuing their nuclear capability to the stage of overt testing.

A second set of problematic perceptions relates to views of the use of force. Many countries in regions of tension have seen that victory in war has brought rewards. Israel retains much of the land it captured in 1967. Egypt’s resort to war in 1973 did not end with victory on the battlefield, but it did trigger a political process that led to the eventual restoration of Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai. Bangladesh is the product of Indian military prowess. Rebels recently overthrew the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, and the continuing attacks against the regime in Kinshasa suggest that the challengers of current Congolese president Laurent Kabila are trying to repeat history.

One might argue that an important counterexample has been the experience of Iraq. It is true that Saddam Hussein has little to show for his military efforts. Yet, he remains in power well after his antagonists in the Gulf War have left office, and there is every indication that the efforts of the UN Special Commission to bring his weapons of mass destruction programs to a permanent end are foundering. Saddam Hussein’s lack of cooperation with the international community over the last seven years has imposed a heavy price on the people of Iraq, but it ultimately may ensure the survival of his regime and Iraq’s role as a regional player region with whom others must reckon.

A third set of perceptions to be overcome relates to arms control, an arena of international transaction that lends itself more than many others to a cooperative approach. In particular, many countries outside the West remain to be convinced of the value of arms control. Despite their lip service to arms control and nonproliferation, many nonaligned states seem to perceive arms control more as a means to control the arms of others—and the nuclear weapons of the superpowers in particular—than as a way of addressing security problems in their own localities. They appear to consider arms control more as a zero-sum game than as an exercise in which the security of all participants can be enhanced. Rather than promoting security at lower levels of military forces, arms control is seen as a construct of Western states intended to limit the advanced military capabilities of nonaligned states, notwithstanding their inability to procure such capabilities to any meaningful degree.

Perceptions of the domestic costs of cooperation also raise questions regarding the ultimate success of cooperative security. In part, perceived costs are financial. Implementing cooperation will cost money that many states may not feel they have at a time when they are struggling economically. Given uncertainty regarding the ultimate value of cooperative security that derives from the combination of perceptions mentioned above, states may be reluctant to shift the necessary resources from defense budgets to cooperative efforts.

More than financial costs, however, are involved. Leaders in states who confront difficult security challenges will be highly sensitive to the domestic political costs cooperation might impose. Conventional wisdom holds, for example, that it would be very difficult for any Indian government to walk back the country’s nuclear program in light of strong domestic support for the nuclear option. The record of former Prime Minister Netanyahu in Israel is a clear reflection of the constraints created by domestic politics and the limitations they impose on pursuing cooperation on security matters.
2.2.3 Strategic Asymmetries

Strategic asymmetries also make cooperation in security affairs more difficult because they make the tradeoffs that might be offered in a cooperative setting harder to identify and to justify.

Some of the complicating asymmetries are:

- **Geographic**: Differences in strategic depth, for example, can pose profound security dilemmas. Israel’s lack of strategic depth has been a major factor shaping Israeli security and military policy throughout its history. Pakistan suffers a distinct disadvantage in strategic depth when compared to India.
- **Topographic**: Specific geographic features may put one state in a less favorable situation in its relations with neighbors or potential adversaries. A state’s dependence on water that originates in another country is one example. The relationship between Egypt and Sudan because of the Nile and the dependence of Syria and Iraq on water flowing from Turkey highlight the tensions that such a geographic configuration can create.
- **Demographic**: The disparity in population size in the Middle East has a number of implications, from fostering intense sensitivity in Israel to casualties to shaping quite different structures of national armed forces in terms of the balance between reserve and active forces. Differences in education levels, technological sophistication, and the homogeneity or heterogeneity of populations are additional demographic factors that could influence a state’s propensity to cooperate with potential adversaries on a variety of security issues.

Asymmetry in the military inventories of potential adversaries is a further barrier to cooperation. Large differences in numbers is one, but not the only problem. Sometimes, the very existence of a particular military capability produces serious difficulties. Egypt’s insistence that any discussion of regional security include a priority focus on Israel’s nuclear capability, for example, was one factor that led to the derailment of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group. Disparities in the technological sophistication of air and ground weaponry make it difficult to identify tradeoffs both within and among various categories of military equipment that participants would deem reasonable. Reconciling military asymmetries is a particularly difficult problem in the context of the perception of multiple threats mentioned earlier. Cooperating with one potential adversary to reduce military capabilities could have important consequences for the military balance with another, making any decisions more difficult.

Some of the factors that impede the pursuit of cooperative security—geography and demographic disparities, for example—cannot be changed. But none of these barriers to cooperation are impossible to overcome. The challenge to those who seek to promote cooperative security is to make those factors matter less, to reduce their relevance in the calculations of decision makers who might consider enhanced cooperation with neighbors and potential adversaries. This will not be an easy task, nor will it be a quick one.

3. Responding to the Challenge

Making cooperative security a major mode of interaction in the international system as the next century unfolds requires that states conduct business differently than they have in the past. Change is needed in both perspective and operations.

3.1 Changes in Perspective

The first change in perspective that is needed is recognition that the old way of doing business—“competitive security” or confrontation—has neither kept the peace nor created conditions for long-term economic growth. Closely related to this perception is the realization that security need not be a zero-sum game. The resolution of transnational problems is in the interests of many states at the same time.
Fostering regional stability will create opportunities to promote a better economic situation for all the states of a particular area. Reducing military arsenals in an agreed, regulated manner will alleviate the defense budget burden for many states while instilling some predictability into the military dimension of their political relationships. History has demonstrated time and again the dangers that flow from unpredictability, instability, and the potential for miscalculation.

The introduction of a degree of certainty through cooperative security measures diminishes that danger for all states. (See Box 3.)

**Box 3**

**Cooperative Security Example III: China**

The self-described pursuit by the People’s Republic of China of cooperation with its neighbors is a centerpiece of Beijing’s current foreign policy. This approach is closely related to the requirement perceived by Chinese leaders for a stable regional environment that will allow China to promote economic growth and development, which is deemed a critical long-term national goal. It also reflects a shift in China’s concept of security, that is, to one in which security must be mutual and in which achieving progress requires China to know others better and for others to know it.

The Chinese approach has three components. First, Beijing has sought partnership relations with almost all its neighbors based on mutual respect, equality, and noninterference in one another’s domestic affairs. Beijing, for example, has developed increasingly good relations with South Korea while keeping close ties to North Korea. Similarly, while remaining a friend of Pakistan, Beijing is also seeking to improve relations with India. As part of this policy thrust, China has also stressed good relations with the Asia-Pacific’s major powers. As a result, Beijing managed to normalize relations with Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, develop a *modus vivendi* with Japan that provides for frequent exchanges despite mutual complaints, and achieve agreement with the United States that a constructive strategic partnership should be a joint goal. That partnership is not yet in place, and substantial differences remain, but a process of extending cooperation between China and the United States makes Beijing prudently optimistic. The evolving relationship with the United States underlines Beijing’s view that partnership does not mean there are not differences, disputes, or frictions, but that such differences should be solved in nonconfrontational ways.

Second, China has sought to reduce tension and stabilize situations with regard to several territorial disputes. China has reached agreements, for example, with Russia, Pakistan, Burma, Laos, and Mongolia. Some difficult disputes remain, however, and solutions are not likely to be achieved in the short term. For these disputes, China has sought to build confidence with the other parties through agreements not to use force to resolve them (e.g., with Vietnam over the South China Sea), and to seek solutions through consultations in such a way that the dispute is isolated from regular state-to-state relations. For disputes that cannot be solved, China seeks to shelve them or maintain the status quo while encouraging confidence building measures. This has been the approach taken with India.

Third, China has begun to emphasize international security cooperation on both the global and regional level. On the global level, the emphasis is felt primarily in terms of arms control and UN peacekeeping efforts. China views arms control, an area in which it feels it still has much to learn, as increasingly important to enhanced security. As a result, China has become a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and a number of nuclear-free zones, and it seeks an early conclusion to talks on a fissile material cutoff treaty. In terms of peacekeeping, China has provided 437 observers in at least six areas, and it contributed a battalion to UN efforts in Cambodia.

China also supports and participates in many regional arrangements. These include both economic (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC) and political (ASEAN Regional Forum, ARF) groupings. For China, the process of consultation in these groups is more important than quick results; promoting consensus is better than trying to force agreements.
Accepting the argument that security is not a zero-sum game also means accepting that other states have legitimate security concerns. This realization imposes an important burden on governments. In particular, it militates for curbing extremists who tend to polarize situations by not granting legitimacy to the arguments of the adversary or casting their security arguments in the worst possible light. In doing so, the extremists threaten to undermine any fragile progress that might be achieved on a cooperative agenda.

The impact of extremists is readily apparent in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. On both sides, extremists have cast fundamental issues in terms that severely limit the freedom of action of the negotiators, define solutions that accommodate only their side, and portray the interests of the other side as unwarranted or in some way less valid than their own. As a result, the "Oslo process" that was intended to produce a negotiated settlement has stalled, and the result has been a marked increase in tension throughout the region.

A second necessary change in perspective is acceptance of asymmetric reciprocity in cooperative agreements. As already mentioned, some strategic asymmetries among potential adversaries can never be eliminated. In the face of such disparities, it makes little sense to ask every party that is seeking a balanced, stable outcome to do exactly the same thing. The acceptance of the notion that some states will be required to "do more" in order to ensure a result that is in everyone's interest was a breakthrough in the negotiations on the levels of conventional forces in Europe. Ultimately, Moscow's willingness to accept deeper cuts in its forces than were required of other nations made the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty possible. Another example of accepting asymmetrical obligations is the Sinai agreement between Egypt and Israel in which Israel returned significant amounts of territory to Egypt without an equal action from Cairo in response.

In multilateral security negotiations, it takes considerable creativity to identify the kinds of asymmetrical obligations that can lead to a conclusion acceptable to all sides. It is tempting to argue that because one side must do more than the others, the result is "unfair."

The question, however, should not be whether an agreement is fair, but whether the result will enhance a nation's security. If it does so in a meaningful fashion, then even accepting asymmetric obligations makes sense. Another way to judge an agreement is not by the fairness of the obligations but of the result. If all parties benefit acceptably from enhanced security, then is not such an agreement "fair"?

Defining the right criteria by which to judge the acceptability of a cooperative agreement is critical. Shifting attention from obligations to results in security negotiations is not unlike the shift that seems frequently to occur in negotiations over water issues from an initial focus on the "rights" of the various participants to an ultimate concentration on their needs. As a result of such shifts, even in regions where water has been of the utmost importance, it has not been an insurmountable hurdle to cooperation. In the process of concluding the peace agreement between Jordan and Israel, for example, water issues were difficult and the last to be resolved. But when the negotiators were instructed by their respective readerships to resolve them, they did. Those involved in the pursuit of cooperation in the more traditional political-military realm might look to the success that has been achieved in addressing water for possible lessons.

A third change in perspective relates to the use of force. As mentioned, the concept of cooperative security was initially premised on the prospect that armed forces would be equipped, organized, and trained to emphasize defensive capabilities only while miscreants would be handled by a coalition of members of the international community, usually operating under UN or some other internationally agreed auspices. Proponents of cooperative security also envisioned a much-reduced role for nuclear weapons if not their complete elimination.

States are not about to relinquish their military capabilities. But there must also be recognition that the kinds of military structures that have characterized armed forces for the last two centuries are increasingly
inadequate or inappropriate for dealing with at least some of the more serious threats of the next century. Advanced combat aircraft, for example, are not very useful in the fight against terrorists. The effectiveness of nuclear weapons in dealing with chemical and biological weapons threats is questionable. Main battle tanks can do little to respond to environmental challenges. This is not to argue that traditional military power is still not an important tool of national policy. Nor has war become obsolete. But exactly what military forces can and cannot do in responding to security challenges of the future must be carefully examined.

A final change in perspective that could enhance the prospects for cooperative security relates to technology. The United States in particular often seeks technological solutions to challenging problems. But technology is not the answer to all problems; nor is it always more important than other tools of policy, including traditional diplomacy, intelligence, or exploiting economic opportunities. Indeed, the concept of cooperative security emerged initially, at least in part, in opposition to the notion that technological solutions are the only answers to contemporary security problems. Moreover, technological solutions can be expensive, not just in terms of the initial outlays for advanced technology, but in terms of maintenance as well.

Having said this, the application of technology clearly will be critical for the success of cooperative security measures. It will shape how many policy tools will be applied, such as the successful implementation of arms control agreements. Technological capabilities, for example, will be essential for generating the information necessary to ensure that agreements are being implemented rigorously. Technology can create opportunities for interaction and exchange among states that had not previously existed.

Technology also often helps to provide the physical infrastructure that represents the wherewithal by which states can cooperate. It can also identify novel routes to solutions to problems, and provides the data needed both to promote transparency and confidence as well to resolve disputes.

As with other aspects of cooperative security, the key with respect to technology is balance...in when and how it should be applied, in the appreciation of its importance relative to other tools of policy, in the system that evolves to address the tension between the sharing of technology for economic advancement and the protection of technology to maintain security. Cooperative security is about policies and people that exploit technology appropriately, appreciating its limitations, but also understanding its potential and matching that potential to critical human capabilities.

3.2 Changes in Operation

In addition to changes in how governments look at security issues and possible ways to deal with them, governments must also act in ways that create opportunities for more cooperation in security affairs.

3.2.1 Establishing Norms

The starting point is creating a strong normative base. Norms matter, and the more international norms can reflect cooperation rather than competition, the more the majority of states not only will be inclined to act in such a manner, but also will consider noncooperation outside the agreed order.

In this regard, the global regimes established by international agreement, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), are very important in that they embody the norms acceptable to the international community.

Not only abiding by those agreements but working to strengthen them to ensure effective implementation is a responsibility of all states interested in cooperative security. Indeed, these agreements constitute a critical foundation for cooperative security in that they articulate common security goals, define the process through which states work together to achieve those goals, and identify the agreed mechanisms
through which that interaction occurs. Participation in such regimes provides important experience in cooperative security that can carry over into other areas.

Promoting cooperative security through international regimes creates the requirement for all parties to that regime to respond effectively to instances of noncompliance. Each time noncompliance occurs without penalty, the regime is weakened and if significant noncompliance goes on too long, the regime will collapse.

Collective action to noncompliance is critical. As Baghdad and Pyongyang have both demonstrated, only the weight of the majority of the international community appears to exert sufficient leverage to restore compliance. But the need for multilateral action creates a dilemma: many states working together are needed to reinforce compliance, but many states are often reluctant to act without the most stringent proof of violations. The result is no action. Resolving this dilemma will require changes in both attitudes and action. If it is not resolved, the international agreements that provide an essential component of the cooperative security framework will become less and less effective, diminishing the value of the norms they embody. Without those global norms, the sense of shared values that underlies the notion of cooperative security will evaporate.

3.2.2 Interim Steps

Because many countries must still come to grips psychologically with the requirements of cooperative security, a second important element in putting the concept into operation must be an emphasis on interim steps through which confidence in cooperation is established gradually. In the military arena, dialogue and the pursuit of confidence building measures (CBMs) are the likely first steps. India and China, for example, are pursuing such a dialogue, apparently to good effect. A similar exchange between Ecuador and Peru recently produced results. (See Box 4.)

There is also some hope that the agreement will lead to a decline in defense spending in both countries. Neither country now faces an external threat, although Peru still has a terrorism problem. The countries’ military leaders have not indicated that they will support any cuts in their budgets, however. A continuing tension, therefore, is likely to exist between their civilian and military leaders.

The goal of dialogue is building confidence. The confidence building process can facilitate, focus, amplify, and help structure the potential for a significant positive transformation in the security relations of participating states. Among measures in the military sphere that have been developed to build confidence have been information exchanges, prenotification of exercises or other military activities, military-to-military interactions, or even a system to question unusual military activities of the other side.

The countries of Europe now have a significant roster of such CBMs built up over more than a decade of negotiations. They have proven to be models for similar measures suggested in other regions. CBMs agreed to by China and India relating to the disputed Line of Control in Himalayas, for example, include

- no threatening military activities,
- respect for and preservation of the Line of Control,
- reductions or limitations on forces and armaments in a mutually agreed-upon area along the Line of Control,
- limited military exercises of restricted scale,
- prior notification of such exercises,
- prevention of air incursions across the Line of Control, and
- exchanges of military personnel.

Elsewhere, during unfortunately short-lived security discussions between North and South Korea in the early 1990s, both sides tabled significant, if not always politically practicable, CBM proposals. CBMs
were also pursued as the initial focus of the Middle East ACRS Working Group, although they never really got off the ground before the talks foundered.

Both the Korean and Middle East experience demonstrate that even limited cooperative steps are hostage to fundamental political dynamics. A number of conditions must first be met before cooperation through confidence building can move forward. Canadian analyst James Macintosh has identified several of these preconditions, including

- "security management fatigue,"
- unease and dissatisfaction with status quo security policies,
- concern about domestic costs of maintaining the status quo,
- a group of experts,
- a new generation of more flexible and sophisticated policy makers,
- a forum for discussion and interaction, and
- perhaps a "leap of faith" initiative by at least one key senior policy maker that is capable of crossing a key emotional and conceptual threshold.

These factors will determine when change is possible, and pursuing CBMs before that time is not likely to prove fruitful. Recognizing when such preconditions exist is not always easy. Nor is action in the interest of certain domestic players. Nevertheless, this combination of factors will increase pressure to do business differently. If these pressures are strong enough, they will be difficult to resist.

Even if agreed-upon CBMs are on the books, it is no guarantee they will be observed. Indian and Pakistani experience with CBMs, for example, has been mixed at best. These agreed-upon measures seem to be implemented only when it suits one side or the other, and they have been honored as well as breached. The Indian/Pakistani experience demonstrates that agreeing to CBMs is not the same as building confidence. Rather, it suggests that unfulfilled commitments can, in fact, aggravate a situation by giving the other side something else to point to as a sign of its adversary’s bad faith.

When it works, however, the confidence building process can begin the institutionalization of improved security relations by providing new rules and practices by which states interact. The restructured relationship that results also creates new expectations of behavior of the other side.

3.2.3 The Importance of Transparency

The importance of CBMs as a foundation for cooperative security highlights the critical role of transparency. Confidence is enhanced when one country knows that what another state is doing is not threatening. That knowledge is acquired primarily through access to data and information shared by the state that wants to reassure potential adversaries or neighbors. In agreed-upon CBMs, both states share information they each consider useful in clarifying motivations, intentions, and policies.

The importance of providing information to support implementation of CBMs is obvious. It is no less critical to the implementation of global security regimes. A key element of the CWC, for example, is the requirement of states’ parties to submit declarations providing information on a wide range of chemical-related activities, both military and civilian. The information provided in these declarations is essential for assembling a mosaic of a state party’s chemical activities. When new pieces of information—whether from the state party or some other source—do not seem to fit the picture that has been built up, there is reason to investigate that state’s behavior using more intrusive measures, including challenge inspections.

Although information sharing in support of global security regimes has gained credence within the international community, questions remain in relation to transparency and information sharing in support of arms control or confidence building agreements in particular and of cooperative security in general.
One relates to handling ambiguous data, which is likely to be a prominent feature in many, if not most, agreements, not least because of the increasingly dual-use nature of many of the materials and equipment now applied in the military sphere. "Smoking guns" are not likely to be discovered to prove noncompliance conclusively and irrefutably.

Methods for dealing with ambiguous data must be developed. They need not, indeed should not, create adversarial conditions between the state that has provided the information and the organization or parties responsible for implementation of the agreement. There are many perfectly innocent reasons why the information a state provides might not always be as precise or as clear as one would want. To challenge ambiguous data as a standard procedure on the assumption that the state in question is acting nefariously is likely to undercut the regime, or at least the enthusiasm with which states participate in it.

Data, therefore, are not enough. Data must be accompanied by strong interpretation and analysis capabilities. Many states fall far short in these areas. One step that might help in this regard is development of international standards for interpretation and analysis that could become the objective of all the states of the international community.

A second important question regarding information sharing relates to monitoring. A distinction has been drawn between simple monitoring, which can be conducted without a state’s agreement if technology permits, and cooperative monitoring, which implies a degree of acceptance of the action. Mutually agreed-upon monitoring, however, has limitations in that a state will agree to have monitored only activities that it wants. On the other hand, monitoring without acceptance could be deemed intelligence gathering and considered a hostile action.

Technological advances are increasing monitoring options. The availability of commercial satellite technology, for example, is now making it possible for NGOs with sufficient resources to monitor developments in far-flung parts of the world. NGO monitoring can be useful in keeping treaty parties honest or in clarifying situations through additional analysis. It can also create considerable “noise in the system,” however, raising doubts or even more serious accusations about state behavior on the basis of incomplete or incorrect analysis.

Another idea related to monitoring is that the United Nations (UN) should develop its own monitoring capabilities that could be applied in ways that eliminate the duplication and overlap of monitoring arrangements for individual agreements. A more active monitoring role for the UN as part of its assumption of broader responsibilities in treaty verification has, in particular, garnered attention. At the same time, strong reservations exist about a greater UN role in verification. This reluctance relates to the fact that not all UN members are also parties to all of the arms control agreements and therefore should not be given a say in how those agreements are implemented. Reservations about a wider UN role also relate to worries that the treaty verification process could become even more politicized than it is already.

Greater transparency has also been advocated for export control regimes. Some people argue that current arrangements, such as the Australia Group (the informal mechanism by which 30 countries coordinate their national export controls on materials and equipment related to chemical and biological weapons), are quickly losing their relevance as more and more technology is dual-use and widely available around the world.

Rather than trying to control technology exports, a global system of technology management has been proposed that would be based on greater transparency regarding the end use of critical technologies. The more a state is transparent about the way it uses its imported technology, the greater the access that state will have to such technology. If a state is not willing to be open about the uses to which its imported technology is put, then the international community would limit the availability of such technology.

This concept is an appealing approach to a problem that has become increasingly difficult in the face of dramatically changing patterns of technology development and diffusion.
Whether it is practical is another question. The system would require a far greater degree of cooperation between technology producers and recipients than is now the case.

The fact that the burden for disclosure falls on the technology recipient could open the system to charges of discrimination, particularly by nonaligned states who are likely to feel themselves the targets of any such system. Verification of such a system could be very difficult conceptually and very costly financially.

The positive impact of transparency in shaping security perceptions can be seen in the benefits states have derived from sharing information voluntarily. Many countries in Asia, for example, have published defense white papers for the first time. China made its recently published Defense White Paper available on the Internet, opening its policy up to the scrutiny of the entire international community, both government and nongovernment.

The publication of defense white papers was a development promoted by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), a non-governmental, "Track II" effort to promote security dialogue among representatives of Asian-Pacific nations, including government officials in their private capacities. The CSCAP dialogue is an excellent example of how information can be shared on a cooperative basis among states for whom transparency is not always seen in positive terms. The chairman of the ASEAN Regional Forum, a more formal government-to-government exercise, summarized the benefits of its efforts, which often build on CSCAP's activities: "Remarkably, there was open and frank expression of views on issues and problems affecting countries of ARF.

We see through this exercise increasingly active participation in our deliberations as well as a predisposition to uplift the comfort level of participants."

3.2.4 The Importance of Capacity Building

Meeting the requirements outlined above as well as defining and implementing specific cooperative security steps demands that many states build a range of capabilities they currently do not enjoy. These include the following capacities:

- **To implement international agreements**—The CWC provides a good example of the kinds of capabilities required. It specifies that each state party must designate a national authority responsible for oversight of national implementation of the convention and for liaison with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). National authorities, therefore, must develop government and industry declarations, prepare for and manage inspections, determine the forms of treaty-mandated cooperation, and ensure that the full range of other obligations are met. An effective national authority requires a combination of arms control, technical, and administrative skills that many governments do not possess. The CWC imposed arms control obligations on many states for the first time (rather than requiring mere statements of commitment), and states have had to work hard to develop the capability to understand and implement them. The capacity to integrate technical chemical knowledge with arms control and administrative expertise has been a particularly significant challenge.

- **To build an analytical community**—Because information is not enough to ensure effective long-term cooperation, an analytical community must also be developed to support policy practitioners. A good analytical community serves as a "reality check" on policy makers, as a source for realistic and practical policy initiatives, and as a means for integrating the complete range of necessary expertise to address increasingly complex challenges. This integrative function is especially important for dealing with the linkages between various problems such as those between the international drug trade, the traffic in light arms, and the threats to domestic stability.
• **To address transnational threats**—Transnational threats do not always lend themselves to traditional security solutions, and unique capabilities may be necessary to address them successfully. Issues such as environmental problems, migration, and fighting infectious diseases, for example, require unprecedented levels of involvement of nongovernmental actors. Ensuring that the inputs of these critical actors are effective and do not work at cross purposes with governmental objectives is a talent that has not necessarily been given great attention by policymakers.

• **To prevent or resolve conflicts**—Conflict prevention and resolution also require unique skills and tools that states interested in cooperation have not necessarily developed. A study by the Council on Foreign Relations, for example, argues that conflict resolution in today's world demands regional approaches that require institutional innovations such as the appointment of special envoys, the convening of regional meetings, and attention in mediation activities to cross-border alliances. These have not necessarily been approaches with which states are comfortable, and some means must be found to dampen a state's otherwise natural anxiety that in a regional context it will have less control in pursuing its interests than in bilateral settings.

• **To build civil societies**—The importance of domestic politics in foreign policy makes the future prospects for the success of cooperative security depend ultimately on the creation of civil societies in states with difficult security concerns. Civil societies, in turn, depend, at least in part, on the functioning of appropriate institutions such as an independent judiciary, participatory political organizations, meaningful economic entities, and many others. Governments must provide the framework for the realization of civil societies, but success depends on nongovernmental actors. They can, for example, help overcome the fragmentation of the political classes which, in a country such as Nigeria, has resulted from years of military politics and corruption.

Civil society coalitions can also serve as watchdogs, insisting that pledges by rulers to promote civil societies be honored. The number of failing, authoritarian, and even predatory governments in regions where security challenges remain intense suggests the enormous problems that must still be overcome before civil societies in those countries can emerge. That sobering reality reinforces the need for patience and a long-term perspective regarding cooperative security.

The requirements for capacity building exist on both a national and regional basis. The changes in the international environment to which cooperative security must respond, the impediments it must overcome, and the agenda it must address are not amenable to bilateral approaches.

Most of the issues creating security problems today engage the interests of more than two states, and successful resolution will be possible only if the interests of all those concerned are addressed. The perception of multiple security threats, the existence of strategic asymmetries, and the novelty of transnational challenges are only some of the factors that militate for regional approaches to cooperative security. (See Box 5.)

This is not to argue that two states cannot reach agreement on a problem in their relationship, even one that has broader regional implications, such as water rights. At some point, however, such agreements must be placed in the broader regional context to ensure that they rest on a solid foundation that cannot be undermined by developments in relation to states who may not be party to them.

Trends in international affairs appear to reflect the recognition of this fact given what one analyst has described as the "explosion" of multilateral organizations for consultation in the past several years. Such organizations are useful, however, if the participants, as well as outside observers, understand what they can and cannot do. Multilateral consultative mechanisms, for example, have not demonstrated yet a strong capacity for conflict resolution. This is not to belittle their contributions, however. Multilateral
consultative mechanisms can establish the foundation on which solutions to regional security problems must be built.

More generally, multilateral forums contribute to "community building" within various regions. A growing sense of regional community could ultimately be the key to successful cooperative security. It would establish workable relationships among the regional states that are neither alliances nor directed toward any specific potential adversary, but reflect a shared view of common interests. Such a sense of community would also emphasize common acceptance of the principle that dispute resolution would be based not on resorting to violence, but on negotiation.

Community building also demands a role for nongovernmental actors. In many respects, nongovernmental interaction can, and must, lead governmental efforts. In particular, the value of nongovernmental activities lies in their ability to overcome or bypass the hurdles imposed by governments in their formal settings. Nongovernmental exchanges can be more provocative, more forward-looking, and more open than the formal processes of governments. Indeed, they must be. If they are not, non-governmental efforts bring little of value to the process, virtually guaranteeing their irrelevance.

**Box 5**

**Cooperative Security Example V: Ukraine**

Ukraine is an excellent example of a country that has sought to promote a stable security environment through participation in regional political, economic, and security groupings. Ukraine, for example, is a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and has a partnership relationship with NATO through the Ukraine-NATO Charter, a Ukrainian initiative. In addition, Ukraine is one of the main drivers, along with Turkey, in the Organization for Black Sea Cooperation, a new entity involving 11 Black Sea states and others. It also has observer status at the Baltic Council and participates in GUAM, a consultative arrangement that also includes Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Through membership in these organizations, Ukraine attempts to be a "player" from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

Ukraine’s involvement in regional forums underlines the fact that cooperation is a must for a middle-sized country trying to balance a variety of pressures and political dynamics. On one hand, there is a legacy of Ukraine’s inclusion as a critical part of the Soviet Union, and Ukraine’s most active relations are focused on the Newly Independent States (NIS). Russia remains Ukraine’s largest trading partner, accounting for as much as 50 percent of Ukraine’s exports. At the same time, Ukraine is actively involved with the former Soviet republics of central Asia. In part, the reasons are economic; Ukraine is pushing hard, for example, for a pipeline to be built across its territory from the oil fields in the Caspian Sea region that will be opening up in the decades ahead. In part, Kiev’s involvement in central Asia is also based on security concerns, particularly ethnic conflict. It has played an active role in attempting to bring the internal conflict in Azerbaijan to a halt, for example, and it has used its own experience of resolving conflicts in the Crimea as a model for efforts in Georgia.

At the same time, Ukraine wants to be part of Europe. It sees membership in Europe as validating its credentials as a democratic state with a market economy as well as a means to provide security. This attitude stands in contrast to old attitudes that may have looked for security through other means, particularly through the nuclear weapons that were left to Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Rather than keeping those weapons, however, Kiev decided that a better route to promote its security would be to relinquish them and utilize the economic savings to work with the West to put itself in a position to develop its economy. The decision highlights the fact that even middle-sized countries have choices about how they will pursue their security imperatives in the future. Other countries may follow Ukraine’s example in deciding that you cannot necessarily get what you want by using the old ways.
4. Conclusions

Proponents of cooperative security confront a three-tiered set of problems: state-to-state, transnational, and internal. Most contemporary security challenges reflect the interaction of all of these levels. The conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa, for example, have been in part internal, in part state-to-state, and in part transnational. A similar pattern has existed in the Balkans conflicts.

This phenomenon reflects more than just the traditional practice of a government of one country supporting insurgents in a neighboring state with which it has security problems, a widely exploited policy tool throughout history. Rather, it reflects the post-Cold War reality that contemporary conflicts are more diffuse and cannot be easily contained—physically or conceptually—within the traditional notions of intrastate or interstate violence. Indeed, although conflict has never totally respected state boundaries, the conflicts witnessed today seem to challenge the very state-based international system itself. As one study put it, "In many respects, intrastate conflict is the continuation of interstate conflict by other means. More precisely, these conflicts often constitute a new form of transnational warfare, including armed groups with cross-border ties to states, social movements, markets, criminal cartels, and corporations."

It is also a measure of the complexity and novelty of contemporary conflicts that they never seem to be brought to an end, but only halted temporarily. Many conflicts in the world today appear to be chronic rather than acute, flaring up and dying down, only to flare again. Agreements thought to end the internal conflicts in Angola and Cambodia have not done so. Sudan is not the only country to experience a decades-long insurgency which, while not able to overthrow the government or achieve the insurgents’ separatist goals, has also not been brought under control by the central government. Anxiety remains high about even seemingly successful agreements, such as the Dayton Accord or the Northern Ireland peace agreement. Even the Gulf War was ended only by a ceasefire agreement between Iraq and the United Nations.

The important changes that have occurred in both the international environment and the global security agenda have created enormous opportunities, but there is no guarantee that those opportunities will be exploited successfully. The results of change could spark yet further conflict, more violence, and greater political instability. A cooperative security mindset is intended to promote positive rather than negative outcomes. Indeed, it represents the best chance to secure favorable results.

Cooperative security, however, has too often been retarded by domestic political processes. A key to cooperative security, therefore, rests in encouraging domestic political change. With the end of the Cold War, the stage for such change has been set. The global endorsement of democracy and free trade, and the ascendance of economic growth as a policy goal have altered the frame of reference for defining national interests. National priorities are now articulated in terms that require stable regional settings, positive economic interactions, and humane and civil domestic societies.

The goal of cooperative security is not the creation of stability at any price. Rather, it is the creation of a broadly accepted, legitimate international and domestic political order in which states, and their people, have the opportunity to pursue their goals without the threat of violence and in which the inevitable conflicts that do emerge can be resolved without the resort to military force. This is not to say that military conflict will be totally eliminated from the international environment. There are predatory states and predatory regimes that will remain a source of violence. Such states and regimes today, however, are in a distinct minority. One outcome of the cooperative security approach is to limit their numbers—and their impact—even further.

Creating the conditions for lasting peace and cooperation will take time. In many cases, those conditions include reorganization of societies, change in basic perceptions, profound economic transformations, and institution building of the most fundamental nature. None of these things will happen overnight. However, promoting such change is as much a part of the cooperative security agenda as the conclusion of specific agreements, the building of confidence, or the joint monitoring of agreed-upon activities.
About the Author

Michael Moodie is co-founder and president of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, a nonpartisan policy research organization committed to arms control and nonproliferation with a special, but not exclusive, focus on the elimination of chemical and biological weapons. He has more than 25 years of experience on international security issues. In government, he has served as Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and as Special Assistant to the Ambassador and Assistant for Special Projects at the U.S. Mission to NATO. In the policy research community, he has held senior positions at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He has also been a visiting professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Mr. Moodie is also a member of Sandia National Laboratories’ Distinguished Advisory Group on Arms Control and Nonproliferation. He was educated at Lawrence University and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.