Establishing a Radioactive Waste Management Center of Excellence in East Asia

By Ralston W. Barnard1, Hong Lae Chang2, and Robert J. Finch3

1 Sandia Staffing Alliance, LLC, 2500 Louisiana Blvd. NE Suite 325b, Albuquerque, NM 87110, USA, contractor to Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico
2 Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, 1045 Daedeokdaero, Yuseong, Daejeon, 305-353, Republic of Korea
3 Sandia National Laboratories, P.O. Box 5800, MS-1373, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 87185, USA*

Introduction

Several East Asian countries have well-developed civilian nuclear programs, and several more countries in the region have expressed interest in developing such programs. Countries that are just embarking on a nuclear-power program have expressed an interest in developing an entire life cycle for the management of nuclear materials used for power generation. Those that currently are generating power from nuclear reactors also have expressed the desire to better manage the nuclear fuel cycle. Management of materials associated with the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., high- and low-level radioactive wastes) remains a persistent issue for many programs in East Asia. Safe management of materials at the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle is important for a variety of reasons. Many people view improper storage and disposal of nuclear materials as a safety problem; further, controlled storage is a major component of reducing the risk of improper diversion of radiological materials. International protocols require the ability to track and confirm the status of nuclear materials for assurances that agreements are being respected. In addition to civilian nuclear-power programs, more than 60 research reactors currently operate in eleven East Asian countries. Many of these used highly enriched uranium as fuel, which can pose a separate and additional risk for proliferation of materials useful for weapons of mass destruction.

Unfortunately, management systems and practices for radioactive wastes are generally not developed as fully as the power generation systems and capabilities. There exist many university and other higher-education programs in nuclear engineering, however, these generally focus on the technical aspects of reactors and materials management, such as the study of the characteristics of nuclear waste from nuclear power plants and research into treatment and disposal of radioactive wastes. With growing amounts of radioactive materials likely to accumulate in the region, it is imperative that countries generating such materials have the human and institutional capacities and infrastructure for appropriately managing them. Thus, the need exists for the establishment of additional facilities and courses of instruction so that these skills can be developed. One solution to the need for building capacity is to establish a Radioactive Waste Management Center of Excellence (RWM-CoE) that will serve as a facility for training and building of human-resource capacity and infrastructure. Given the similar nature of the needs for these sorts of disciplines in East Asia, a regional RWM-CoE could serve many entities that require development of the same areas of expertise. A regional RWM-CoE will help develop consistent management and operational practices and responses to off-normal situations that will benefit all the nuclear programs in East Asia. Specifically, the goal of the CoE would be

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to build regional capacity in all aspects of radioactive waste management, including safety, security, and safeguards, and waste-management practices associated with handling, transporting, storing, and disposing radioactive materials.

An RWM-CoE would address the management needs for various radioactive wastes arising from nuclear power generation, as well as other potential sources of low- and intermediate-level wastes (LILW). The RWM-CoE would bolster indigenous capacities for safe and secure disposition of radioactive wastes, provide opportunity to consolidate waste in the interest of combating WMD proliferation and terrorism, build human resource capacities to aid in future nuclear energy development and deployment, promote technical cooperation among countries in the region, facilitate regional cooperation and confidence building, and is consistent with objectives of the United States’ Next Generation Safeguards Initiative.

**Concepts Behind an RWM-CoE**

A starting point for defining the scope of an RWM-CoE is to identify the Needs, the Critical System Requirements, and the Major Functional Areas of radioactive waste management. A self-evident statement of the needs of a radioactive waste management system is to ensure that all parties have confidence in the ability of the RWM system to perform its mission with minimal risk to the environment or populations. The CoE mission must be to ensure that RWM personnel understand that the components of any radwaste management system must perform properly during normal conditions, as well as during all foreseeable off-normal states. Ongoing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage and disposal programs (such as the DOE’s Yucca Mountain Project and WIPP) have established formalisms for evaluating the safety to workers and the general public of designs and operations of radwaste and SNF-management activities; these formalisms should be a component of a CoE curriculum.

Other needs of a radwaste management system that should be addressed by a CoE are to ensure that the operations of the system do not increase the risk that the theft or misuse of stored radwaste is used as a constituent for nuclear threats. This need implies the development of systems-analysis and operations-engineering disciplines so that potential customers of a radwaste management system have seamless operations for packaging, transport, and storage of nuclear materials. These same systems- and operations-engineering disciplines can also aid in making management services economically attractive to potential customers, governments, and taxpayers. Lastly, the CoE’s overall emphasis can be to make system be acceptable to a broad range of interested parties, including national governments, regulators, international agencies, and interveners. This includes developing sensitivities to governmental policies and public sentiment, and presenting the radwaste management concepts in a way that encourages general agreement and understanding among affected parties.

A CoE can assist in developing the full spectrum of critical system requirements. In addition to the technical requirements dealing with radwaste management and operations, addressing issues of concern to regulators, interveners, and international overseers are important. Examples of the latter requirements include assurances that all phases of operations are safe, secure, and transparent; preparation of comprehensive threat assessments covering both accidental and intentional off-normal situations; assurances
that any storage system or radwaste management system is environmentally sound; and
availability of information on the entire radwaste management facilities and operational
history in readily analyzable form.

The major functional areas of a radwaste management system encompass characterization,
packaging, transportation, storage, monitoring, reporting, technical lifetime and health
analyses, disposal, and facility decommissioning. Although some of these topics are part of
university nuclear, civil, and environmental engineering curricula, a CoE could focus on the
direct application to issues specifically associated with the back end of the nuclear fuel
cycle. Beyond the technical factors listed above, the human-resources and social
capabilities are what distinguish the CoE from typical university engineering curricula. As
has been emphasized before, the CoE would structure the information to not only cover
technical aspects, but also to include consideration of those areas that are needed to satisfy
regulators, governmental officials and the public. A few examples of the unique concepts
that the CoE could address include

- **Legal and regulatory sensitivities**
  Because things nuclear can be politically contentious, success in the field requires
  sensitivity to issues beyond those strictly technical. These include ways to reassure the
  public and address their concerns about the safety of radwaste management. The needs
  of governmental and regulatory officials to ensure that infrastructure and management
  systems are in place must also be addressed. The CoE can help develop an attitude and
  view of proponents and workers dealing with radwaste management that
  recognizes the differing opinions and aids communication that can lead to
  agreement and progress.

- **Facility operations**
  Facility operations include receipt of radwaste shipments, inspections, identification
  systems and procedures for storage casks, transfers of material within the facility,
  periodic inspections and evaluations of stored materials, plans for response to off-
  normal events, and processes for repatriation of stored material at the conclusion of
  the terms of storage. This requires the CoE to incorporate operations training into
  the curriculum.

- **Tracking and security of radwaste movements**
  During transit from originating sites to a radwaste storage facility, all interested
  parties (e.g., radwaste owners, governmental entities in jurisdictions through which
  the material is passing, international bodies such as the IAEA, and non-
  governmental groups) must be able to observe the location, the physical condition,
  and the security status of the material. This requires the development and
  understanding of sensors, remote reporting of information, and response tactics as
  part of a CoE curriculum.

- **Monitoring and performance assessments**
  All phases of radwaste management systems must be transparently operated so that
  interested parties, such as the owners of the material, regulators, international
  agencies, and interested non-governmental organizations can inspect and analyze
  the operations on their own schedules. Secondly, performance assessments,
wherein the future behavior of the storage systems is modeled, are necessary to provide confidence in the longer-term safety of the systems. Probabilistic Risk Assessments and Performance Assessments are two examples of topics that should be covered as part of the CoE program.

- **Materials lifetime and degradation studies**
  The condition of the physical storage facilities during the period of storage is an important factor in assuring the safety of the storage system. These components include the radwaste, containers, and the storage infrastructure. Degradation of the material contained in casks could result in changes in the thermal, criticality, mechanical, or other properties of the stored material. Such changes could cause problems either during storage or during any transportation activities. Periodic tests of the condition of casks and contained material will help with estimates of storage-system behavior. The CoE should include materials-science studies related to degradation and lifetime-affecting processes as part of the curriculum.

- **Compendium of above items to form a management-systems Knowledge Base**
  A Knowledge Base can have great utility in providing information to all interested parties in a transparent and current fashion. It could have two primary functions: to describe the implementation of radwaste management systems, and to contain information about the ongoing operations, contents, and regulatory environment of the systems. The Knowledge Base can contain information on the design, operation, and technologies used in the management of radwaste. It will provide both descriptive information and results of the transparency, safeguards, non-proliferation, and monitoring capabilities of the systems. It will contain information on the techniques and results of tests on the physical condition of the stored materials. The Knowledge Base will also contain the results of performance assessments, probabilistic risk assessments, and projections of the technical condition of the materials at the end of their storage times. Development and implementation of a radwaste Knowledge Base is one of the most important capabilities of an RWM-CoE.

**Implementation of an RWM-CoE**

A well-designed CoE should consist of two parts: To provide hands-on experience for facility operators, the CoE could be established at an operating waste-disposal facility; this component would emphasize operational practices, including safety, security and transparency. The other component would be classroom-style education. The CoE could draw on the curricula that universities have developed for areas such as environmental, nonproliferation engineering, nuclear safety practices, and security culture. Any interested East Asian universities or other institutions that already have experience and expertise in waste-management matters could be asked to support other interested candidate institutions that have less experience.

The first step is to ascertain the amount and nature of the demand in East Asia for a broadening of the areas of study related to nuclear engineering, such as nuclear safety, security, and safeguards practices. This will clearly influence the decision to proceed, as well as the emphasis of the focus of the CoE. If a demand and a focus can be established, then a “package” can be prepared for potential CoE hosts to review. The package will set out the basic principles to
systematize, standardize and codify waste-management practices and the relationships between nuclear engineering and other related engineering practices. Any discussion with potential organizers of a CoE should emphasize that the Center must include the physical, engineering, and social sciences in its academic scope. The culture of excellence in nuclear programs is as much mental and social as it is technical. Another emphasis is on understanding the meaning and importance of safety rules (think Chernobyl and TMI as examples of operator error or indifference to the rules).

Starting the process by defining the needs of potential participants will focus the efforts of the CoE on the most relevant interests. This step can also help to identify the most engaged participants and perhaps a location for the CoE facility. A final partnership for a CoE could therefore include the US, East Asian entities with relevant competence, and the institution hosting the CoE.

Given that considerable amounts of radioactive wastes already exist in East Asia, many of the management practices for both LILW and other waste types can be coordinated. The capability of the CoE to address the non-technical issues peripheral to the actual radwaste-management operations allows it to encompass all types of radioactive materials.

**Potential Fields of Study for an RWM-CoE**

A persistent area of concern for East Asian radwaste management is the issue of interim storage for radioactive wastes. Some of the aspects of this problem include the following:

- Evaluating the relative merits of localized (i.e., at-reactor distributed) vs. centralized storage.
- All the aspects of implementation of a dry-storage facility — siting, design, licensing, operations, security, maintenance, decommissioning.
- Optimizing wet vs. dry storage practices and programs.
- Transportation of radioactive materials.
- Consideration and creation of a Knowledge Base (KB) to support monitoring and transparency of storage operations.

Expanding on these examples, a CoE could develop responses to issues that politicians, government leaders, regulators, international oversight bodies, radioactive-source generators, scientists, and concerned citizens are likely to raise. Thus, CoE graduates would be prepared to answer questions of regulators and politicians regarding topics such as how storage-site proponents would analyze potential accident resistance to events such as floods, earthquakes, tornado missiles, or temperature extremes. Further, a systematic preparation for regulators’ questions would include an emergency plan, security program, quality-assurance programs, radiation-protection, and other training programs. To properly evaluate a centralized radwaste storage facility, site-related and transportation questions should be anticipated by the CoE curriculum. Site characteristics ranging from the geology to nearby populations and/or civilian or military facilities should be included in any analysis of a potential site. Transportation issues such as passage near large population centers or industrial facilities, or transportation choke points are examples of preparation that the CoE should offer.

A Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a systematic process for examining how engineered systems and human interactions with these systems work together to ensure facility safety. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission employs Probabilistic Risk
Assessment as a method to satisfy their mandate that there is no undue risk to the health and safety of the public associated with the operation of nuclear power plants, or other facilities that it licenses. This process is quantitative, in that the probabilities of events with public-health consequences and the magnitudes of those potential health consequences are calculated. The risk of such events is the product of the event probabilities and their consequences. A PRA as an analytical tool includes consideration of the following:

- Identification and delineation of the combinations of events that, if they occur, could lead to an accident (or other undesired event);
- Estimation of the chance of occurrence for each combination; and
- Estimation of the consequences associated with each combination.

A Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA) is based on the creation of models for all the components, subsystems, and processes that can occur over time in a radwaste storage system. Scenarios that attempt to weight events by their probability of occurrence are used to describe the possible changes in the environment at the radwaste storage facility. The TSPA then uses computer simulations to model the processes occurring in the entire modeled system over time, and the responses of the components and physical configurations to normal and disruptive scenarios. By modeling numerous possible (and perhaps some very unlikely) scenarios, a predictive estimate of the most likely behavior of the system can be produced. Estimates of the consequences of low-probability scenarios can also be provided. Both a PRA and a TSPA are valuable tools that should be developed as part of a CoE curriculum.

Creation of a radwaste management Knowledge Base should be a key effort of a CoE. As the KB develops, it will provide a history of and guidance to the analyses and decisions made. It will also document the best practices developed, and provide a record of monitoring, inspections, incidents and responses during management and operations of the systems. The goal is to provide access, through the KB, to information showing that the critical system requirements have been met, that the major functions and technologies have been implemented, and that the operations are conforming to the needs of the interested parties.

**Summary**

In this paper we have discussed prospects for establishing a regional RWM-CoE, including methods for identifying potential host institutions and partners. Given the depth of technical capability at East Asian centers of higher education, the emphasis of the CoE should be on those aspects of radwaste management peripheral to the core technical knowledge, but vitally important to creating a culture and impression of sensitivity to all aspects of nuclear safety and security. These steps include creating a security culture, developing contingency plans for off-normal events, understanding the importance of risk and other predictive analyses, and creating a compendium of the history and best practices involved in radwaste management.

All these techniques will be useful ways to reassure the public and address their concerns about the safety of radioactive-waste management. The needs of governmental and regulatory officials to ensure that infrastructure and management systems are in place will also be addressed.